Eric Entrican Wilson
Biographic Data
| ID | 5130945 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Eric Entrican Wilson |
| GIVEN NAMES | Eric Entrican |
| FAMILY NAME | Wilson |
| SIGNATURE | WILSON E E |
| AFFILIATIONS | Georgia State University |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 6 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 1 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 6 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2013 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Hutcheson and the Stoics on Emotion Regulation
This paper is about Hutcheson's account of governing the passions (‘emotion regulation’). In it, I argue against interpreting Hutcheson's theory as a form of Stoicism. The influence of certain Stoics on his thought makes this interpretation tempting, but the temptation should be resisted. By examining several core details of Hutcheson's theory, we can see that his account of emotion regulation is substantively different from the Stoics’
Habitual Desire
Tamar Schapiro has offered an important new ‘Kantian’ account of inclination and motivation, one that expands and refines Christine Korsgaard’s view. In this article I argue that Kant’s own view differs significantly from Schapiro’s. Above all, Kant thinks of inclinations as dispositions, not occurrent desires; and he does not believe that they stem directly from a non-rational source, as she argues. Schapiro’s ‘Kantian’ view rests on a much shar…
Kant and the Selfish Hypothesis
Kant’S Moral Philosophy
Self‐Legislation and Self‐Command in Kant's Ethics
In his later writings, Kant distinguishes between autonomy and self‐mastery or self‐command. My article explains the relation between these two ideas, both of which are integral to his understanding of moral agency and the pursuit of virtue. I point to problems with other interpretations of this relation and offer an alternative. On my view, self‐command is a condition or state achieved by those agents who become proficient at solving problems pr…
Kant on Autonomy and the Value of Persons
This essay seeks to contribute to current debates about value in Kant's ethics. Its main objective is to dislodge the widely shared intuition that his view of autonomy requires constructivism or some other alternative to moral realism. I argue the following. Kant seems to think that the value of persons is due to their very nature, not to what anyone decides is the case (however rational or pure those decisions may be). He also seems to think tha…
Self‐Legislation and Self‐Command in Kant's Ethics
In his later writings, Kant distinguishes between autonomy and self‐mastery or self‐command. My article explains the relation between these two ideas, both of which are integral to his understanding of moral agency and the pursuit of virtue. I point to problems with other interpretations of this relation and offer an alternative. On my view, self‐command is a condition or state achieved by those agents who become proficient at solving problems pr…
Kant on Autonomy and the Value of Persons
This essay seeks to contribute to current debates about value in Kant's ethics. Its main objective is to dislodge the widely shared intuition that his view of autonomy requires constructivism or some other alternative to moral realism. I argue the following. Kant seems to think that the value of persons is due to their very nature, not to what anyone decides is the case (however rational or pure those decisions may be). He also seems to think tha…
Kant and the Selfish Hypothesis
Kant’S Moral Philosophy
Self‐Legislation and Self‐Command in Kant's Ethics
In his later writings, Kant distinguishes between autonomy and self‐mastery or self‐command. My article explains the relation between these two ideas, both of which are integral to his understanding of moral agency and the pursuit of virtue. I point to problems with other interpretations of this relation and offer an alternative. On my view, self‐command is a condition or state achieved by those agents who become proficient at solving problems pr…
Habitual Desire
Tamar Schapiro has offered an important new ‘Kantian’ account of inclination and motivation, one that expands and refines Christine Korsgaard’s view. In this article I argue that Kant’s own view differs significantly from Schapiro’s. Above all, Kant thinks of inclinations as dispositions, not occurrent desires; and he does not believe that they stem directly from a non-rational source, as she argues. Schapiro’s ‘Kantian’ view rests on a much shar…
Hutcheson and the Stoics on Emotion Regulation
This paper is about Hutcheson's account of governing the passions (‘emotion regulation’). In it, I argue against interpreting Hutcheson's theory as a form of Stoicism. The influence of certain Stoics on his thought makes this interpretation tempting, but the temptation should be resisted. By examining several core details of Hutcheson's theory, we can see that his account of emotion regulation is substantively different from the Stoics’
Philosophical Ethics and Theory (6 works) · Epistemology (5 works) · Philosophy (4 works) · War, Ethics, and Justification (3 works) · Autonomy (2 works) · Passions (2 works) · Political science (2 works) · Agency (philosophy (1 work) · Applied philosophy (1 work) · Computer Science (1 work)