S Andrew Schroeder
Biographic Data
| ID | 5237240 |
|---|---|
| NAME | S Andrew Schroeder |
| GIVEN NAMES | S Andrew |
| FAMILY NAME | Schroeder |
| SIGNATURE | SCHROEDER S A |
| AFFILIATIONS | Claremont McKenna College |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-7305-3283 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 11 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 53 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 10 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 1 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2013 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2023 |
| H-INDEX | 4 |
Lockdowns, Bioethics, and the Public
Commentaries on the ethics of Covid lockdowns nearly all focus on offering substantive guidance to policy‐makers. Lockdowns, however, raise many ethical questions that admit of a range of reasonable answers. In such cases, policy‐making in a liberal democracy ought to be sensitive to which reasonable views the public actually holds—a topic existing bioethical work on lockdowns has not explored in detail. In this essay, I identify several importan…
Thinking about Values in Science
Philosophers of science now broadly agree that doing good science involves making non-epistemic value judgments. I call attention to two very different normative standards which can be used to evaluate such judgments: standards grounded in ethics and standards grounded in political philosophy . Though this distinction has not previously been highlighted, I show that the values in science literature contain arguments of each type. I conclude by ex…
Diversifying science
The Limits of Democratizing Science
Scientists are frequently called upon to “democratize” science, by bringing the public into scientific research. One appealing point for public involvement concerns the nonepistemic values involved in science. Suppose, though, a scientist invites the public to participate in making such value-laden determinations but finds that the public holds values the scientist considers morally unacceptable. Does the argument for democratizing science commit…
Democratic Values
There is a growing consensus among philosophers of science that core parts of the scientific process involve non-epistemic values. This undermines the traditional foundation for public trust in science. In this article I consider two proposals for justifying public trust in value-laden science. According to the first, scientists can promote trust by being transparent about their value choices. On the second, trust requires that the values of a sc…
Social Trust
What makes science trustworthy to the public? This chapter examines one answer: the trustworthiness of science is based in part on its independence from the idiosyncratic values, wishes and interests of individual scientists. That is, science is trustworthy to the extent that following the scientific method would result in the same conclusions, regardless of the particular scientists involved. This “idiosyncrasy-free ideal” (IFI) for science has …
Measuring the Global Burden of Disease
Which values should be built into economic measures?
Many economic measures are structured to reflect ethical values. I describe three attitudes towards this: maximalism , according to which we should aim to build all relevant values into measures; minimalism , according to which we should aim to keep values out of measures; and an intermediate view. I argue the intermediate view is likely correct, but existing versions are inadequate. In particular, economists have strong reason to structure measu…
Well-Being, Opportunity, and Selecting for Disability
In this paper I look at the much-discussed case of disabled parents seeking to conceive (or “selecting for”) disabled children. I argue that the permissibility of selecting for disability does not depend on the precise impact the disability will have on the child’s wellbeing. I then turn to an alternative analysis, which argues that the permissibility of selecting for disability depends on the impact that disability will have on the child’s futur…
Using Democratic Values in Science
Many philosophers of science have argued that social and ethical values have a significant role to play in core parts of the scientific process. This naturally suggests the following question: when such value choices need to be made, which or whose values should be used? A common answer to this question turns to democratic values—the values of the public or its representatives. I argue that this imposes a morally significant burden on certain sci…
Rethinking Health
Theorists of health have, to this point, focused exclusively on trying to define a state—health—that an organism might be in. I argue that they have overlooked the possibility of a comparativist theory of health, which would begin by defining a relation—healthier than—that holds between two organisms or two possible states of the same organism. I show that a comparativist approach to health has a number of attractive features, and has important i…
Democratic Values
There is a growing consensus among philosophers of science that core parts of the scientific process involve non-epistemic values. This undermines the traditional foundation for public trust in science. In this article I consider two proposals for justifying public trust in value-laden science. According to the first, scientists can promote trust by being transparent about their value choices. On the second, trust requires that the values of a sc…
Using Democratic Values in Science
Many philosophers of science have argued that social and ethical values have a significant role to play in core parts of the scientific process. This naturally suggests the following question: when such value choices need to be made, which or whose values should be used? A common answer to this question turns to democratic values—the values of the public or its representatives. I argue that this imposes a morally significant burden on certain sci…
Rethinking Health
