Richard Scheer
Biographic Data
| ID | 5132548 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Richard Scheer |
| GIVEN NAMES | Richard |
| FAMILY NAME | Scheer |
| SIGNATURE | SCHEER R |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Missouri |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 4 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 1 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 4 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1966 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2004 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
The ‘Mental State’ Theory of Intentions
This theory regards intentions as mental states, e.g., attitudes, which, typically, have causal power. But we do not speak of our intentions as having such powers. Instead, we speak of a person's resolve, determination, or his anxiety, eagerness, and so forth, as the ‘powers’ that move us. Of course, one desires for various reasons to carry out his various intentions but that desire is not a component of the intentions. An intention is, roughly, …
Intentions, Motives, and Causation
I criticize the ‘Humean’ view of reasons for actions, the view that the reasons for an action can be stated in terms of desires and beliefs. I point out that this view must ignore concepts which are central to our understanding of human actions, namely, intention, motivation and associated concepts such as decision. One can then see just how inadequate the Humean view is
Predictions of Events
Predictions of Events Get access Richard K. Scheer Richard K. Scheer University of Missouri Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 17, Issue 68, July 1967, Pages 257–261, https://doi.org/10.2307/2218161 Published: 01 July 1967
Fundamentals of Logic
Intentions, Motives, and Causation
I criticize the ‘Humean’ view of reasons for actions, the view that the reasons for an action can be stated in terms of desires and beliefs. I point out that this view must ignore concepts which are central to our understanding of human actions, namely, intention, motivation and associated concepts such as decision. One can then see just how inadequate the Humean view is
Fundamentals of Logic
Predictions of Events
Predictions of Events Get access Richard K. Scheer Richard K. Scheer University of Missouri Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 17, Issue 68, July 1967, Pages 257–261, https://doi.org/10.2307/2218161 Published: 01 July 1967
Intentions, Motives, and Causation
I criticize the ‘Humean’ view of reasons for actions, the view that the reasons for an action can be stated in terms of desires and beliefs. I point out that this view must ignore concepts which are central to our understanding of human actions, namely, intention, motivation and associated concepts such as decision. One can then see just how inadequate the Humean view is
The ‘Mental State’ Theory of Intentions
This theory regards intentions as mental states, e.g., attitudes, which, typically, have causal power. But we do not speak of our intentions as having such powers. Instead, we speak of a person's resolve, determination, or his anxiety, eagerness, and so forth, as the ‘powers’ that move us. Of course, one desires for various reasons to carry out his various intentions but that desire is not a component of the intentions. An intention is, roughly, …
Computer Science (3 works) · Action (physics (2 works) · Epistemology (2 works) · Philosophical Ethics and Theory (2 works) · Philosophy (2 works) · Psychology (2 works) · Advanced Algebra and Logic (1 work) · Anxiety (1 work) · Causation (1 work) · Cognitive psychology (1 work)