Stephen Leeds
Datos Biográficos
| ID | 5233168 |
|---|---|
| NOMBRE | Stephen Leeds |
| NOMBRES | Stephen |
| APELLIDO | Leeds |
| FIRMA | LEEDS S |
| AFILIACIONES | University of Colorado Boulder |
| VERIFICADO | No |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 14 |
| TOTAL DE CITAS | 20 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 14 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 0 |
| PRIMER AÑO DE PUBLICACIÓN | 1979 |
| AÑO MÁS RECIENTE DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2007 |
| ÍNDICE H | 3 |
Physical and Metaphysical Necessity
I propose a different way of thinking about metaphysical and physical necessity: namely that the fundamental notion of necessity is what would ordinarily be called “truth in all physically possible worlds”– a notion which includes the standard physical necessities and the metaphysical ones as well; I suggest that the latter are marked off not as a stricter kind of necessity but by their epistemic status. One result of this reconceptualization is …
Correspondence truth and scientific realism
Foundations of Statistical Mechanics—Two Approaches
This paper is a discussion of David Albert's approach to the foundations of classical statistical menchanics. I point out a respect in which his account makes a stronger claim about the statistical mechanical probabilities than is usually made, and I suggest what might be motivation for this. I outline a less radical approach, which I attribute to Boltzmann, and I give some reasons for thinking that this approach is all we need, and also the most…
Physicalism and its Discontents
Physicalism, a topic that has been central to modern philosophy of mind and metaphysics, is the philosophical view that everything in the space-time world is ultimately physical. The physicalist will claim that all facts about the mind and the mental are physical facts and deny the existence of mental events and state insofar as these are thought of as independent of physical things, events and states. This collection of essays, first published i…
Gauges
I defend the interpretation of the Aharonov-Bohm effect originally advanced by Aharonov and Bohm, i.e., that it is caused by an interaction between the electron and the vector potential. The defense depends on taking the fiber bundle formulation of electrodynamics literally, or almost literally
A Note on Van Fraassen's Modal Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics
Although there has been some discussion in the literature of Bas van Fraassen's modal interpretation of Quantum Mechanics, it has for the most part been concentrated on difficulties that van Fraassen's viewpoint shares with those of some other authors, including Kochen, Dieks, and Healey. van Fraassen's approach has, however, some problems of its own; in this note we want to focus on what seems to us to be one of the most serious of these. The di…
Wheeler–Feynman Again
Holes and Determinism
I argue that Earman and Norton's familiar “hole argument” raises questions as to whether GTR is a deterministic theory only given a certain assumption about determinism: namely, that to ask whether a theory is deterministic is to ask about the physical situations described by the theory. I think this is a mistake: whether a theory is deterministic is a question about what sentences can be proved within the theory. I show what these sentences look…
Constructive empiricism
Price on the Wheeler-Feynman Theory
Kyburg and Fiducial Inference
An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content
Perception and Cognition
Twenty-Five Years of Logical Methodology in Poland
Church's Translation Argument
What are the objects of the so-called ‘propositional attitudes’ — belief, desire, and the like? One of the best-known accounts holds them to be sentences. According to this account — which I shall call the ‘linguistic theory’ — an analysis of the logical form of a sentence like (1) John believes that the moon is round will see the word ‘that’ as a hidden pair of quotation marks: except for niceties of idiom, (1) might be written (2) John believes…
Foundations of Statistical Mechanics—Two Approaches
This paper is a discussion of David Albert's approach to the foundations of classical statistical menchanics. I point out a respect in which his account makes a stronger claim about the statistical mechanical probabilities than is usually made, and I suggest what might be motivation for this. I outline a less radical approach, which I attribute to Boltzmann, and I give some reasons for thinking that this approach is all we need, and also the most…
Constructive empiricism
Gauges
I defend the interpretation of the Aharonov-Bohm effect originally advanced by Aharonov and Bohm, i.e., that it is caused by an interaction between the electron and the vector potential. The defense depends on taking the fiber bundle formulation of electrodynamics literally, or almost literally
Holes and Determinism
