Robert M Harnish
Biographic Data
| ID | 564893 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Robert M Harnish |
| GIVEN NAMES | Robert M |
| FAMILY NAME | Harnish |
| SIGNATURE | HARNISH R M |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Arizona |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 17 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 17 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 17 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1976 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2009 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
The problem of fragments: Two interpretative strategies
We do not always talk in complete sentences; we sometimes speak in “fragments”, such as ‘Fire!’, ‘Off with his head’, ‘From Cuba’, ‘Next!’, and ‘Shall we?’. Research has tended to focus on the ellipsis wars — the issue of whether all or most fragments are really sentential or not. Less effort has been put into the question of exactly how fragments are to be interpreted, especially their force. We separate off the issue of fragment interpretation …
Experimental pragmatics: Testing for implicitures
Grice proposed to investigate ‘the total signification of the utterance’. One persistent criticism of Grice’s taxonomy of signification is that he missed an important category of information. This content, and/or the process of providing it, goes by a variety of labels: ‘generalized implicature’, ‘explicature’, ‘unarticulated constituents’, ‘default heuristics’, ‘impliciture’. In this study we first take a sample of such phenomena and, from the p…
Illocutionary rules
The idea that speaking a language is a rule‐ (or convention‐)governed form of behavior goes back at least to Wittgenstein’s language-game analogy, and can be found most prominently in the work of Searle and Alston. Both theorists have a conception of illocutionary rules as putting illocutionary conditions on utterance acts. We argue that this conception of illocutionary rules is inadequate — it does not meet intuitively plausible conditions of ad…
Folk psychology and literal meaning
Recanati (2004), Literal Meaning argues against what he calls “literalism” and for what he calls “contextualism”. He considers a wide spectrum of positions and arguments from relevance theory to hidden variables theory. In the end, however, he seems to hold that semantic and pragmatic theorizing must answer to broadly introspective or folk psychological constraints — they don’t exist in “heaven”. After surveying Recanati’s wide-ranging and provoc…
Linguistics: An Introduction to Language and Communication
Modularity and Speech Acts
Modules, as Marr (1982) and Fodor (1983) conceive of them, lie between sensory and central processes. Modules have the functional property of representing that portion of the world which turns them on, and nine non-functional or structural properties that facilitate carrying out that function. Fodor has proposed that the processing of linguistic information is carried out by a language module (LM), which therefore has the functional and structura…
Meaning and Force: The Pragmatics of Performative Utterances
The author argues that no utterance can be fully understood simply in terms of its linguistic meaning but only with regard to contextual inference. He refutes the views of Austin and Searle and deals with major issues of pragmatics and speech-act theory
Some implications of illocutions
Pragmatics and the modularity of the linguistic system
Linguistic Communication and Speech Acts
Pragmatic derivations
Propositional Structure and Illocutionary Force: A Study of the Contribution of Sentence Meaning to Speech Acts
This book offers a new theory of the structure of propositions, which provides a uniform treatment of constative and performative sentences. Jerrold Katz shows that performatives can enter into logically valid arguments, even though, as Austin claimed, they can't be true or false. Katz also argues that speech act theory is not a theory at all, but an assortment of observations about heterogeneous aspects of the performance of speech acts. He show…
Linguistics: An Introduction to Language and Communication
Linguistic Communication and Speech Acts
The work of Bach and Harnish represents an able attempt by a philosopher and a linguist respectively to restore some sorely needed naturalistic assumptions to the study of linguistic communication
Meaning, reference and necessity: New studies in semantics
Meaning and speech acts
Philosophy and the nature of language
Meaning and speech acts
Linguistic Communication and Speech Acts
The work of Bach and Harnish represents an able attempt by a philosopher and a linguist respectively to restore some sorely needed naturalistic assumptions to the study of linguistic communication
Pragmatic derivations
Pragmatics and the modularity of the linguistic system
Philosophy and the nature of language
Meaning and speech acts
Meaning, reference and necessity: New studies in semantics
Linguistics: An Introduction to Language and Communication
Linguistic Communication and Speech Acts
The work of Bach and Harnish represents an able attempt by a philosopher and a linguist respectively to restore some sorely needed naturalistic assumptions to the study of linguistic communication
Linguistic Communication and Speech Acts
Pragmatic derivations
Propositional Structure and Illocutionary Force: A Study of the Contribution of Sentence Meaning to Speech Acts
This book offers a new theory of the structure of propositions, which provides a uniform treatment of constative and performative sentences. Jerrold Katz shows that performatives can enter into logically valid arguments, even though, as Austin claimed, they can't be true or false. Katz also argues that speech act theory is not a theory at all, but an assortment of observations about heterogeneous aspects of the performance of speech acts. He show…
Some implications of illocutions
Pragmatics and the modularity of the linguistic system
Meaning and Force: The Pragmatics of Performative Utterances
The author argues that no utterance can be fully understood simply in terms of its linguistic meaning but only with regard to contextual inference. He refutes the views of Austin and Searle and deals with major issues of pragmatics and speech-act theory
Modularity and Speech Acts
Modules, as Marr (1982) and Fodor (1983) conceive of them, lie between sensory and central processes. Modules have the functional property of representing that portion of the world which turns them on, and nine non-functional or structural properties that facilitate carrying out that function. Fodor has proposed that the processing of linguistic information is carried out by a language module (LM), which therefore has the functional and structura…
Linguistics: An Introduction to Language and Communication
Folk psychology and literal meaning
Recanati (2004), Literal Meaning argues against what he calls “literalism” and for what he calls “contextualism”. He considers a wide spectrum of positions and arguments from relevance theory to hidden variables theory. In the end, however, he seems to hold that semantic and pragmatic theorizing must answer to broadly introspective or folk psychological constraints — they don’t exist in “heaven”. After surveying Recanati’s wide-ranging and provoc…
Illocutionary rules
The idea that speaking a language is a rule‐ (or convention‐)governed form of behavior goes back at least to Wittgenstein’s language-game analogy, and can be found most prominently in the work of Searle and Alston. Both theorists have a conception of illocutionary rules as putting illocutionary conditions on utterance acts. We argue that this conception of illocutionary rules is inadequate — it does not meet intuitively plausible conditions of ad…
Experimental pragmatics: Testing for implicitures
Grice proposed to investigate ‘the total signification of the utterance’. One persistent criticism of Grice’s taxonomy of signification is that he missed an important category of information. This content, and/or the process of providing it, goes by a variety of labels: ‘generalized implicature’, ‘explicature’, ‘unarticulated constituents’, ‘default heuristics’, ‘impliciture’. In this study we first take a sample of such phenomena and, from the p…
The problem of fragments: Two interpretative strategies
We do not always talk in complete sentences; we sometimes speak in “fragments”, such as ‘Fire!’, ‘Off with his head’, ‘From Cuba’, ‘Next!’, and ‘Shall we?’. Research has tended to focus on the ellipsis wars — the issue of whether all or most fragments are really sentential or not. Less effort has been put into the question of exactly how fragments are to be interpreted, especially their force. We separate off the issue of fragment interpretation …
Linguistics (17 works) · Philosophy (17 works) · Epistemology (9 works) · Psychology (8 works) · Language, Metaphor, and Cognition (7 works) · Computer Science (6 works) · Philosophy (5 works) · Sociology (5 works) · Speech act (4 works) · Syntax, Semantics, Linguistic Variation (4 works)