David P Hunt
Biographic Data
| ID | 5434414 |
|---|---|
| NAME | David P Hunt |
| GIVEN NAMES | David P |
| FAMILY NAME | Hunt |
| SIGNATURE | HUNT D P |
| AFFILIATIONS | Whittier College |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 8 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 0 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 8 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1991 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2017 |
| H-INDEX | 0 |
Freedom, Foreknowledge and Frankfurt
This chapter discusses an exercise in ‘applied Frankfurtianism.’ One of the classic puzzles raised by the theistic conception of God is whether infallible foreknowledge is compatible with libertarian freedom. At the heart of Harry Frankfurt’s argument lies a peculiar kind of counterexample. The best-known of these counterexamples goes something like this. Two judgments about BSJ are integral to Frankfurt’s argument. One is that Jones is unable to…
Moral Responsibility and Buffered Alternatives
Providence, foreknowledge, and explanatory loops
In a number of earlier papers I have attempted to defend the providential utility of simple foreknowledge as a via media between the accounts of divine providence offered by Molinists, on the one hand, and ‘open theists’, on the other. In the current issue of this journal, Michael Robinson argues that my response to one of the standard difficulties for simple foreknowledge – that its providential employment would generate explanatory loops – is i…
The Association of the Lady and the Unicorn, and the Hunting Mythology of the Caucasus
Written evidence from the hunting folk literature of the Caucasus is presented together with the suggestion that the origin of the unicorn lies in hunting mythology and that remnants of it are to be seen in the figures in "The Lady and the Unicorn" tapestries in France
How (not) to exempt Platonic Forms from Parmenides' Third Man
One response invited by the Third Man Argument (or "TMA") of Plato's Parmenides is that it simply fails against the middle-period theory of Forms, not so much because its premises radically misconstrue that theory, but because there are good reasons endemic to the theory itself (and not simply introduced ad hoc) for exempting the Forms from at least some of the principles which drive the argument
The Compatibility of Omniscience and Intentional Action
The paper that follows continues a discussion with Tomis Kapitan in the pages of this journal over the compatibility of divine agency with divine foreknowledge. I had earlier argued against two premises in Kapitan's case for omniscient impotence: (i) that intentionally A-ing presupposes prior acquisition of the intention to A, and (ii) that acquiring the intention to A presupposes prior ignorance whether one will A. In response to my criticisms, …
Omniprescient Agency
The principle that (P 1 ) One cannot deliberate over what one already (prior to deliberating) knows is going to happen, when suitably qualified, has seemed to many philosophers to be about as secure a truth as one is likely to find in this life.Fortunately, (P 1 ) poses little restriction on human deliberation, since the conditions which would trigger its prohibition seldom arise for us: our knowledge of the future is intermittent at best, and th…
Middle Knowledge and the Soteriological Problem of Evil
According to the thesis of divine ‘middle knowledge’, first propounded by the Jesuit theologian Luis de Molina in the sixteenth century, subjunctive conditionals stating how free agents would freely respond under counter-factual conditions (call such expressions ‘counterfactuals of freedom’) may be straightforwardly true, and thus serve as the objects of divine knowledge. This thesis has provoked considerable controversy, and the recent revival o…
No prominent works on this page.
Middle Knowledge and the Soteriological Problem of Evil
According to the thesis of divine ‘middle knowledge’, first propounded by the Jesuit theologian Luis de Molina in the sixteenth century, subjunctive conditionals stating how free agents would freely respond under counter-factual conditions (call such expressions ‘counterfactuals of freedom’) may be straightforwardly true, and thus serve as the objects of divine knowledge. This thesis has provoked considerable controversy, and the recent revival o…
Omniprescient Agency
The principle that (P 1 ) One cannot deliberate over what one already (prior to deliberating) knows is going to happen, when suitably qualified, has seemed to many philosophers to be about as secure a truth as one is likely to find in this life.Fortunately, (P 1 ) poses little restriction on human deliberation, since the conditions which would trigger its prohibition seldom arise for us: our knowledge of the future is intermittent at best, and th…
The Compatibility of Omniscience and Intentional Action
The paper that follows continues a discussion with Tomis Kapitan in the pages of this journal over the compatibility of divine agency with divine foreknowledge. I had earlier argued against two premises in Kapitan's case for omniscient impotence: (i) that intentionally A-ing presupposes prior acquisition of the intention to A, and (ii) that acquiring the intention to A presupposes prior ignorance whether one will A. In response to my criticisms, …
How (not) to exempt Platonic Forms from Parmenides' Third Man
One response invited by the Third Man Argument (or "TMA") of Plato's Parmenides is that it simply fails against the middle-period theory of Forms, not so much because its premises radically misconstrue that theory, but because there are good reasons endemic to the theory itself (and not simply introduced ad hoc) for exempting the Forms from at least some of the principles which drive the argument
The Association of the Lady and the Unicorn, and the Hunting Mythology of the Caucasus
Written evidence from the hunting folk literature of the Caucasus is presented together with the suggestion that the origin of the unicorn lies in hunting mythology and that remnants of it are to be seen in the figures in "The Lady and the Unicorn" tapestries in France
Providence, foreknowledge, and explanatory loops
In a number of earlier papers I have attempted to defend the providential utility of simple foreknowledge as a via media between the accounts of divine providence offered by Molinists, on the one hand, and ‘open theists’, on the other. In the current issue of this journal, Michael Robinson argues that my response to one of the standard difficulties for simple foreknowledge – that its providential employment would generate explanatory loops – is i…
Moral Responsibility and Buffered Alternatives
Freedom, Foreknowledge and Frankfurt
This chapter discusses an exercise in ‘applied Frankfurtianism.’ One of the classic puzzles raised by the theistic conception of God is whether infallible foreknowledge is compatible with libertarian freedom. At the heart of Harry Frankfurt’s argument lies a peculiar kind of counterexample. The best-known of these counterexamples goes something like this. Two judgments about BSJ are integral to Frankfurt’s argument. One is that Jones is unable to…
Philosophy (7 works) · Epistemology (6 works) · Theology and Philosophy of Evil (4 works) · Foreknowledge (3 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (3 works) · Agency (philosophy) (2 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (2 works) · Political Philosophy and Ethics (2 works) · Psychology (2 works) · Theology (2 works)