Binesh Hass
Biographic Data
| ID | 5579655 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Binesh Hass |
| GIVEN NAMES | Binesh |
| FAMILY NAME | Hass |
| SIGNATURE | HASS B |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Oxford |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-4581-576X |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 3 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 0 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 3 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2022 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2023 |
| H-INDEX | 0 |
Reasoning and reversibility in capacity law
A key objective of the law in the assessment of decision-making capacity in clinical settings is to allow clinicians and judges to avoid making value judgements about the reasons that patients use to refuse treatment. This paper advances two lines of argument in respect of this objective. The first is that authorities cannot rationally avoid significant evaluative judgements in the assessment of a patient’s own assessment of the facts of their ca…
Reasonableness in Capacity Law
It is not uncommon for people to hold bizarre views. Sometimes, these views appear before the courts in mental capacity cases. Judges must then decide if the views are so bizarre that they constitute evidence of incapacity or, instead, if those views are the everyday sort that do not constitute such evidence. The idea behind the distinction is that the everyday sort can be false but, in some important sense, not that unreasonable. But what should…
The values and rules of capacity assessments
This article advances two views on the role of evaluative judgment in clinical assessments of decision-making capacity. The first is that it is rationally impossible for such assessments to exclude judgments of the values a patient uses to motivate their decision-making. Predictably, and second, attempting to exclude such judgments sometimes yields outcomes that contain intractable dilemmas that harm patients. These arguments count against the pr…
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The values and rules of capacity assessments
This article advances two views on the role of evaluative judgment in clinical assessments of decision-making capacity. The first is that it is rationally impossible for such assessments to exclude judgments of the values a patient uses to motivate their decision-making. Predictably, and second, attempting to exclude such judgments sometimes yields outcomes that contain intractable dilemmas that harm patients. These arguments count against the pr…
Reasoning and reversibility in capacity law
A key objective of the law in the assessment of decision-making capacity in clinical settings is to allow clinicians and judges to avoid making value judgements about the reasons that patients use to refuse treatment. This paper advances two lines of argument in respect of this objective. The first is that authorities cannot rationally avoid significant evaluative judgements in the assessment of a patient’s own assessment of the facts of their ca…
Reasonableness in Capacity Law
It is not uncommon for people to hold bizarre views. Sometimes, these views appear before the courts in mental capacity cases. Judges must then decide if the views are so bizarre that they constitute evidence of incapacity or, instead, if those views are the everyday sort that do not constitute such evidence. The idea behind the distinction is that the everyday sort can be false but, in some important sense, not that unreasonable. But what should…
Computer Science (3 works) · Law (3 works) · Political science (3 works) · Psychology (3 works) · Economics (2 works) · Epistemology (2 works) · Ethics in medical practice (2 works) · Healthcare Decision-Making and Restraints (2 works) · Law and economics (2 works) · Medicine (2 works)