Matt E M Bower
Biographic Data
| ID | 5241574 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Matt E M Bower |
| GIVEN NAMES | Matt E M |
| FAMILY NAME | Bower |
| SIGNATURE | BOWER M E M |
| AFFILIATIONS | Texas State University |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-2864-2980 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 6 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 0 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 6 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2014 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2023 |
| H-INDEX | 0 |
Phenomenological Reduction and the Nature of Perceptual Experience
Sociality and the minimal self
I present and critically examine Dan Zahavi's view that minimal selfhood and self‐awareness per se do not have a social character. I argue that Zahavi's conception of the minimal self as fundamentally asocial makes it hard to comprehend the unity of the self and that it is partly the result of an overly narrow conception of what it might mean for the self to be social
Is perception inadequate? Husserl's case for non‐sensory objectual phenomenology in perception
One key difference between perceptual experience and thought is the distinctly sensory way perception presents things to us. Some philosophers nevertheless suggest this sensory phenomenal character does not exhaust the way things are made manifest to us in perceptual experience. Edmund Husserl maintains that there is also a significant non‐sensory side to perception's phenomenal character. We may experience, for instance, an object's facing surfa…
Do We Visually Experience Objects’ Occluded Parts
A number of philosophers have held that we visually experience objects’ occluded parts, such as the out-of-view exterior of a voluminous, opaque object. That idea is supposed to be what best explains the fact that we see objects as whole or complete despite having only a part of them in view at any given moment. Yet, the claim doesn’t express a phenomenological datum and the reasons for thinking we do experience objects’ occluded parts, I argue, …
Husserl’s motivation and method for phenomenological reconstruction
Husserl's Theory of Instincts as a Theory of Affection
Husserl's theory of passive experience first came to systematic and detailed expression in the lectures on passive synthesis from the early 1920s, where he discusses pure passivity under the rubric of affection and association. In this paper, I suggest that this familiar theory of passive experience is a first approximation leaving important questions unanswered. Focusing primarily on affection, I will show that Husserl did not simply leave his t…
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Husserl’s motivation and method for phenomenological reconstruction
Husserl's Theory of Instincts as a Theory of Affection
Husserl's theory of passive experience first came to systematic and detailed expression in the lectures on passive synthesis from the early 1920s, where he discusses pure passivity under the rubric of affection and association. In this paper, I suggest that this familiar theory of passive experience is a first approximation leaving important questions unanswered. Focusing primarily on affection, I will show that Husserl did not simply leave his t…
Do We Visually Experience Objects’ Occluded Parts
A number of philosophers have held that we visually experience objects’ occluded parts, such as the out-of-view exterior of a voluminous, opaque object. That idea is supposed to be what best explains the fact that we see objects as whole or complete despite having only a part of them in view at any given moment. Yet, the claim doesn’t express a phenomenological datum and the reasons for thinking we do experience objects’ occluded parts, I argue, …
Is perception inadequate? Husserl's case for non‐sensory objectual phenomenology in perception
One key difference between perceptual experience and thought is the distinctly sensory way perception presents things to us. Some philosophers nevertheless suggest this sensory phenomenal character does not exhaust the way things are made manifest to us in perceptual experience. Edmund Husserl maintains that there is also a significant non‐sensory side to perception's phenomenal character. We may experience, for instance, an object's facing surfa…
Phenomenological Reduction and the Nature of Perceptual Experience
Sociality and the minimal self
I present and critically examine Dan Zahavi's view that minimal selfhood and self‐awareness per se do not have a social character. I argue that Zahavi's conception of the minimal self as fundamentally asocial makes it hard to comprehend the unity of the self and that it is partly the result of an overly narrow conception of what it might mean for the self to be social
Epistemology (5 works) · Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy (5 works) · Philosophy (5 works) · Psychology (5 works) · Perception (3 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (3 works) · Philosophy, Ethics, and Existentialism (3 works) · Aesthetics (2 works) · Embodied and Extended Cognition (2 works) · Philosophy and Historical Thought (2 works)