I argue that Earman and Norton's familiar “hole argument” raises questions as to whether GTR is a deterministic theory only given a certain assumption about determinism: namely, that to ask whether a theory is deterministic is to ask about the physical situations described by the theory. I think this is a mistake: whether a theory is deterministic is a question about what sentences can be proved within the theory. I show what these sentences look…
Price on the Wheeler-Feynman Theory
A Note on Van Fraassen's Modal Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics
Although there has been some discussion in the literature of Bas van Fraassen's modal interpretation of Quantum Mechanics, it has for the most part been concentrated on difficulties that van Fraassen's viewpoint shares with those of some other authors, including Kochen, Dieks, and Healey. van Fraassen's approach has, however, some problems of its own; in this note we want to focus on what seems to us to be one of the most serious of these. The di…
Wheeler–Feynman Again
Church's Translation Argument
What are the objects of the so-called ‘propositional attitudes’ — belief, desire, and the like? One of the best-known accounts holds them to be sentences. According to this account — which I shall call the ‘linguistic theory’ — an analysis of the logical form of a sentence like (1) John believes that the moon is round will see the word ‘that’ as a hidden pair of quotation marks: except for niceties of idiom, (1) might be written (2) John believes…
Perception and Cognition
Twenty-Five Years of Logical Methodology in Poland
Kyburg and Fiducial Inference
An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content
Constructive empiricism
Price on the Wheeler-Feynman Theory
Wheeler–Feynman Again
Holes and Determinism
I argue that Earman and Norton's familiar “hole argument” raises questions as to whether GTR is a deterministic theory only given a certain assumption about determinism: namely, that to ask whether a theory is deterministic is to ask about the physical situations described by the theory. I think this is a mistake: whether a theory is deterministic is a question about what sentences can be proved within the theory. I show what these sentences look…
A Note on Van Fraassen's Modal Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics
Although there has been some discussion in the literature of Bas van Fraassen's modal interpretation of Quantum Mechanics, it has for the most part been concentrated on difficulties that van Fraassen's viewpoint shares with those of some other authors, including Kochen, Dieks, and Healey. van Fraassen's approach has, however, some problems of its own; in this note we want to focus on what seems to us to be one of the most serious of these. The di…
Gauges
I defend the interpretation of the Aharonov-Bohm effect originally advanced by Aharonov and Bohm, i.e., that it is caused by an interaction between the electron and the vector potential. The defense depends on taking the fiber bundle formulation of electrodynamics literally, or almost literally
Physicalism and its Discontents
Physicalism, a topic that has been central to modern philosophy of mind and metaphysics, is the philosophical view that everything in the space-time world is ultimately physical. The physicalist will claim that all facts about the mind and the mental are physical facts and deny the existence of mental events and state insofar as these are thought of as independent of physical things, events and states. This collection of essays, first published i…
Foundations of Statistical Mechanics—Two Approaches
This paper is a discussion of David Albert's approach to the foundations of classical statistical menchanics. I point out a respect in which his account makes a stronger claim about the statistical mechanical probabilities than is usually made, and I suggest what might be motivation for this. I outline a less radical approach, which I attribute to Boltzmann, and I give some reasons for thinking that this approach is all we need, and also the most…
Physical and Metaphysical Necessity
I propose a different way of thinking about metaphysical and physical necessity: namely that the fundamental notion of necessity is what would ordinarily be called “truth in all physically possible worlds”– a notion which includes the standard physical necessities and the metaphysical ones as well; I suggest that the latter are marked off not as a stricter kind of necessity but by their epistemic status. One result of this reconceptualization is …
Correspondence truth and scientific realism
Philosophy (11 obras) · Epistemology (10 obras) · Computer Science (7 obras) · Physics (5 obras) · Quantum Mechanics and Applications (5 obras) · Metaphysics (4 obras) · Philosophy and History of Science (4 obras) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (4 obras) · Argument (complex analysis) (3 obras) · Linguistics (3 obras)