Ursula Coope
Biographic Data
| ID | 5140625 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Ursula Coope |
| GIVEN NAMES | Ursula |
| FAMILY NAME | Coope |
| SIGNATURE | COOPE U |
| AFFILIATIONS | Corpus Christi CollegeMerton Street, Oxford OX1 4FJUK |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 7 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 12 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 6 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 1 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2001 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2021 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Ancient Ethics and the Natural World
Freedom and Responsibility in Neoplatonist Thought
"The Neoplatonists have a perfectionist view of freedom: an entity is free to the extent that it succeeds in making itself good. Free entities are wholly in control of themselves-they are self-determining, self-constituting, and self-knowing. Neoplatonist philosophers argue that such freedom is only possible for non-bodily things. The human soul is free insofar as it rises above bodily things and engages in intellection, but when it turns its des…
Why does Aristotle Think that Ethical Virtue is Required for Practical Wisdom
In this paper, I ask why Aristotle thinks that ethical virtue (rather than mere self-control) is required for practical wisdom. I argue that a satisfactory answer will need to explain why being prone to bad appetites implies a failing of the rational part of the soul. I go on to claim that the self-controlled person does suffer from such a rational failing: a failure to take a specifically rational kind of pleasure in fine action. However, this s…
I—Ursula Coope: Aristotle on Action
Journal Article I—Ursula Coope: Aristotle on Action Get access Ursula Coope Ursula Coope Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, Volume 81, Issue 1, 1 June 2007, Pages 109–138, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8349.2007.00153.x Published: 11 August 2015
Time for Aristotle: Physics IV. 10-14
This book is about Aristotle’s account of time in Physics IV.10-14. Aristotle claims that time is not a kind of change, but that it is something dependent on change. He defines it as a kind of ‘number of change’ with respect to the before and after. It is argued that this means that time is a kind of order (not, as is commonly supposed, that it is a kind of measure). It is a universal order within which all changes are related to each other. This…
Colloquium 5: Aristotle’s Account of Agency in Physics III 3
Why Does Aristotle say that there is No Time Without Change?
Why does Aristotle Think that Ethical Virtue is Required for Practical Wisdom
In this paper, I ask why Aristotle thinks that ethical virtue (rather than mere self-control) is required for practical wisdom. I argue that a satisfactory answer will need to explain why being prone to bad appetites implies a failing of the rational part of the soul. I go on to claim that the self-controlled person does suffer from such a rational failing: a failure to take a specifically rational kind of pleasure in fine action. However, this s…
Why Does Aristotle say that there is No Time Without Change?
Time for Aristotle: Physics IV. 10-14
This book is about Aristotle’s account of time in Physics IV.10-14. Aristotle claims that time is not a kind of change, but that it is something dependent on change. He defines it as a kind of ‘number of change’ with respect to the before and after. It is argued that this means that time is a kind of order (not, as is commonly supposed, that it is a kind of measure). It is a universal order within which all changes are related to each other. This…
Colloquium 5: Aristotle’s Account of Agency in Physics III 3
I—Ursula Coope: Aristotle on Action
Journal Article I—Ursula Coope: Aristotle on Action Get access Ursula Coope Ursula Coope Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, Volume 81, Issue 1, 1 June 2007, Pages 109–138, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8349.2007.00153.x Published: 11 August 2015
Why does Aristotle Think that Ethical Virtue is Required for Practical Wisdom
In this paper, I ask why Aristotle thinks that ethical virtue (rather than mere self-control) is required for practical wisdom. I argue that a satisfactory answer will need to explain why being prone to bad appetites implies a failing of the rational part of the soul. I go on to claim that the self-controlled person does suffer from such a rational failing: a failure to take a specifically rational kind of pleasure in fine action. However, this s…
Freedom and Responsibility in Neoplatonist Thought
"The Neoplatonists have a perfectionist view of freedom: an entity is free to the extent that it succeeds in making itself good. Free entities are wholly in control of themselves-they are self-determining, self-constituting, and self-knowing. Neoplatonist philosophers argue that such freedom is only possible for non-bodily things. The human soul is free insofar as it rises above bodily things and engages in intellection, but when it turns its des…
Ancient Ethics and the Natural World
Classical Philosophy and Thought (6 works) · Epistemology (6 works) · Philosophy (6 works) · Philosophy (3 works) · Action (physics) (2 works) · Ancient philosophy (2 works) · Computer Science (2 works) · Free Will and Agency (2 works) · History (2 works) · Mathematics (2 works)