Jeffrey Record
Datos Biográficos
| ID | 528885 |
|---|---|
| NOMBRE | Jeffrey Record |
| NOMBRES | Jeffrey |
| APELLIDO | Record |
| FIRMA | RECORD J |
| AFILIACIONES | Policy Analysis (United States) |
| VERIFICADO | No |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 44 |
| TOTAL DE CITAS | 32 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 44 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 0 |
| PRIMER AÑO DE PUBLICACIÓN | 1971 |
| AÑO MÁS RECIENTE DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2011 |
| ÍNDICE H | 3 |
Beating Goliath
Leaving Vietnam
Are there insights for the United States in Iraq to be gained from the American military departure from Vietnam from 1969 to 1973? Specifically, what should the administration of President Barack Obama know about the Vietnam withdrawal to better serve American national security interests as well as those of the region and Iraq itself? What were the causes and consequences of the U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam, and do they have a bearing on possible…
Retiring Hitler and “Appeasement” from the National Security Debate
Some seem to believe that we should negotiate with terrorists and radicals, as if some ingenious argument will persuade them they have been wrong all along. have an obligation to call this what it is--the false comfort of appeasement, which has been repeatedly discredited by history. President George W. Bush (1) It is high time to retire Adolf Hitler and appeasement from national security debate. The repeated analogizing of current threats to men…
The Use and Abuse of History
External Assistance
V ictorious insurgencies are exceptional because the strong usually beat the weak. 1 But all power is relative, and if an insurgency has access to external assistance, such assistance can alter the insurgent-government power ratio even to the point where the insurgency becomes the stronger side. This is what happened during the American War of Independence. This is what did not happen during the American Civil War. External assistance made Yorkto…
Why the Strong Lose
T he continuing insurgency in Iraq underscores the capacity of the weak to impose considerable military and political pain on the strong. Whether that pain will compel the United States to abandon its agenda in Iraq remains to be seen
The limits and temptations of America's conventional military primacy
The United States today enjoys a measure of conventional military primacy unprecedented in world history. However, the obvious advantages of that primacy, including deterrence of conventional attack, must be weighed against its accumulating disadvantages. Primacy has accelerated enemy investment in asymmetric responses; renewed US interest in preventive war; and heightened Pentagon insensitivity to the difficulties of converting easy military vic…
Threat Confusion and Its Penalties
Threat Confusion and Its Penalties
In the wake of the 11 September al-Qaeda terrorist attacks on the United States, the Bush administration postulated a global threat that conflated non-state terrorist organisations and rogue states, most specifically al-Qaeda and Saddam Hussein's Iraq. In so doing, the administration ignored key differences between the two, including interests, agendas and vulnerability to threatened and actual US military action. The price of threat confusion ha…
Commentary & Reply
Allan Millett is one of our nation's finest military historians
The Bush Doctrine and War with Iraq
a year after the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States by al Qaeda. The document's Chapter V summarizes the Administration's approach to using force, known as the Bush Doctrine. It essentially reiterates, in four pages, presidential statements made over the months following 9/11, including the President's speeches before a Joint Session of Congress on 20 September 2001, before the Warsaw Conference on Combating Terrorism on 6 November, his …
Collapsed Countries, Casualty Dread, and the New American Way of War
The combination of failed states, elite casualty phobia, and unfolding aerial precision strike and associated technologies is profoundly altering the locus and style of future US military interventions overseas. The United States is beginning to practice a new way of warfare in parts of the world peripheral to traditional American security interests
Making War, Thinking History
Exit Strategy Delusions
During the past decade of US military interventions in Africa, the Caribbean, and the Balkans, there has been a rising clamor on Capitol Hill and within the Pentagon for "clear exit strategies" before resorting to force overseas. It is believed that road maps for post-intervention military extrication can and must be crafted in advance of military action, and that such maps can and must be followed throughout the course of intervention. The Unite…
A Note on Interests, Values, and the Use of Force
The recent presidential election campaign intensified a public debate that began in earnest in November 1984 when Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger delivered his famous National Press Club speech on the use of force. That debate has evolved over the years. It began as a discussion of whether force should be withheld only for real war or also used for coercive diplomacy. Though this issue persists, the debate has come to focus primarily on wh…
Commentary & Reply
