T L Short T L Short
Biographic Data
| ID | 5514968 |
|---|---|
| NAME | T L Short T L Short |
| GIVEN NAMES | T L Short T L |
| FAMILY NAME | Short |
| SIGNATURE | SHORT T L S T L |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 2 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 3 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 2 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2017 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2018 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Peirce's Irony
Peirce once claimed seriousness in irony. He practiced other forms of literary indirection as well. And he explored conjectures without being committed to any one formulation of them. To take everything he said seriously is to miss what he was serious about. This applies most to his two most famous essays, ‘The Fixation of Belief’ and ‘How to Make Our Ideas Clear’. The first is ironic in structure and purpose. The second poses a multitude of inte…
The 1903 Maxim
The maxim that concludes Peirce's 1903 Harvard lectures on pragmatism is not a figurative restatement of his 1878 pragmatic maxim: it adds to it a non-verificationist dimension of meaning. That addition is required to defend as meaningful the modal realism that the 1878 maxim presupposes but for the meaning of which it cannot itself account. The 1903 maxim grounds Peirce's late, phenomenological project of tracing metaphysical categories to their…
The 1903 Maxim
The maxim that concludes Peirce's 1903 Harvard lectures on pragmatism is not a figurative restatement of his 1878 pragmatic maxim: it adds to it a non-verificationist dimension of meaning. That addition is required to defend as meaningful the modal realism that the 1878 maxim presupposes but for the meaning of which it cannot itself account. The 1903 maxim grounds Peirce's late, phenomenological project of tracing metaphysical categories to their…
The 1903 Maxim
The maxim that concludes Peirce's 1903 Harvard lectures on pragmatism is not a figurative restatement of his 1878 pragmatic maxim: it adds to it a non-verificationist dimension of meaning. That addition is required to defend as meaningful the modal realism that the 1878 maxim presupposes but for the meaning of which it cannot itself account. The 1903 maxim grounds Peirce's late, phenomenological project of tracing metaphysical categories to their…
Peirce's Irony
Peirce once claimed seriousness in irony. He practiced other forms of literary indirection as well. And he explored conjectures without being committed to any one formulation of them. To take everything he said seriously is to miss what he was serious about. This applies most to his two most famous essays, ‘The Fixation of Belief’ and ‘How to Make Our Ideas Clear’. The first is ironic in structure and purpose. The second poses a multitude of inte…
Epistemology (2 works) · Philosophy (2 works) · Philosophy (2 works) · Aesthetics (1 works) · Art (1 works) · Computer Science (1 works) · French Literature and Poetry (1 works) · Historical and Literary Studies (1 works) · Indirection (1 works) · Irony (1 works)