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Marc Turenne

Biographic Data

ID5533979
NAMEMarc Turenne
GIVEN NAMESMarc
FAMILY NAMETurenne
SIGNATURETURENNE M
AFFILIATIONSUniversity of Michigan
ORCID0000-0002-5325-3381
VERIFIEDYes
TOTAL WORKS5
TOTAL CITATIONS0
AUTHOR COUNT5
EDITOR COUNT0
FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR2003
LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR2022
H-INDEX0
  • The Role of Social Risk Factors in Dialysis Quality and Patient Outcomes Under a Medicare Quality Incentive Program

    Andrew Breck, Jeffrey Marr et al.•ARTICLE•Medical Care•2022•References: 15

    BACKGROUND: There have been critical improvements in dialysis care and mortality in the last decade. These improvements track with the implementation of the end-stage renal disease (ESRD) Quality Incentive Program (QIP) beginning in 2012, which aligns Medicare payments to dialysis facilities with performance on quality measures. This study explores whether the improvements in dialysis care and patient outcomes under the ESRD QIP have been shared …

  • When Payment Systems Collide

    Marc Turenne, Marc N Turenne et al.•ARTICLE•Medical Care•2010•References: 22

    BACKGROUND: Different types of providers often face differing financial incentives for providing similar types of care. This may have implications for payment systems that target improvements in care requiring multiple types of providers. OBJECTIVES: The objective of this study was to determine how hospitalization influences the anemia of Medicare patients with chronic renal failure, where anemia is treated under a prospective payment system duri…

  • Do Resource Utilization and Clinical Measures Still Vary Across Dialysis Chains After Controlling for the Local Practices of Facilities and Physicians

    Richard A Hirth, Marc Turenne et al.•ARTICLE•Medical Care•2010•References: 21

    BACKGROUND: Because of adverse survival effects, anemia management and financial incentives to increase doses of erythropoiesis-stimulating agents (ESAs) have been controversial. Prior studies showed more aggressive anemia management in dialysis facilities owned by for-profit chains, but have been criticized for not accounting for practices of individual physicians and facilities. OBJECTIVE: To improve understanding of how dialysis practices and …

  • Using Knowledge of Multiple Levels of Variation in Care to Target Performance Incentives to Providers

    Marc Turenne, Marc N Turenne et al.•ARTICLE•Medical Care•2008•References: 8

    BACKGROUND: In developing "pay-for-performance" and capitation systems that provide incentives for improving the quality and efficiency of care, policymakers need to determine which healthcare providers to evaluate and reward. OBJECTIVES: This study demonstrates methods for determining and understanding the relative contributions of facilities and physicians to the quality and cost of care. Specifically, this study distinguishes levels of variati…

  • Does Quality Influence Consumer Choice of Nursing Homes? Evidence from Nursing Home to Nursing Home Transfers

    Open Access•Richard A Hirth, Jane Banaszak-Holl et al.•ARTICLE•INQUIRY The Journal of Health…•2003

    We estimated Cox proportional hazards models using assessment data from the Minimum Data Set to test whether nursing home residents and their proxies respond to quality of care by changing providers. Various indicators of poor quality increased the likelihood of transfer. Residents of for-profit homes or homes with excess capacity also were more likely to transfer. Inability to participate in care decisions and factors indicating frailty limited …

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  • Does Quality Influence Consumer Choice of Nursing Homes? Evidence from Nursing Home to Nursing Home Transfers

    Open Access•Richard A Hirth, Jane Banaszak-Holl et al.•ARTICLE•INQUIRY The Journal of Health…•2003

    We estimated Cox proportional hazards models using assessment data from the Minimum Data Set to test whether nursing home residents and their proxies respond to quality of care by changing providers. Various indicators of poor quality increased the likelihood of transfer. Residents of for-profit homes or homes with excess capacity also were more likely to transfer. Inability to participate in care decisions and factors indicating frailty limited …

  • Using Knowledge of Multiple Levels of Variation in Care to Target Performance Incentives to Providers

    Marc Turenne, Marc N Turenne et al.•ARTICLE•Medical Care•2008•References: 8

    BACKGROUND: In developing "pay-for-performance" and capitation systems that provide incentives for improving the quality and efficiency of care, policymakers need to determine which healthcare providers to evaluate and reward. OBJECTIVES: This study demonstrates methods for determining and understanding the relative contributions of facilities and physicians to the quality and cost of care. Specifically, this study distinguishes levels of variati…

  • When Payment Systems Collide

    Marc Turenne, Marc N Turenne et al.•ARTICLE•Medical Care•2010•References: 22

    BACKGROUND: Different types of providers often face differing financial incentives for providing similar types of care. This may have implications for payment systems that target improvements in care requiring multiple types of providers. OBJECTIVES: The objective of this study was to determine how hospitalization influences the anemia of Medicare patients with chronic renal failure, where anemia is treated under a prospective payment system duri…

  • Do Resource Utilization and Clinical Measures Still Vary Across Dialysis Chains After Controlling for the Local Practices of Facilities and Physicians

    Richard A Hirth, Marc Turenne et al.•ARTICLE•Medical Care•2010•References: 21

    BACKGROUND: Because of adverse survival effects, anemia management and financial incentives to increase doses of erythropoiesis-stimulating agents (ESAs) have been controversial. Prior studies showed more aggressive anemia management in dialysis facilities owned by for-profit chains, but have been criticized for not accounting for practices of individual physicians and facilities. OBJECTIVE: To improve understanding of how dialysis practices and …

  • The Role of Social Risk Factors in Dialysis Quality and Patient Outcomes Under a Medicare Quality Incentive Program

    Andrew Breck, Jeffrey Marr et al.•ARTICLE•Medical Care•2022•References: 15

    BACKGROUND: There have been critical improvements in dialysis care and mortality in the last decade. These improvements track with the implementation of the end-stage renal disease (ESRD) Quality Incentive Program (QIP) beginning in 2012, which aligns Medicare payments to dialysis facilities with performance on quality measures. This study explores whether the improvements in dialysis care and patient outcomes under the ESRD QIP have been shared …

Business (4 works) · Dialysis and Renal Disease Management (4 works) · Incentive (4 works) · Medicine (4 works) · Dialysis (3 works) · Economics (3 works) · Anemia (2 works) · Chronic Kidney Disease and Diabetes (2 works) · Healthcare Policy and Management (2 works) · Hematocrit (2 works)

Ethnos_APP • Open Source Project • MIT License • Frontend v2.0.0 • Privacy and Cookies • API Documentation: api.ethnos.app/docs • API Source Code: GitHub • DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.17049435 • Frontend Source Code: GitHub • DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.17050053 • cruz.rio.br • Expectantes Misericordiae