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Ullin T Place

Biographic Data

ID5651129
NAMEUllin T Place
GIVEN NAMESUllin T
FAMILY NAMEPlace
SIGNATUREPLACE U T
AFFILIATIONSUniversity of Oxford
VERIFIEDNo
TOTAL WORKS6
TOTAL CITATIONS37
AUTHOR COUNT6
EDITOR COUNT0
FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR1955
LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR1999
H-INDEX2
  • Intentionality and the Physical: A Reply to Mumford

    Ullin T Place•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Quarterly•1999

    Martin and Pfeifer claim ‘that the most typical characterizations of intentionality’ proposed by philosophers are satisfied by physical dispositions. If that is correct, we must conclude either, as they do and as Mumford (this volume) does, that the philosophers are wrong and intentionality is something else or, as I do, that intentionality is what the philosophers say it is, in which case it is the mark, not of the mental, but of the disposition…

  • The Role of the Ethnomethodological Experiment in the Empirical Investigation of Social Norms and Its Application to Conceptual Analysis

    Open Access•Ullin T Place•ARTICLE•Philosophy of the Social Sciences•1992•Cited by: 2•References: 5

    It is argued that conceptual analysis as practiced by the philosophers of ordinary language, is an empirical procedure that relies on a version of Garfinkel's ethnomethodological experiment. The ethnomethodological experiment is presented as a procedure in which the existence and nature of a social norm is demonstrated by flouting the putative convention and observing what reaction that produces in the social group within which the convention is …

  • On the social relativity of truth and the analytic/synthetic distinction

    Open Access•Ullin T Place•ARTICLE•Human Studies•1991•Cited by: 1•References: 6

  • The ‘Phenomenological Fallacy’—a Reply to J. R. Smythies

    Open Access•Ullin T Place•ARTICLE•British Journal of Psychology•1959

  • Is Consciousness a Brain Process

    Open Access•Ullin T Place•ARTICLE•British Journal of Psychology•1956•Cited by: 34

    thesis that consciousness is a process in brain is put forward as a reasonable scientific hypothesis, not to be dismissed on logical grounds alone. conditions under which two sets of observations are treated as observations of same process, rather than as observations of two independent correlated processes, are discussed. It is suggested that we can identify consciousness with a given pattern of brain activity, if we can explain subject's intros…

  • Contradictories and Entailment

    Ullin T Place, J J C Smart et al.•ARTICLE•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•1955

  • Is Consciousness a Brain Process

    Open Access•Ullin T Place•ARTICLE•British Journal of Psychology•1956•Cited by: 34

    thesis that consciousness is a process in brain is put forward as a reasonable scientific hypothesis, not to be dismissed on logical grounds alone. conditions under which two sets of observations are treated as observations of same process, rather than as observations of two independent correlated processes, are discussed. It is suggested that we can identify consciousness with a given pattern of brain activity, if we can explain subject's intros…

  • The Role of the Ethnomethodological Experiment in the Empirical Investigation of Social Norms and Its Application to Conceptual Analysis

    Open Access•Ullin T Place•ARTICLE•Philosophy of the Social Sciences•1992•Cited by: 2•References: 5

    It is argued that conceptual analysis as practiced by the philosophers of ordinary language, is an empirical procedure that relies on a version of Garfinkel's ethnomethodological experiment. The ethnomethodological experiment is presented as a procedure in which the existence and nature of a social norm is demonstrated by flouting the putative convention and observing what reaction that produces in the social group within which the convention is …

  • On the social relativity of truth and the analytic/synthetic distinction

    Open Access•Ullin T Place•ARTICLE•Human Studies•1991•Cited by: 1•References: 6

  • Contradictories and Entailment

    Ullin T Place, J J C Smart et al.•ARTICLE•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•1955

  • Is Consciousness a Brain Process

    Open Access•Ullin T Place•ARTICLE•British Journal of Psychology•1956•Cited by: 34

    thesis that consciousness is a process in brain is put forward as a reasonable scientific hypothesis, not to be dismissed on logical grounds alone. conditions under which two sets of observations are treated as observations of same process, rather than as observations of two independent correlated processes, are discussed. It is suggested that we can identify consciousness with a given pattern of brain activity, if we can explain subject's intros…

  • The ‘Phenomenological Fallacy’—a Reply to J. R. Smythies

    Open Access•Ullin T Place•ARTICLE•British Journal of Psychology•1959

  • On the social relativity of truth and the analytic/synthetic distinction

    Open Access•Ullin T Place•ARTICLE•Human Studies•1991•Cited by: 1•References: 6

  • The Role of the Ethnomethodological Experiment in the Empirical Investigation of Social Norms and Its Application to Conceptual Analysis

    Open Access•Ullin T Place•ARTICLE•Philosophy of the Social Sciences•1992•Cited by: 2•References: 5

    It is argued that conceptual analysis as practiced by the philosophers of ordinary language, is an empirical procedure that relies on a version of Garfinkel's ethnomethodological experiment. The ethnomethodological experiment is presented as a procedure in which the existence and nature of a social norm is demonstrated by flouting the putative convention and observing what reaction that produces in the social group within which the convention is …

  • Intentionality and the Physical: A Reply to Mumford

    Ullin T Place•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Quarterly•1999

    Martin and Pfeifer claim ‘that the most typical characterizations of intentionality’ proposed by philosophers are satisfied by physical dispositions. If that is correct, we must conclude either, as they do and as Mumford (this volume) does, that the philosophers are wrong and intentionality is something else or, as I do, that intentionality is what the philosophers say it is, in which case it is the mark, not of the mental, but of the disposition…

Epistemology (6 works) · Philosophy (6 works) · Psychology (4 works) · Computer Science (3 works) · Sociology (3 works) · Fallacy (2 works) · Linguistics (2 works) · Philosophy (2 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (2 works) · Social Representations and Identity (2 works)

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