Theorists of health have, to this point, focused exclusively on trying to define a state—health—that an organism might be in. I argue that they have overlooked the possibility of a comparativist theory of health, which would begin by defining a relation—healthier than—that holds between two organisms or two possible states of the same organism. I show that a comparativist approach to health has a number of attractive features, and has important i…
The Limits of Democratizing Science
Scientists are frequently called upon to “democratize” science, by bringing the public into scientific research. One appealing point for public involvement concerns the nonepistemic values involved in science. Suppose, though, a scientist invites the public to participate in making such value-laden determinations but finds that the public holds values the scientist considers morally unacceptable. Does the argument for democratizing science commit…
Diversifying science
Social Trust
What makes science trustworthy to the public? This chapter examines one answer: the trustworthiness of science is based in part on its independence from the idiosyncratic values, wishes and interests of individual scientists. That is, science is trustworthy to the extent that following the scientific method would result in the same conclusions, regardless of the particular scientists involved. This “idiosyncrasy-free ideal” (IFI) for science has …
Rethinking Health
Theorists of health have, to this point, focused exclusively on trying to define a state—health—that an organism might be in. I argue that they have overlooked the possibility of a comparativist theory of health, which would begin by defining a relation—healthier than—that holds between two organisms or two possible states of the same organism. I show that a comparativist approach to health has a number of attractive features, and has important i…
Using Democratic Values in Science
Many philosophers of science have argued that social and ethical values have a significant role to play in core parts of the scientific process. This naturally suggests the following question: when such value choices need to be made, which or whose values should be used? A common answer to this question turns to democratic values—the values of the public or its representatives. I argue that this imposes a morally significant burden on certain sci…
Well-Being, Opportunity, and Selecting for Disability
In this paper I look at the much-discussed case of disabled parents seeking to conceive (or “selecting for”) disabled children. I argue that the permissibility of selecting for disability does not depend on the precise impact the disability will have on the child’s wellbeing. I then turn to an alternative analysis, which argues that the permissibility of selecting for disability depends on the impact that disability will have on the child’s futur…
Which values should be built into economic measures?
Many economic measures are structured to reflect ethical values. I describe three attitudes towards this: maximalism , according to which we should aim to build all relevant values into measures; minimalism , according to which we should aim to keep values out of measures; and an intermediate view. I argue the intermediate view is likely correct, but existing versions are inadequate. In particular, economists have strong reason to structure measu…
Measuring the Global Burden of Disease
Democratic Values
There is a growing consensus among philosophers of science that core parts of the scientific process involve non-epistemic values. This undermines the traditional foundation for public trust in science. In this article I consider two proposals for justifying public trust in value-laden science. According to the first, scientists can promote trust by being transparent about their value choices. On the second, trust requires that the values of a sc…
Social Trust
What makes science trustworthy to the public? This chapter examines one answer: the trustworthiness of science is based in part on its independence from the idiosyncratic values, wishes and interests of individual scientists. That is, science is trustworthy to the extent that following the scientific method would result in the same conclusions, regardless of the particular scientists involved. This “idiosyncrasy-free ideal” (IFI) for science has …
Thinking about Values in Science
Philosophers of science now broadly agree that doing good science involves making non-epistemic value judgments. I call attention to two very different normative standards which can be used to evaluate such judgments: standards grounded in ethics and standards grounded in political philosophy . Though this distinction has not previously been highlighted, I show that the values in science literature contain arguments of each type. I conclude by ex…
Diversifying science
The Limits of Democratizing Science
Scientists are frequently called upon to “democratize” science, by bringing the public into scientific research. One appealing point for public involvement concerns the nonepistemic values involved in science. Suppose, though, a scientist invites the public to participate in making such value-laden determinations but finds that the public holds values the scientist considers morally unacceptable. Does the argument for democratizing science commit…
Lockdowns, Bioethics, and the Public
Commentaries on the ethics of Covid lockdowns nearly all focus on offering substantive guidance to policy‐makers. Lockdowns, however, raise many ethical questions that admit of a range of reasonable answers. In such cases, policy‐making in a liberal democracy ought to be sensitive to which reasonable views the public actually holds—a topic existing bioethical work on lockdowns has not explored in detail. In this essay, I identify several importan…
Sociology (10 works) · Epistemology (9 works) · Philosophy (9 works) · Political science (9 works) · Law (8 works) · Computer Science (6 works) · Mathematics (6 works) · Politics (6 works) · Economics (4 works) · Feminist Epistemology and Gender Studies (4 works)