Tim Jankowiak
Biographic Data
| ID | 5132820 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Tim Jankowiak |
| GIVEN NAMES | Tim |
| FAMILY NAME | Jankowiak |
| SIGNATURE | JANKOWIAK T |
| AFFILIATIONS | Southern Utah University |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-3459-4591 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 5 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 5 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 5 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2013 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Kant, Intentional Laser Beams, and the Mismatch Argument for a Phenomenalist Reading
This paper aims to reconsider the relation between two opposed classes of interpretation of Kant’s idealism: (1) metaphysical two-aspect readings and (2) intentional object phenomenalist readings. Two major claims are advanced: first, I show that the difference between these views is far less drastic than many of their proponents (on both sides) make it seem; second, I argue that the phenomenalist option is nevertheless to be preferred because it…
‘Ordered and Placed in a Certain Form’: Kant on the Spatiality of Sensation
Kant claims repeatedly that experience involves sensations being ‘ordered and placed’ in space. This paper considers what this surprising claim could possibly mean. After presenting the relevant textual evidence and rejecting two candidate interpretations of it, I defend a qualia or ‘mental paint’ interpretation, according to which experience involves a direct, conscious ‘acquaintance’ with sensations arrayed in a ‘phenomenal space.’ This interpr…
Kantian Phenomenalism Without Berkeleyan Idealism
Phenomenalist interpretations of Kant are out of fashion. The most common complaint from anti-phenomenalist critics is that a phenomenalist reading of Kant would collapse Kantian idealism into Berkeleyan idealism. This would be unacceptable because Berkeleyan idealism is incompatible with core elements of Kant’s empirical realism. In this paper, I argue that not all phenomenalist readings threaten empirical realism. First, I distinguish several v…
Sensations as Representations in Kant
This paper defends an interpretation of the representational function of sensation in Kant's theory of empirical cognition. Against those who argue that sensations are ‘subjective representations’ and hence can only represent the sensory state of the subject, I argue that Kant appeals to different notions of subjectivity, and that the subjectivity of sensations is consistent with sensations representing external, spatial objects. Against those wh…
Kant's Argument for the Principle of Intensive Magnitudes
In the first Critique, Kant attempts to prove what we can call the ‘principle of intensive magnitudes’, according to which every possible object of experience will possess a determinate ‘degree’ of reality. Curiously, Kant argues for this principle by inferring from a psychological premise about internal sensations (they have intensive magnitudes) to a metaphysical thesis about external objects (they also have intensive magnitudes). Most commenta…
Sensations as Representations in Kant
This paper defends an interpretation of the representational function of sensation in Kant's theory of empirical cognition. Against those who argue that sensations are ‘subjective representations’ and hence can only represent the sensory state of the subject, I argue that Kant appeals to different notions of subjectivity, and that the subjectivity of sensations is consistent with sensations representing external, spatial objects. Against those wh…
Kant's Argument for the Principle of Intensive Magnitudes
In the first Critique, Kant attempts to prove what we can call the ‘principle of intensive magnitudes’, according to which every possible object of experience will possess a determinate ‘degree’ of reality. Curiously, Kant argues for this principle by inferring from a psychological premise about internal sensations (they have intensive magnitudes) to a metaphysical thesis about external objects (they also have intensive magnitudes). Most commenta…
Sensations as Representations in Kant
This paper defends an interpretation of the representational function of sensation in Kant's theory of empirical cognition. Against those who argue that sensations are ‘subjective representations’ and hence can only represent the sensory state of the subject, I argue that Kant appeals to different notions of subjectivity, and that the subjectivity of sensations is consistent with sensations representing external, spatial objects. Against those wh…
Kantian Phenomenalism Without Berkeleyan Idealism
Phenomenalist interpretations of Kant are out of fashion. The most common complaint from anti-phenomenalist critics is that a phenomenalist reading of Kant would collapse Kantian idealism into Berkeleyan idealism. This would be unacceptable because Berkeleyan idealism is incompatible with core elements of Kant’s empirical realism. In this paper, I argue that not all phenomenalist readings threaten empirical realism. First, I distinguish several v…
‘Ordered and Placed in a Certain Form’: Kant on the Spatiality of Sensation
Kant claims repeatedly that experience involves sensations being ‘ordered and placed’ in space. This paper considers what this surprising claim could possibly mean. After presenting the relevant textual evidence and rejecting two candidate interpretations of it, I defend a qualia or ‘mental paint’ interpretation, according to which experience involves a direct, conscious ‘acquaintance’ with sensations arrayed in a ‘phenomenal space.’ This interpr…
Kant, Intentional Laser Beams, and the Mismatch Argument for a Phenomenalist Reading
This paper aims to reconsider the relation between two opposed classes of interpretation of Kant’s idealism: (1) metaphysical two-aspect readings and (2) intentional object phenomenalist readings. Two major claims are advanced: first, I show that the difference between these views is far less drastic than many of their proponents (on both sides) make it seem; second, I argue that the phenomenalist option is nevertheless to be preferred because it…
Philosophical Ethics and Theory (5 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (5 works) · Epistemology (4 works) · Metaphysics (4 works) · Intuition (3 works) · Philosophy (3 works) · Cognitive psychology (2 works) · Historical Philosophy and Science (2 works) · Intentionality (2 works) · Perception (2 works)