Nicola Spano
Biographic Data
| ID | 5241576 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Nicola Spano |
| GIVEN NAMES | Nicola |
| FAMILY NAME | Spano |
| SIGNATURE | SPANO N |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Würzburg |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-7370-9406 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 7 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 4 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 7 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2022 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2024 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Categorial Representation Anew
In the present article, I address the issue of categorial representative contents, which, according to Husserl’s phenomenological theory, make knowledge possible by providing fullness to intuitive categorial acts. First, I discuss Husserl’s assertion that he no longer approves of his theory of categorial representation developed in Logical Investigations . I argue that the influential interpretation of Husserl’s self-criticism advanced by Dieter …
Intentionality as Tendency and Intentionality as Consciousness-of
In this paper, I argue that according to Edmund Husserl “tendency” does not designate a specific class of intentional experiences but rather, on par with “consciousness-of,” a universal mode of intentionality essential for any constitution of sense. In doing so, I explicate Husserl’s distinction between intentionality as tendency ( Tendenz ), which he describes as a striving ( Streben ), and intentionality as consciousness-of ( Bewusstsein-von ),…
Introduction
No abstract available
Habits of Phantasy and the Possibility of A Priori Knowledge
In this article, I analyze the working principle and associated concepts of the method of eidetic variation as illustrated by Husserl in Experience and Judgment. In so doing, I scrutinize the very specific sense in which, for Husserl, variation must be free in order to have intuition of a universal as pure, that is, as having a priori validity. I then discuss Husserl’s problematic claim that, even if totally free, the eidetic variation is actuall…
Volitional causality vs natural causality
Husserl’s Taxonomy of Action
In the present article I discuss, in confrontation with the most recent studies on Husserl’s phenomenology of acting and willing, the taxonomy of action that is collected in the volume ‘ Wille und Handlung ’ of the Husserliana edition Studien zur Struktur des Bewussteins . In so doing, I first present Husserl’s universal characterization of action ( Handlung ) as a volitional process ( willentlicher Vorgang ). Then, after clarifying what it means…
The Genesis of Action in Husserl’s Studien zur Struktur des Bewusstseins
In the present article, I discuss Husserl’s analysis of the genesis of action in the Husserliana edition Studien zur Struktur des Bewusstseins. My aim is to clarify how a “voluntary action” has its genetic phenomenological origin in a “non-voluntary doing”, and, in turn, clarify how this latter activity has its genetic phenomenological origin in a passive “tendency” of the will. In order to achieve this aim, I first present the characterization o…
The Genesis of Action in Husserl’s Studien zur Struktur des Bewusstseins
In the present article, I discuss Husserl’s analysis of the genesis of action in the Husserliana edition Studien zur Struktur des Bewusstseins. My aim is to clarify how a “voluntary action” has its genetic phenomenological origin in a “non-voluntary doing”, and, in turn, clarify how this latter activity has its genetic phenomenological origin in a passive “tendency” of the will. In order to achieve this aim, I first present the characterization o…
Intentionality as Tendency and Intentionality as Consciousness-of
In this paper, I argue that according to Edmund Husserl “tendency” does not designate a specific class of intentional experiences but rather, on par with “consciousness-of,” a universal mode of intentionality essential for any constitution of sense. In doing so, I explicate Husserl’s distinction between intentionality as tendency ( Tendenz ), which he describes as a striving ( Streben ), and intentionality as consciousness-of ( Bewusstsein-von ),…
Introduction
No abstract available
Volitional causality vs natural causality
Husserl’s Taxonomy of Action
In the present article I discuss, in confrontation with the most recent studies on Husserl’s phenomenology of acting and willing, the taxonomy of action that is collected in the volume ‘ Wille und Handlung ’ of the Husserliana edition Studien zur Struktur des Bewussteins . In so doing, I first present Husserl’s universal characterization of action ( Handlung ) as a volitional process ( willentlicher Vorgang ). Then, after clarifying what it means…
The Genesis of Action in Husserl’s Studien zur Struktur des Bewusstseins
In the present article, I discuss Husserl’s analysis of the genesis of action in the Husserliana edition Studien zur Struktur des Bewusstseins. My aim is to clarify how a “voluntary action” has its genetic phenomenological origin in a “non-voluntary doing”, and, in turn, clarify how this latter activity has its genetic phenomenological origin in a passive “tendency” of the will. In order to achieve this aim, I first present the characterization o…
Habits of Phantasy and the Possibility of A Priori Knowledge
In this article, I analyze the working principle and associated concepts of the method of eidetic variation as illustrated by Husserl in Experience and Judgment. In so doing, I scrutinize the very specific sense in which, for Husserl, variation must be free in order to have intuition of a universal as pure, that is, as having a priori validity. I then discuss Husserl’s problematic claim that, even if totally free, the eidetic variation is actuall…
Categorial Representation Anew
In the present article, I address the issue of categorial representative contents, which, according to Husserl’s phenomenological theory, make knowledge possible by providing fullness to intuitive categorial acts. First, I discuss Husserl’s assertion that he no longer approves of his theory of categorial representation developed in Logical Investigations . I argue that the influential interpretation of Husserl’s self-criticism advanced by Dieter …
Intentionality as Tendency and Intentionality as Consciousness-of
In this paper, I argue that according to Edmund Husserl “tendency” does not designate a specific class of intentional experiences but rather, on par with “consciousness-of,” a universal mode of intentionality essential for any constitution of sense. In doing so, I explicate Husserl’s distinction between intentionality as tendency ( Tendenz ), which he describes as a striving ( Streben ), and intentionality as consciousness-of ( Bewusstsein-von ),…
Introduction
No abstract available
Epistemology (7 works) · Philosophy (7 works) · Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy (5 works) · Philosophy, Ethics, and Existentialism (5 works) · Psychology (5 works) · Philosophy and Historical Thought (4 works) · Physics (3 works) · Consciousness (2 works) · Intentionality (2 works) · Linguistics (2 works)