Stathis Psillos
Biographic Data
| ID | 5213876 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Stathis Psillos |
| GIVEN NAMES | Stathis |
| FAMILY NAME | Psillos |
| SIGNATURE | PSILLOS S |
| AFFILIATIONS | National and Kapodistrian University of Athens |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 22 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 112 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 22 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1994 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2017 |
| H-INDEX | 7 |
Scientific realism: Quo vadis? Introduction: new thinking about scientific realism
Counterfactual Reasoning, Qualitative: Philosophical Aspects
Living with the abstract: Realism and models
On Reichenbach’s argument for scientific realism
Choosing the realist framework
Scientific Realism: Between Platonism and Nominalism
In this paper, I discuss the prospects of nominalistic scientific realism (NSR) and show that it fails on many counts. In section 2, I discuss what is required for NSR to get off the ground. In section 3, I question the idea that theories have well-defined nominalistic content and the idea that causal activity is a necessary condition for commitment to the reality of an entity. In section 4, I challenge the notion of nominalistic adequacy of theo…
Causal Pluralism
Grasping At Realist Straws
The Routledge Companion To Philosophy Of Science
The Structure, the Whole Structure, and Nothing but the Structure
This paper is structured around the three elements of the title. Section 2 claims that (a) structures need objects and (b) scientific structuralism should focus on in re structures. Therefore, pure structuralism is undermined. Section 3 discusses whether the world has ‘excess structure’ over the structure of appearances. The main point is that the claim that only structure can be known is false. Finally, Section 4 argues directly against ontic st…
Scientific Realism: How Science Tracks Truth
Scientific realism is the optimistic view that modern science is on the right track: that the world really is the way our best scientific theories describe it . In his book, Stathis Psillos gives us a detailed and comprehensive study which restores the intuitive plausibility of scientific realism. We see that throughout the twentieth century, scientific realism has been challenged by philosophical positions from all angles: from reductive empiric…
Tracking the Real: Through Thick and Thin
In this paper, I examine Azzouni's tracking requirement and its use as a normative constraint on theories about objects which we take as real. I focus on what he calls ‘thick epistemic access’ and argue that there is a logical–conceptual sense in which thick access to the real presupposes thin access to it. Then, I move on to advance an alternative—Sellarsian—way to ontic commitment and show that (a) it is better than Azzouni's, and (b) it can ac…
Causation and Explanation
Stathis Psillos divides his account into three sections: causation, laws of nature, and explanation. He begins the causation section with Hume's classic "reductive" account and then focuses on the subsequent division between Humean and non-Humean accounts, examining topics such as regularities and singular causation, causation and counterfactuals, and causation and mechanism
Causation and Explanation
What is the nature of causation? How is causation linked with explanation? Can there be an adequate theory of explanation? These questions and many others are addressed in this unified and rigorous examination of the philosophical problems surrounding causation, laws and explanation. Part 1 of the book explores Hume's views on causation, theories of singular causation, and counterfactual and mechanistic approaches. Part 2 considers the regularity…
Relativism and Reality: A Contemporary Introduction
Our thoughts about the world are clearly influenced by such things as point of view, temperament, past experience and culture. However, some thinkers go much further and argue that everything that exists depends on us, arguing that 'even reality is relative'. Can we accept such a claim in the face of events such as floods and other natural disasters or events seemingly beyond our control? 'Realists' argue that reality is independent of out thinki…
Author’s response
Predictive Similarity and the Success of Science: A Reply to Stanford
P. Kyle Stanford (2000) attempts to offer a truth-linked explanation of the success of science which, he thinks, can be welcome to antirealists. He proposes an explanation of the success of a theory T 1 in terms of its predictive similarity to the true theory T of the relevant domain. After raising some qualms about the supposed antirealist credentials of Stanford's account, I examine his explanatory story in some detail and show that it fails to…
Is Structural Realism Possible
