Ivan V Ivanov
Biographic Data
| ID | 5501385 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Ivan V Ivanov |
| GIVEN NAMES | Ivan V |
| FAMILY NAME | Ivanov |
| SIGNATURE | IVANOV I V |
| AFFILIATIONS | Sun Yat-sen University |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-6465-0406 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 5 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 1 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 5 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2021 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Naïve Realism and the Laws of Appearance
The Laws of Appearance are ostensively necessary constraints on the contents of perceptual experiences. As such, they put pressure on the various available accounts of such experiences. The growing consensus is that none of those accounts can explain the Laws in their apparent modal force, so the latter must get explained away. This paper delivers a different verdict: the Laws can get derived in their full apparent modal force once the explanator…
Perceptual metaphysics
In this paper, we propose an account of how perceptual evidence might allow us to draw justified conclusions about the existence of composite objects. We call the thesis at issue PERCEPTUAL ADEQUACY, and argue that a specific, naïve realist picture of the phenomenal character of perception provides us with a straightforward way to defend it. The claim that we have empirical evidence for the existence of macroscopic composites cannot be propped up…
Bad to the bone
Naïve realists have a motive to but have thus far been unable to offer compelling reasons for positing an external constraint on the occurrence of the consciousness involved in perfect hallucinations. If the occurrences of such consciousness were confined to abnormal perceptual contexts, the possibility of perfect hallucinations would have no bearing on the nature of the consciousness involved in cases of perception. On the other hand, it is uncl…
Sensing mind-independence
Properties in sight and in thought
Sensing mind-independence
Properties in sight and in thought
Bad to the bone
Naïve realists have a motive to but have thus far been unable to offer compelling reasons for positing an external constraint on the occurrence of the consciousness involved in perfect hallucinations. If the occurrences of such consciousness were confined to abnormal perceptual contexts, the possibility of perfect hallucinations would have no bearing on the nature of the consciousness involved in cases of perception. On the other hand, it is uncl…
Perceptual metaphysics
In this paper, we propose an account of how perceptual evidence might allow us to draw justified conclusions about the existence of composite objects. We call the thesis at issue PERCEPTUAL ADEQUACY, and argue that a specific, naïve realist picture of the phenomenal character of perception provides us with a straightforward way to defend it. The claim that we have empirical evidence for the existence of macroscopic composites cannot be propped up…
Naïve Realism and the Laws of Appearance
The Laws of Appearance are ostensively necessary constraints on the contents of perceptual experiences. As such, they put pressure on the various available accounts of such experiences. The growing consensus is that none of those accounts can explain the Laws in their apparent modal force, so the latter must get explained away. This paper delivers a different verdict: the Laws can get derived in their full apparent modal force once the explanator…
Perception (4 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (4 works) · Psychology (4 works) · Cognitive psychology (3 works) · Cognitive science (3 works) · Epistemology (3 works) · Metaphysics (3 works) · Philosophy (3 works) · Computer Science (2 works) · Mathematics (2 works)