A Anagnostopoulos
Biographic Data
| ID | 5462437 |
|---|---|
| NAME | A Anagnostopoulos |
| GIVEN NAMES | A |
| FAMILY NAME | Anagnostopoulos |
| SIGNATURE | ANAGNOSTOPOULOS A |
| AFFILIATIONS | Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-6197-3023 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 6 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 2 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 6 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2011 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2023 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Aristotle’s First Moves Regarding Perception
Whereas scholars often look to De Anima 2.5 to support one or another understanding of the sense in which perception, for Aristotle, qualifies as an alteration and qualitative assimilation to the sense-object, I ask the more basic question of what the chapter is meant to establish or accomplish with respect to the question whether perception is an alteration. I argue that the chapter does not presuppose or legitimate the view that perception is a…
Changes in socioeconomic resources and mental health after the second Covid-19 wave (2020–2021)
This study confirms the association of economic stressors and mental health during the COVID-19 pandemic and highlights the exacerbating role of subjective risk perception on this association
Mixture, Generation and the First Aporia of Aristotle’s GC 1.10
This paper concerns the classification of the process of mixture, for Aristotle, and the related issue of the manner in which the ingredients remain present once mixed. I argue that mixture is best viewed as a kind of substantial generation in the context of the GC and, accordingly, that the ingredients do not enjoy the kind of strong presence within a mixture usually attributed to them. To do this, I critically examine the most promising version…
Change, Agency and the Incomplete in Aristotle
Aristotle’s most fundamental distinction between changes and other activities is not that of Metaphysics Θ.6, between end-exclusive and end-inclusive activities, but one implicit in Physics 3.1’s definition of change, between the activity of something incomplete and the activity of something complete. Notably, only the latter distinction can account for Aristotle’s view, in Physics 3.3, that ‘agency’—effecting change in something, e.g. teaching—d…
Aristotle’s Parmenidean Dilemma
Aristotle’s treatment, in Physics 1.8, of a dilemma purporting to show that change is impossible, aims in the first instance to defend not the existence of change, but the explicability of change, a presupposition of his natural science. The opponent fails to recognize that causal explanation is sensitive to the differences between merely coinciding beings. This formal principle of explanation is implicit in Aristotle’s theory that change involve…
Senses of Dunamis and the Structure of Aristotle’s Metaphysics Θ1
This essay aims to analyze the structure of Aristotle’s Metaphysics Θ by explicating various senses of the term δύναμις at issue in the treatise. It is argued that Aristotle’s central innovation, the sense of δύναμις most useful to his project in the treatise, is the kind of capacity characteristic of the pre-existent matter for substance. It is neither potentiality as a mode of being, as recent studies maintain, nor capacity for ‘complete’ activ…
Senses of Dunamis and the Structure of Aristotle’s Metaphysics Θ1
This essay aims to analyze the structure of Aristotle’s Metaphysics Θ by explicating various senses of the term δύναμις at issue in the treatise. It is argued that Aristotle’s central innovation, the sense of δύναμις most useful to his project in the treatise, is the kind of capacity characteristic of the pre-existent matter for substance. It is neither potentiality as a mode of being, as recent studies maintain, nor capacity for ‘complete’ activ…
Senses of Dunamis and the Structure of Aristotle’s Metaphysics Θ1
This essay aims to analyze the structure of Aristotle’s Metaphysics Θ by explicating various senses of the term δύναμις at issue in the treatise. It is argued that Aristotle’s central innovation, the sense of δύναμις most useful to his project in the treatise, is the kind of capacity characteristic of the pre-existent matter for substance. It is neither potentiality as a mode of being, as recent studies maintain, nor capacity for ‘complete’ activ…
Aristotle’s Parmenidean Dilemma
Aristotle’s treatment, in Physics 1.8, of a dilemma purporting to show that change is impossible, aims in the first instance to defend not the existence of change, but the explicability of change, a presupposition of his natural science. The opponent fails to recognize that causal explanation is sensitive to the differences between merely coinciding beings. This formal principle of explanation is implicit in Aristotle’s theory that change involve…
Change, Agency and the Incomplete in Aristotle
Aristotle’s most fundamental distinction between changes and other activities is not that of Metaphysics Θ.6, between end-exclusive and end-inclusive activities, but one implicit in Physics 3.1’s definition of change, between the activity of something incomplete and the activity of something complete. Notably, only the latter distinction can account for Aristotle’s view, in Physics 3.3, that ‘agency’—effecting change in something, e.g. teaching—d…
Mixture, Generation and the First Aporia of Aristotle’s GC 1.10
This paper concerns the classification of the process of mixture, for Aristotle, and the related issue of the manner in which the ingredients remain present once mixed. I argue that mixture is best viewed as a kind of substantial generation in the context of the GC and, accordingly, that the ingredients do not enjoy the kind of strong presence within a mixture usually attributed to them. To do this, I critically examine the most promising version…
Aristotle’s First Moves Regarding Perception
Whereas scholars often look to De Anima 2.5 to support one or another understanding of the sense in which perception, for Aristotle, qualifies as an alteration and qualitative assimilation to the sense-object, I ask the more basic question of what the chapter is meant to establish or accomplish with respect to the question whether perception is an alteration. I argue that the chapter does not presuppose or legitimate the view that perception is a…
Changes in socioeconomic resources and mental health after the second Covid-19 wave (2020–2021)
This study confirms the association of economic stressors and mental health during the COVID-19 pandemic and highlights the exacerbating role of subjective risk perception on this association
Classical Philosophy and Thought (5 works) · Epistemology (5 works) · Philosophy (5 works) · Medieval and Classical Philosophy (3 works) · Philosophy (3 works) · Ancient philosophy (2 works) · Classical Antiquity Studies (2 works) · Economics (2 works) · Historical, Religious, and Philosophical Studies (2 works) · History (2 works)