This paper examines in detail two paths that lead to Structural Realism (SR), viz. a substantive philosophical position which asserts that only the structure of the world is knowable. The upward path is any attempt to begin with empiricist premises and reach a sustainable realist position. (It has been advocated by Russell, Weyl, and Maxwell among others.) The downward path is any attempt to start from realist premises and construct a weaker real…
Rudolf Carnap's `Theoretical Concepts in Science
Naturalism without truth
Scientific Realism and the ‘Pessimistic Induction’
Over the last two decades, the debate over scientific realism has been dominated by two arguments that pull in contrary directions: the ‘no miracle’ argument and the ‘pessimistic induction’. The latter suggests that the historical record destroys the realist’s belief in an explanatory connection between truthlikeness and genuine empirical success. This paper analyzes the structure of the ‘pessimistic induction’, presents a move—the divide et impe…
A philosophical study of the transition from the caloric theory of heat to thermodynamics: Resisting the pessimistic meta-induction
Is Structural Realism Possible
This paper examines in detail two paths that lead to Structural Realism (SR), viz. a substantive philosophical position which asserts that only the structure of the world is knowable. The upward path is any attempt to begin with empiricist premises and reach a sustainable realist position. (It has been advocated by Russell, Weyl, and Maxwell among others.) The downward path is any attempt to start from realist premises and construct a weaker real…
A philosophical study of the transition from the caloric theory of heat to thermodynamics: Resisting the pessimistic meta-induction
Living with the abstract: Realism and models
The Structure, the Whole Structure, and Nothing but the Structure
This paper is structured around the three elements of the title. Section 2 claims that (a) structures need objects and (b) scientific structuralism should focus on in re structures. Therefore, pure structuralism is undermined. Section 3 discusses whether the world has ‘excess structure’ over the structure of appearances. The main point is that the claim that only structure can be known is false. Finally, Section 4 argues directly against ontic st…
Choosing the realist framework
Rudolf Carnap's `Theoretical Concepts in Science
Scientific Realism and the ‘Pessimistic Induction’
Over the last two decades, the debate over scientific realism has been dominated by two arguments that pull in contrary directions: the ‘no miracle’ argument and the ‘pessimistic induction’. The latter suggests that the historical record destroys the realist’s belief in an explanatory connection between truthlikeness and genuine empirical success. This paper analyzes the structure of the ‘pessimistic induction’, presents a move—the divide et impe…
On Reichenbach’s argument for scientific realism
Tracking the Real: Through Thick and Thin
In this paper, I examine Azzouni's tracking requirement and its use as a normative constraint on theories about objects which we take as real. I focus on what he calls ‘thick epistemic access’ and argue that there is a logical–conceptual sense in which thick access to the real presupposes thin access to it. Then, I move on to advance an alternative—Sellarsian—way to ontic commitment and show that (a) it is better than Azzouni's, and (b) it can ac…
Scientific Realism: Between Platonism and Nominalism
In this paper, I discuss the prospects of nominalistic scientific realism (NSR) and show that it fails on many counts. In section 2, I discuss what is required for NSR to get off the ground. In section 3, I question the idea that theories have well-defined nominalistic content and the idea that causal activity is a necessary condition for commitment to the reality of an entity. In section 4, I challenge the notion of nominalistic adequacy of theo…
Scientific realism: Quo vadis? Introduction: new thinking about scientific realism
A philosophical study of the transition from the caloric theory of heat to thermodynamics: Resisting the pessimistic meta-induction
Scientific Realism and the ‘Pessimistic Induction’
Over the last two decades, the debate over scientific realism has been dominated by two arguments that pull in contrary directions: the ‘no miracle’ argument and the ‘pessimistic induction’. The latter suggests that the historical record destroys the realist’s belief in an explanatory connection between truthlikeness and genuine empirical success. This paper analyzes the structure of the ‘pessimistic induction’, presents a move—the divide et impe…
Naturalism without truth
Rudolf Carnap's `Theoretical Concepts in Science
Author’s response
Predictive Similarity and the Success of Science: A Reply to Stanford
