Zhikuo Liu
Biographic Data
| ID | 5231672 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Zhikuo Liu |
| GIVEN NAMES | Zhikuo |
| FAMILY NAME | Liu |
| SIGNATURE | LIU Z |
| AFFILIATIONS | Shanghai University of Finance and Economics |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-0435-604X |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 5 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 12 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 5 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2016 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2024 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
The Impacts of the U.S. Trade War on Chinese Exporters
This paper studies the impacts of the 2018 U.S. tariff surges on export prices and adjustments of sales across different markets of Chinese exporters. The finding that U.S. tariffs did not affect the free-on-board price of Chinese exports is robust to controlling for firm-related fixed effects. While firms’ exports to the United States dropped significantly, exports to the EU increased moderately and domestic sales or exports to other foreign mar…
Power Signaling and Intergovernmental Transfers
Objective This article analyzes how authoritarian leaders manipulate intergovernmental transfers to signal their superior status relative to their rivals in power competition. Methods We first discuss under what circumstances the leaders have the incentive to signal dominance over his or her rivals. We then hypothesize that, at equilibrium, those who showed loyalty to the more powerful receive more resources while those who demonstrated loyalty t…
Location-based tax incentives and entrepreneurial activities
The Political Logic of Partial Reform of China’s State-Owned Enterprises
By exploring the composition of the Chinese Communisty Party’s Central Committee since the 1990s, we analyze why state-owned enterprises reform has fallen into a partial reform equilibrium. We argue that two hypotheses, the interest group hypothesis and the adaptive power-sharing hypothesis, should be combined to fully comprehend the partial reform equilibrium symptom
Eating, Drinking, and Power Signaling in Institutionalized Authoritarianism
Immediately after Xi Jinping assumed the position of party secretary general, he launched a large-scale top-down antiwaste campaign amongst the Chinese cadre corps. Compared with similar policies announced by Xi’s predecessors, this campaign has distinct features that entail substantial political risk for the party secretary general. Why did Xi choose this politically risky strategy? Drawing on recent literature on authoritarian regimes, this art…
Eating, Drinking, and Power Signaling in Institutionalized Authoritarianism
Immediately after Xi Jinping assumed the position of party secretary general, he launched a large-scale top-down antiwaste campaign amongst the Chinese cadre corps. Compared with similar policies announced by Xi’s predecessors, this campaign has distinct features that entail substantial political risk for the party secretary general. Why did Xi choose this politically risky strategy? Drawing on recent literature on authoritarian regimes, this art…
The Political Logic of Partial Reform of China’s State-Owned Enterprises
By exploring the composition of the Chinese Communisty Party’s Central Committee since the 1990s, we analyze why state-owned enterprises reform has fallen into a partial reform equilibrium. We argue that two hypotheses, the interest group hypothesis and the adaptive power-sharing hypothesis, should be combined to fully comprehend the partial reform equilibrium symptom
Eating, Drinking, and Power Signaling in Institutionalized Authoritarianism
Immediately after Xi Jinping assumed the position of party secretary general, he launched a large-scale top-down antiwaste campaign amongst the Chinese cadre corps. Compared with similar policies announced by Xi’s predecessors, this campaign has distinct features that entail substantial political risk for the party secretary general. Why did Xi choose this politically risky strategy? Drawing on recent literature on authoritarian regimes, this art…
The Political Logic of Partial Reform of China’s State-Owned Enterprises
By exploring the composition of the Chinese Communisty Party’s Central Committee since the 1990s, we analyze why state-owned enterprises reform has fallen into a partial reform equilibrium. We argue that two hypotheses, the interest group hypothesis and the adaptive power-sharing hypothesis, should be combined to fully comprehend the partial reform equilibrium symptom
Location-based tax incentives and entrepreneurial activities
Power Signaling and Intergovernmental Transfers
Objective This article analyzes how authoritarian leaders manipulate intergovernmental transfers to signal their superior status relative to their rivals in power competition. Methods We first discuss under what circumstances the leaders have the incentive to signal dominance over his or her rivals. We then hypothesize that, at equilibrium, those who showed loyalty to the more powerful receive more resources while those who demonstrated loyalty t…
The Impacts of the U.S. Trade War on Chinese Exporters
This paper studies the impacts of the 2018 U.S. tariff surges on export prices and adjustments of sales across different markets of Chinese exporters. The finding that U.S. tariffs did not affect the free-on-board price of Chinese exports is robust to controlling for firm-related fixed effects. While firms’ exports to the United States dropped significantly, exports to the EU increased moderately and domestic sales or exports to other foreign mar…
China (5 works) · Economics (5 works) · China's Socioeconomic Reforms and Governance (3 works) · Incentive (3 works) · Law (3 works) · Market economy (3 works) · Political science (3 works) · Politics (3 works) · Authoritarianism (2 works) · Business (2 works)