Philip J Nickel
Biographic Data
| ID | 5444877 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Philip J Nickel |
| GIVEN NAMES | Philip J |
| FAMILY NAME | Nickel |
| SIGNATURE | NICKEL P J |
| AFFILIATIONS | Eindhoven University of Technology |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-5173-8991 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 5 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 15 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 5 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2009 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2022 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
Trust in medical artificial intelligence
This paper sets out an account of trust in AI as a relationship between clinicians, AI applications, and AI practitioners in which AI is given discretionary authority over medical questions by clinicians. Compared to other accounts in recent literature, this account more adequately explains the normative commitments created by practitioners when inviting clinicians’ trust in AI. To avoid committing to an account of trust in AI applications themse…
Towards a Design Toolkit of Informed Consent Models Across Fields
In the 60+ years that the modern concept of informed consent has been around, researchers in various fields of practice, especially medical ethics, have developed new models to overcome theoretical and practical problems. While (systematic) literature reviews of such models exist within given fields (e.g., genetic screening), this article breaks ground by analyzing academic literature on consent models across fields. Three electronic research dat…
Disruptive Innovation and Moral Uncertainty
This paper develops a philosophical account of moral disruption. According to Robert Baker, moral disruption is a process in which technological innovations undermine established moral norms without clearly leading to a new set of norms. Here I analyze this process in terms of moral uncertainty, formulating a philosophical account with two variants. On the harm account, such uncertainty is always harmful because it blocks our knowledge of our own…
Voluntary Belief on a Reasonable Basis
A person presented with adequate but not conclusive evidence for a proposition is in a position voluntarily to acquire a belief in that proposition, or to suspend judgment about it. The availability of doxastic options in such cases grounds a moderate form of doxastic voluntarism not based on practical motives, and therefore distinct from pragmatism. In such cases, belief-acquisition or suspension of judgment meets standard conditions on willing:…
Trust, Staking, and Expectations
Trust is a kind of risky reliance on another person. Social scientists have offered two basic accounts of trust: predictive expectation accounts and staking (betting) accounts. Predictive expectation accounts identify trust with a judgment that performance is likely. Staking accounts identify trust with a judgment that reliance on the person's performance is worthwhile. I argue (1) that these two views of trust are different, (2) that the staking…
Disruptive Innovation and Moral Uncertainty
This paper develops a philosophical account of moral disruption. According to Robert Baker, moral disruption is a process in which technological innovations undermine established moral norms without clearly leading to a new set of norms. Here I analyze this process in terms of moral uncertainty, formulating a philosophical account with two variants. On the harm account, such uncertainty is always harmful because it blocks our knowledge of our own…
Voluntary Belief on a Reasonable Basis
A person presented with adequate but not conclusive evidence for a proposition is in a position voluntarily to acquire a belief in that proposition, or to suspend judgment about it. The availability of doxastic options in such cases grounds a moderate form of doxastic voluntarism not based on practical motives, and therefore distinct from pragmatism. In such cases, belief-acquisition or suspension of judgment meets standard conditions on willing:…
Trust, Staking, and Expectations
Trust is a kind of risky reliance on another person. Social scientists have offered two basic accounts of trust: predictive expectation accounts and staking (betting) accounts. Predictive expectation accounts identify trust with a judgment that performance is likely. Staking accounts identify trust with a judgment that reliance on the person's performance is worthwhile. I argue (1) that these two views of trust are different, (2) that the staking…
Trust, Staking, and Expectations
Trust is a kind of risky reliance on another person. Social scientists have offered two basic accounts of trust: predictive expectation accounts and staking (betting) accounts. Predictive expectation accounts identify trust with a judgment that performance is likely. Staking accounts identify trust with a judgment that reliance on the person's performance is worthwhile. I argue (1) that these two views of trust are different, (2) that the staking…
Voluntary Belief on a Reasonable Basis
A person presented with adequate but not conclusive evidence for a proposition is in a position voluntarily to acquire a belief in that proposition, or to suspend judgment about it. The availability of doxastic options in such cases grounds a moderate form of doxastic voluntarism not based on practical motives, and therefore distinct from pragmatism. In such cases, belief-acquisition or suspension of judgment meets standard conditions on willing:…
Disruptive Innovation and Moral Uncertainty
This paper develops a philosophical account of moral disruption. According to Robert Baker, moral disruption is a process in which technological innovations undermine established moral norms without clearly leading to a new set of norms. Here I analyze this process in terms of moral uncertainty, formulating a philosophical account with two variants. On the harm account, such uncertainty is always harmful because it blocks our knowledge of our own…
Trust in medical artificial intelligence
This paper sets out an account of trust in AI as a relationship between clinicians, AI applications, and AI practitioners in which AI is given discretionary authority over medical questions by clinicians. Compared to other accounts in recent literature, this account more adequately explains the normative commitments created by practitioners when inviting clinicians’ trust in AI. To avoid committing to an account of trust in AI applications themse…
Towards a Design Toolkit of Informed Consent Models Across Fields
In the 60+ years that the modern concept of informed consent has been around, researchers in various fields of practice, especially medical ethics, have developed new models to overcome theoretical and practical problems. While (systematic) literature reviews of such models exist within given fields (e.g., genetic screening), this article breaks ground by analyzing academic literature on consent models across fields. Three electronic research dat…
Computer Science (3 works) · Law (3 works) · Political science (3 works) · Psychology (3 works) · Epistemology (2 works) · Ethics in medical practice (2 works) · Free Will and Agency (2 works) · Law (2 works) · Law and economics (2 works) · Philosophy (2 works)