P. Kyle Stanford (2000) attempts to offer a truth-linked explanation of the success of science which, he thinks, can be welcome to antirealists. He proposes an explanation of the success of a theory T 1 in terms of its predictive similarity to the true theory T of the relevant domain. After raising some qualms about the supposed antirealist credentials of Stanford's account, I examine his explanatory story in some detail and show that it fails to…
Is Structural Realism Possible
This paper examines in detail two paths that lead to Structural Realism (SR), viz. a substantive philosophical position which asserts that only the structure of the world is knowable. The upward path is any attempt to begin with empiricist premises and reach a sustainable realist position. (It has been advocated by Russell, Weyl, and Maxwell among others.) The downward path is any attempt to start from realist premises and construct a weaker real…
Causation and Explanation
What is the nature of causation? How is causation linked with explanation? Can there be an adequate theory of explanation? These questions and many others are addressed in this unified and rigorous examination of the philosophical problems surrounding causation, laws and explanation. Part 1 of the book explores Hume's views on causation, theories of singular causation, and counterfactual and mechanistic approaches. Part 2 considers the regularity…
Relativism and Reality: A Contemporary Introduction
Our thoughts about the world are clearly influenced by such things as point of view, temperament, past experience and culture. However, some thinkers go much further and argue that everything that exists depends on us, arguing that 'even reality is relative'. Can we accept such a claim in the face of events such as floods and other natural disasters or events seemingly beyond our control? 'Realists' argue that reality is independent of out thinki…
Causation and Explanation
Stathis Psillos divides his account into three sections: causation, laws of nature, and explanation. He begins the causation section with Hume's classic "reductive" account and then focuses on the subsequent division between Humean and non-Humean accounts, examining topics such as regularities and singular causation, causation and counterfactuals, and causation and mechanism
Tracking the Real: Through Thick and Thin
In this paper, I examine Azzouni's tracking requirement and its use as a normative constraint on theories about objects which we take as real. I focus on what he calls ‘thick epistemic access’ and argue that there is a logical–conceptual sense in which thick access to the real presupposes thin access to it. Then, I move on to advance an alternative—Sellarsian—way to ontic commitment and show that (a) it is better than Azzouni's, and (b) it can ac…
Scientific Realism: How Science Tracks Truth
Scientific realism is the optimistic view that modern science is on the right track: that the world really is the way our best scientific theories describe it . In his book, Stathis Psillos gives us a detailed and comprehensive study which restores the intuitive plausibility of scientific realism. We see that throughout the twentieth century, scientific realism has been challenged by philosophical positions from all angles: from reductive empiric…
The Structure, the Whole Structure, and Nothing but the Structure
This paper is structured around the three elements of the title. Section 2 claims that (a) structures need objects and (b) scientific structuralism should focus on in re structures. Therefore, pure structuralism is undermined. Section 3 discusses whether the world has ‘excess structure’ over the structure of appearances. The main point is that the claim that only structure can be known is false. Finally, Section 4 argues directly against ontic st…
The Routledge Companion To Philosophy Of Science
Causal Pluralism
Grasping At Realist Straws
Scientific Realism: Between Platonism and Nominalism
In this paper, I discuss the prospects of nominalistic scientific realism (NSR) and show that it fails on many counts. In section 2, I discuss what is required for NSR to get off the ground. In section 3, I question the idea that theories have well-defined nominalistic content and the idea that causal activity is a necessary condition for commitment to the reality of an entity. In section 4, I challenge the notion of nominalistic adequacy of theo…
Living with the abstract: Realism and models
On Reichenbach’s argument for scientific realism
Choosing the realist framework
Counterfactual Reasoning, Qualitative: Philosophical Aspects
Scientific realism: Quo vadis? Introduction: new thinking about scientific realism
Epistemology (21 works) · Philosophy (21 works) · Philosophy and History of Science (17 works) · Realism (9 works) · Scientific realism (8 works) · Computer Science (7 works) · Metaphysics (6 works) · Philosophy of science (6 works) · Philosophy, Science, and History (6 works) · Science and Climate Studies (6 works)