Elizabeth Tropman
Biographic Data
| ID | 5145995 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Elizabeth Tropman |
| GIVEN NAMES | Elizabeth |
| FAMILY NAME | Tropman |
| SIGNATURE | TROPMAN E |
| AFFILIATIONS | Colorado State University |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-6293-9895 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 5 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 0 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 5 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2009 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2022 |
| H-INDEX | 0 |
How to be an aesthetic realist
This paper develops a form of realism about aesthetics that is stronger than typical versions of aesthetic realism. As I conceive of it, aesthetic realism is the view that there are some response‐independent aesthetic facts. This kind of realism is unpopular in aesthetics and is often viewed as a non‐starter. Against this pessimism, I argue that the prospects for this realist approach are more favorable than commonly supposed. I offer some reason…
Why Cornell Moral Realism Cannot Provide an Adequate Account of Moral Knowledge
According to C ornell moral realists, we can know about moral facts in much the same way that we do the empirical facts of the natural sciences. In “ C an C ornell M oral R ealism A dequately A ccount for M oral K nowledge?” (2012), I argue that this positive comparison to scientific knowledge hurts, rather than helps, the moral realist position. J oseph L ong has recently defended C ornell moral realism against my concerns. In this article, I re…
Varieties of Moral Intuitionism
Can Cornell Moral Realism Adequately Account for Moral Knowledge
This article raises a problem for Cornell varieties of moral realism. According to Cornell moral realists, we can know about moral facts just as we do the empirical facts of the natural sciences. If this is so, it would remove any special mystery that is supposed to attach to our knowledge of objective moral facts. After clarifying the ways in which moral knowledge is to be similar to scientific knowledge, I claim that the analogy fails, but for …
Intuitionism and the Secondary-Quality Analogy in Ethics
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Intuitionism and the Secondary-Quality Analogy in Ethics
Can Cornell Moral Realism Adequately Account for Moral Knowledge
This article raises a problem for Cornell varieties of moral realism. According to Cornell moral realists, we can know about moral facts just as we do the empirical facts of the natural sciences. If this is so, it would remove any special mystery that is supposed to attach to our knowledge of objective moral facts. After clarifying the ways in which moral knowledge is to be similar to scientific knowledge, I claim that the analogy fails, but for …
Why Cornell Moral Realism Cannot Provide an Adequate Account of Moral Knowledge
According to C ornell moral realists, we can know about moral facts in much the same way that we do the empirical facts of the natural sciences. In “ C an C ornell M oral R ealism A dequately A ccount for M oral K nowledge?” (2012), I argue that this positive comparison to scientific knowledge hurts, rather than helps, the moral realist position. J oseph L ong has recently defended C ornell moral realism against my concerns. In this article, I re…
Varieties of Moral Intuitionism
How to be an aesthetic realist
This paper develops a form of realism about aesthetics that is stronger than typical versions of aesthetic realism. As I conceive of it, aesthetic realism is the view that there are some response‐independent aesthetic facts. This kind of realism is unpopular in aesthetics and is often viewed as a non‐starter. Against this pessimism, I argue that the prospects for this realist approach are more favorable than commonly supposed. I offer some reason…
Epistemology (5 works) · Philosophy (5 works) · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment (4 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (3 works) · Realism (3 works) · Sociology (3 works) · Analogy (2 works) · Intuitionism (2 works) · Moral disengagement (2 works) · Moral psychology (2 works)