Antulio J Echevarria
Biographic Data
| ID | 5653173 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Antulio J Echevarria |
| GIVEN NAMES | Antulio J |
| FAMILY NAME | Echevarria |
| SIGNATURE | ECHEVARRIA A J |
| AFFILIATIONS | United States Army War College |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 26 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 4 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 26 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1995 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Strategic Rivalries: How Are They Won
This article argues strategic rivalries—distinct from general strategic competition—are best understood as contests in which states prioritize weakening a specific opponent’s capacity to compete. It departs from existing work by critiquing the Joint Concept for Competing’s narrow definition and by emphasizing rivalry termination as a central but understudied dimension. Drawing on decades of international relations scholarship and historical datas…
Reframing the Nature of Strategic Competition
In this Corner, Dr. Antulio J. Echevarria II, professor of strategic competition at the US Army War College, critiques the essential concepts underpinning US doctrine concerning intrastate strategic competition. In this, his inaugural contribution, Dr. Echevarria discusses the shortfalls in the Joint concept of interstate strategic competition, namely, its failure to capture the true nature of that competition. A more extensive reading of the sch…
Putin’s Invasion of Ukraine in 2022: Implications for Strategic Studies
This special commentary examines critical issues for the field of strategic studies raised by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, including the waning of major war, strategic coercion, and “War Amongst the People.” Drawing on previous scholarship and current events, this commentary considers the questions raised by the first major war of the twenty-first century. It provides recommendations for scholars and senior leaders on how to work together to add…
Putin’s Invasion of Ukraine in 2022: Implications for Strategic Studies
This commentary discusses how some of the key dilemmas in strategic studies—such as the decline of major wars, the limitations of strategic coercion, the utility of the paradigm “War amongst the People,” and our current understanding of the relationship between war’s character and its nature—are either challenged or refined by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine
War's Logic: Strategic Thought and the American Way of War
Antulio J. Echevarria II reveals how successive generations of American strategic theorists have thought about war. Analyzing the work of Alfred Thayer Mahan, Billy Mitchell, Bernard Brodie, Robert Osgood, Thomas Schelling, Herman Kahn, Henry Eccles, Joseph Wiley, Harry Summers, John Boyd, William Lind, and John Warden, he uncovers the logic that underpinned each theorist's critical concepts, core principles, and basic assumptions about the natur…
Colin Gray and the paradox of strategic culture: Critical but unknowable
As Colin Gray’s colleagues and friends well know, he invested considerable intellectual energy into championing the concept of strategic culture. His affinity for it traces to his 1981 article in I
Hostility and War, Small or Otherwise
Translations are difficult because they require translators to choose between several words, and thereby to interpret rather than merely to translate. Any interpretation is, almost by definition, i
Rediscovering US Military Strategy: A Role for Doctrine
This article argues that US military doctrine, and by extension that of most Western militaries, missed an opportunity in the period following the Cold War to rediscover the many types of military strategies employed to good effect before the industrial-age wars of the twentieth century. This missed opportunity resulted in Coalition forces having to relearn many of those strategies through costly trial and error in Iraq and Afghanistan
Strategy’ as Prologue
Beatrice Heuser's The Evolution of Strategy is an interesting book. 1 It is a first-rate historical review of several principal ideas concerning ‘Strategy with a capital S’, which is defined, appro
On the Clausewitz of the Cold War: Reconsidering the Primacy of Policy in On War
Throughout the Cold War, scholars gave considerable privilege to Clausewitz's observation that war is the “mere continuation of political activity ( Politik) by other means.” It is often referred to in intellectual shorthand as the primacy of policy. This article questions the extent to which emphasis on the primacy of policy has been overstressed, influenced perhaps by the strategic context of the Cold War. Clausewitz's trinitarian concept of wa…
The Trouble with History