s article "Managing an Unpredictable Moscow" (Parameters, Winter 1999-2000) contains three fundamental errors.It errs in its assumptions, it errs in its methodology, and it errs in the validity of its policy recommendations.The first incorrect assumption is that the Yeltsin era is ending.The Yeltsin era or legacy is a Russia ruled by a superpresidential system lacking checks and balances to restrain executive power.This allowed Yeltsin to rule by…
The Wrong War
Journal Article The Wrong War: Why We Lost in Vietnam. By Jeffrey Record, Defending the Free World: John E Kennedy, Lyndon Johnson, and the Vietnam War, 1961–1965. By Orrin Schwab, Choosing War: The Lost Chance for Peace and the Escalation of War in Vietnam. By Fredrik Logevall and Nixon's Vietnam War. By Jeffrey Kimball Get access Jacques Portes Jacques Portes University of Paris VIII, Paris, France Search for other works by this author on: Oxfo…
Operation Allied Force
The recent war against Serbia underscores a post-Cold War fact of life that is bad news for the Army: the growing relative attractiveness of air power alone as a vehicle for the very kind of value-driven US military interventions that have dominated the Pentagon's operational agenda since the Soviet Union's disappearance. America's political leadership has become hyper-averse to incurring American casualties, even among all-volunteer professional…
The Wrong War
Was the U.S. military prevented from achieving victory in Vietnam by poor decisions made by civilian leaders, a hostile media, and the antiwar movement, or was it doomed to failure from the start? Twenty-five years after the last U.S. troops left Vietnam, the most divisive foreign U.S. armed conflict since the War of 1812 remains an open wound not only because 58,000 Americans were killed and billions of dollars wasted, but because it was an igno…
Vietnam in Retrospect
Indochina is devoid of decisive military objectives and the allocation of more than token US armed forces in Indochina would be a serious diversion of limited US capabilities."[1]--Joint Chiefs of Staff, 26 May 1954 Notwithstanding the departure of the last US combat troops from Vietnam in 1973, the Vietnam War continues to be fought and refought here in the United States.Wars are unpleasant to wage, and even more unpleasant to lose.The Vietnam W…
Ready for What and Modernized Against Whom? A Strategic Perspective on Readiness and Modernization
Trade-offs between readiness and modernization come with the territory of any defense budget. Choosing between the two can be particularly painful in periods of declining total expenditure. We are entering a second decade of steadily declining annual real defense spending. Allegations of eroding force readiness are mounting. The Clinton Administration earlier this year agreed to add $25 billion to the defense budget over the next six years to imp…
The Gulf Conflict 1990-1991
Defeating desert storm (and why Saddam didn't)
The single most important key to the Persian Gulf war coalition's success was Saddam Hussein's “stupifying strategic incompetence and military amateurishness,” which derived from a general ignorance of his adversaries’ will and capabilities. Saddam believed that the United States would not take what appeared to be tremendous risks in going to war to liberate Kuwait. These illusions were reinforced by the Bush administration's pre‐war behavior tow…
Theater Ballistic Missile Defense and US Contingency Operations
Sizing Up Military Effectiveness
Making War, Thinking History
The Use and Abuse of History
The Falklands War
Even a partial analysis of information derived from the Falklands war suggests the need to examine key aspects of U.S. military policy, such as the nature of the All-Volunteer Force, the organization of the Rapid Deployment Force, and the procurement of giant aircraft carriers
Defeating desert storm (and why Saddam didn't)
The single most important key to the Persian Gulf war coalition's success was Saddam Hussein's “stupifying strategic incompetence and military amateurishness,” which derived from a general ignorance of his adversaries’ will and capabilities. Saddam believed that the United States would not take what appeared to be tremendous risks in going to war to liberate Kuwait. These illusions were reinforced by the Bush administration's pre‐war behavior tow…
The Military Reform Caucus
Fraught with an unfocused legislative agenda, poor management, and a lack of consensus among its members, the much-heralded congressional military reform movement has made little headway in establishing significant reform legislation
Jousting with Unreality
The Rapid Deployment Force and U.S. Military Intervention in the Persian Gulf
Outwitting “Smart” Weapons
Additional informationNotes on contributorsJeffrey RecordJeffrey Record is currently legislative assistant for military affairs to Senator Sam Nunn. He was previously research associate on the Defense Analysis Staff of the Brookings Institution, and is the author of Sizing Up the Soviet Army and U.S. Nuclear Weapons in Europe: Issues and Alternatives, both published by Brookings
Theatre nuclear weapons
Tactical nuclear Weapons in Europe
The limits and temptations of America's conventional military primacy
The United States today enjoys a measure of conventional military primacy unprecedented in world history. However, the obvious advantages of that primacy, including deterrence of conventional attack, must be weighed against its accumulating disadvantages. Primacy has accelerated enemy investment in asymmetric responses; renewed US interest in preventive war; and heightened Pentagon insensitivity to the difficulties of converting easy military vic…
