Andrés Luco
Biographic Data
| ID | 5129350 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Andrés Luco |
| GIVEN NAMES | Andrés |
| FAMILY NAME | Luco |
| SIGNATURE | LUCO A |
| AFFILIATIONS | Nanyang Technological University |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-7270-0346 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 3 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 1 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 3 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2014 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2016 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Non-negotiable
The Definition of Morality
This essay proposes and defends a descriptive definition of morality.Under this definition, a moral system is a system of rules, psychological states,and modes of character development which performs the function of enabling mutually beneficial social cooperation.I shall argue that the methodologies employed by two prominent moral psychologists rely upon to establish a descriptive definition of morality only serve to track patterns in people’s us…
Normative reasons and the possibility of motivation
This article defends a claim about the conditions under which agents possess normative reasons for action. According to this claim, an agent has a normative reason to φ only if it's psychologically possible for that reason to motivate the agent to φ. The claim is called ‘Williams's explanatory constraint’, since it's drawn from Bernard Williams's work on the topic of practical reason. A two-premise ‘master argument’ for Williams's explanatory con…
The Definition of Morality
This essay proposes and defends a descriptive definition of morality.Under this definition, a moral system is a system of rules, psychological states,and modes of character development which performs the function of enabling mutually beneficial social cooperation.I shall argue that the methodologies employed by two prominent moral psychologists rely upon to establish a descriptive definition of morality only serve to track patterns in people’s us…
Normative reasons and the possibility of motivation
This article defends a claim about the conditions under which agents possess normative reasons for action. According to this claim, an agent has a normative reason to φ only if it's psychologically possible for that reason to motivate the agent to φ. The claim is called ‘Williams's explanatory constraint’, since it's drawn from Bernard Williams's work on the topic of practical reason. A two-premise ‘master argument’ for Williams's explanatory con…
Non-negotiable
Epistemology (3 works) · Free Will and Agency (2 works) · Morality (2 works) · Normative (2 works) · Philosophical Ethics and Theory (2 works) · Philosophy (2 works) · Action (physics (1 work) · Applied philosophy (1 work) · Categorical imperative (1 work) · Environmental ethics (1 work)