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Stan Husi

Biographic Data

ID5140306
NAMEStan Husi
GIVEN NAMESStan
FAMILY NAMEHusi
SIGNATUREHUSI S
AFFILIATIONSUniversity of Wisconsin–Milwaukee
ORCID0000-0003-4256-662X
VERIFIEDYes
TOTAL WORKS2
TOTAL CITATIONS1
AUTHOR COUNT2
EDITOR COUNT0
FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR2011
LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR2017
H-INDEX1
  • Why We (Almost Certainly) are Not Moral Equals

    Open Access•Stan Husi•ARTICLE•The Journal of Ethics•2017

  • Why Reasons Skepticism is Not Self‐Defeating

    Open Access•Stan Husi•ARTICLE•European Journal of Philosophy•2011•Cited by: 1•References: 18

    Radical meta‐normative skepticism is the view that no standard, norm, or principle has objective authority or normative force. It does not deny that there are norms, standards of correctness, and principles of various kinds that render it possible that we succeed or fail in measuring up to their prerogatives. Rather, it denies that any norm has the status of commanding with objective authority, of giving rise to normative reasons to take seriousl…

  • Why Reasons Skepticism is Not Self‐Defeating

    Open Access•Stan Husi•ARTICLE•European Journal of Philosophy•2011•Cited by: 1•References: 18

    Radical meta‐normative skepticism is the view that no standard, norm, or principle has objective authority or normative force. It does not deny that there are norms, standards of correctness, and principles of various kinds that render it possible that we succeed or fail in measuring up to their prerogatives. Rather, it denies that any norm has the status of commanding with objective authority, of giving rise to normative reasons to take seriousl…

  • Why Reasons Skepticism is Not Self‐Defeating

    Open Access•Stan Husi•ARTICLE•European Journal of Philosophy•2011•Cited by: 1•References: 18

    Radical meta‐normative skepticism is the view that no standard, norm, or principle has objective authority or normative force. It does not deny that there are norms, standards of correctness, and principles of various kinds that render it possible that we succeed or fail in measuring up to their prerogatives. Rather, it denies that any norm has the status of commanding with objective authority, of giving rise to normative reasons to take seriousl…

  • Why We (Almost Certainly) are Not Moral Equals

    Open Access•Stan Husi•ARTICLE•The Journal of Ethics•2017

Epistemology (2 works) · Philosophical Ethics and Theory (2 works) · Political Philosophy and Ethics (2 works) · Political science (2 works) · Politics (2 works) · Deliberation (1 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (1 works) · Faith (1 works) · Hannah Arendt's Political Philosophy (1 works) · Law (1 works)

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