Threat Confusion and Its Penalties
Conventional Retaliation into Eastern Europe
Those who try to cope with the frustrating problem of making European defense more effective owe a debt of gratitude to Samuel Huntington for lucid, compelling presentation of an alternate strategy in his article Deterrence and Conventional Retaliation in Europe, in the Winter 1983/84 International Security (Vol. 8, No. 3, pp. 32-56). Professor Huntington's central argument is that achievement by the Soviet Union of parity in both strategic and s…
The Rapid Deployment Force
The character and capabilities of the Rapid Deployment Force formed by the Carter administration in the wake of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan do not reflect sufficient appreciation of the two pivotal conditions governing any U.S. attempt to mount a credible military defense of its vital interests in the Persian Gulf region: (1) the lack of secure military access ashore in the region, and (2) an unavoidable reliance on forces already committe…
Viet Cong
Viet Cong
U. S. Force Structure in Nato
Tactical nuclear Weapons in Europe
Theatre nuclear weapons
Outwitting “Smart” Weapons
Additional informationNotes on contributorsJeffrey RecordJeffrey Record is currently legislative assistant for military affairs to Senator Sam Nunn. He was previously research associate on the Defense Analysis Staff of the Brookings Institution, and is the author of Sizing Up the Soviet Army and U.S. Nuclear Weapons in Europe: Issues and Alternatives, both published by Brookings
The RDF
The Rapid Deployment Force and U.S. Military Intervention in the Persian Gulf
Force Reductions in Europe
The Rapid Deployment Force
The character and capabilities of the Rapid Deployment Force formed by the Carter administration in the wake of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan do not reflect sufficient appreciation of the two pivotal conditions governing any U.S. attempt to mount a credible military defense of its vital interests in the Persian Gulf region: (1) the lack of secure military access ashore in the region, and (2) an unavoidable reliance on forces already committe…
Should America Pay for Europe's Security
The Falklands War
Even a partial analysis of information derived from the Falklands war suggests the need to examine key aspects of U.S. military policy, such as the nature of the All-Volunteer Force, the organization of the Rapid Deployment Force, and the procurement of giant aircraft carriers
U.S. Strategy at the Crossroads
The Military Reform Caucus
Fraught with an unfocused legislative agenda, poor management, and a lack of consensus among its members, the much-heralded congressional military reform movement has made little headway in establishing significant reform legislation
Jousting with Unreality
Reagan's Military Strategy
Conventional Retaliation into Eastern Europe
Those who try to cope with the frustrating problem of making European defense more effective owe a debt of gratitude to Samuel Huntington for lucid, compelling presentation of an alternate strategy in his article Deterrence and Conventional Retaliation in Europe, in the Winter 1983/84 International Security (Vol. 8, No. 3, pp. 32-56). Professor Huntington's central argument is that achievement by the Soviet Union of parity in both strategic and s…
Operational Brilliance, Strategic Incompetence
Sizing Up Military Effectiveness
Defending Post-INF Europe
Beyond Military Reform
Theater Ballistic Missile Defense and US Contingency Operations
Defeating desert storm (and why Saddam didn't)
The single most important key to the Persian Gulf war coalition's success was Saddam Hussein's “stupifying strategic incompetence and military amateurishness,” which derived from a general ignorance of his adversaries’ will and capabilities. Saddam believed that the United States would not take what appeared to be tremendous risks in going to war to liberate Kuwait. These illusions were reinforced by the Bush administration's pre‐war behavior tow…
The Gulf Conflict 1990-1991
Ready for What and Modernized Against Whom? A Strategic Perspective on Readiness and Modernization
Trade-offs between readiness and modernization come with the territory of any defense budget. Choosing between the two can be particularly painful in periods of declining total expenditure. We are entering a second decade of steadily declining annual real defense spending. Allegations of eroding force readiness are mounting. The Clinton Administration earlier this year agreed to add $25 billion to the defense budget over the next six years to imp…
Vietnam in Retrospect
Indochina is devoid of decisive military objectives and the allocation of more than token US armed forces in Indochina would be a serious diversion of limited US capabilities."[1]--Joint Chiefs of Staff, 26 May 1954 Notwithstanding the departure of the last US combat troops from Vietnam in 1973, the Vietnam War continues to be fought and refought here in the United States.Wars are unpleasant to wage, and even more unpleasant to lose.The Vietnam W…
Political science (41 obras) · Law (27 obras) · Sociology (13 obras) · Law (12 obras) · Military and Defense Studies (12 obras) · Military History and Strategy (12 obras) · Political economy (12 obras) · Economics (11 obras) · Politics (10 obras) · Engineering (9 obras)