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STUART SILVERS

Biographic Data

ID5236888
NAMESTUART SILVERS
GIVEN NAMESSTUART
FAMILY NAMESILVERS
SIGNATURESILVERS S
AFFILIATIONSClemson University
VERIFIEDNo
TOTAL WORKS4
TOTAL CITATIONS0
WORKS AS AUTHOR4
WORKS AS EDITOR0
FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR1967
LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR1997
H-INDEX0
  • The elm and the experts

    Open Access•Stuart Silver, STUART SILVERS•ARTICLE•Journal of the History of the…•1997

  • On Naturalizing the Semantics of Mental Representation

    STUART SILVERS•ARTICLE•The British Journal for the…•1991•References: 8

  • Representational Capacity, Intentional Ascription, and the Slippery Slope

    Open Access•STUART SILVERS•ARTICLE•Philosophy of Science•1989•References: 3

    A long-standing objection to Fodor's version of the Representational Theory of Mind (RTM) argues that in ascribing intentional content to an organism's representational states there needs to be some way of distinguishing between the kinds of organisms that have such representational capacity and those kinds that haven't. Without a principled distinction there would be no way of delimiting the appropriate domain of intentional ascription. As Fodor…

  • Brian Skyrms. Choice and chance

    Open Access•STUART SILVERS•ARTICLE•Philosophy of Science•1967

    An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content

No prominent works on this page.

  • Brian Skyrms. Choice and chance

    Open Access•STUART SILVERS•ARTICLE•Philosophy of Science•1967

    An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content

  • Representational Capacity, Intentional Ascription, and the Slippery Slope

    Open Access•STUART SILVERS•ARTICLE•Philosophy of Science•1989•References: 3

    A long-standing objection to Fodor's version of the Representational Theory of Mind (RTM) argues that in ascribing intentional content to an organism's representational states there needs to be some way of distinguishing between the kinds of organisms that have such representational capacity and those kinds that haven't. Without a principled distinction there would be no way of delimiting the appropriate domain of intentional ascription. As Fodor…

  • On Naturalizing the Semantics of Mental Representation

    STUART SILVERS•ARTICLE•The British Journal for the…•1991•References: 8

  • The elm and the experts

    Open Access•Stuart Silver, STUART SILVERS•ARTICLE•Journal of the History of the…•1997

Computer Science (3 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (3 works) · Epistemology (2 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (2 works) · Library science (2 works) · Philosophy (2 works) · Philosophy and History of Science (2 works) · Political science (2 works) · Sociology (2 works) · Art (1 work)

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