once admitted that the past, which he aptly referred to as an "inexhaustible storehouse of events," could be used to "prove anything or its contrary." 1 Howard's admission exposes an underlying problem with history that most historians prefer not to acknowledge. The past has indeed served many masters and conflicting purposes over time; its storehouse of events has been used to validate or discredit practically every major theory, precept, or pri…
Deconstructing the theory of fourth-generation war
Although Colonel Hammes rightly takes the Pentagon's vision of future warfare to task for being too technologically oriented and for not taking into account the countermeasures an intelligent, adap
Preparing the U.S. Army for Homeland Security: Concepts, Issues, and Options
Globalization and the Clausewitzian Nature of War
(2003). Globalization and the Clausewitzian Nature of War. The European Legacy: Vol. 8, No. 3, pp. 317-332
Helmuth von Moltke and the Origins of the First World War
Rapid decisive operations: US operational assumptions regarding future warfare
(2002). Rapid decisive operations: US operational assumptions regarding future warfare. Defence Studies: Vol. 2, No. 1, pp. 127-138
Rapid decisive operations: US operational assumptions regarding future warfare
The 'Cult of the Offensive' Revisited: Confronting Technological Change Before the Great War
Conventional wisdom maintains that military thinkers before the Great War resorted to an irrational, and ultimately self-defeating, 'cult of the offensive' to overcome the rapidly increasing effectiveness of modern firepower. On the contrary, an underlying and, indeed, compelling military rationale did exist for placing renewed emphasis on the offensive spirit, particularly after the Russo-Japanese War. Moreover, the cult's central argument was n…
After Clausewitz: German Military Thinkers before the Great War
The German Idea of Militarism: Radical and Socialist Critics 1866-1914
Introduction Part I. The Anti-Militarist Tradition: 1. The Reich, democracy and cheap government 2. National interest and national defence 3. Karl Kautsky's theory of militarism Part II. The New Militarism: 4. Karl Liebknecht and the end of democratic anti-militarism 5. The economics of armament 6. The turn to pacifism, 1907-14 Conclusion
Tomorrow's Army: The Challenge of Nonlinear Change
Heroic History and Vicarious War: Nineteenth‐Century German Military History Writing
Moltke and the German Military Tradition: His Theories and Legacies
to 1871, and then of the Great General Staff (GGS) from 1871 to 1888, and architect of Germany's brilliant Wars of Unification (1864-71), remains the historical figure most responsible for shaping modern German military thought.[1] He not only established enduring paradigms for Prusso-German tactical, operational, and strategic thinking during his lifetime, but also shaped many of the political attitudes within the officer corps, particularly in …
General Staff Historian Hugo Freiherr von Freytag-Loringhoven and the Dialectics of German Military Thought
Antulio J. Echevarria, General Staff Historian Hugo Freiherr von Freytag-Loringhoven and the Dialectics of German Military Thought, The Journal of Military History, Vol. 60, No. 3 (Jul., 1996), pp. 471-494
Borrowing from the Master: Uses of Clausewitz in German Military Literature before the Great War
On the Brink of the Abyss: The Warrior Identity and German Military Thought before the Great War
Rediscovering US Military Strategy: A Role for Doctrine
This article argues that US military doctrine, and by extension that of most Western militaries, missed an opportunity in the period following the Cold War to rediscover the many types of military strategies employed to good effect before the industrial-age wars of the twentieth century. This missed opportunity resulted in Coalition forces having to relearn many of those strategies through costly trial and error in Iraq and Afghanistan
Deconstructing the theory of fourth-generation war
Although Colonel Hammes rightly takes the Pentagon's vision of future warfare to task for being too technologically oriented and for not taking into account the countermeasures an intelligent, adap
On the Brink of the Abyss: The Warrior Identity and German Military Thought before the Great War
Moltke and the German Military Tradition: His Theories and Legacies
to 1871, and then of the Great General Staff (GGS) from 1871 to 1888, and architect of Germany's brilliant Wars of Unification (1864-71), remains the historical figure most responsible for shaping modern German military thought.[1] He not only established enduring paradigms for Prusso-German tactical, operational, and strategic thinking during his lifetime, but also shaped many of the political attitudes within the officer corps, particularly in …
General Staff Historian Hugo Freiherr von Freytag-Loringhoven and the Dialectics of German Military Thought
Antulio J. Echevarria, General Staff Historian Hugo Freiherr von Freytag-Loringhoven and the Dialectics of German Military Thought, The Journal of Military History, Vol. 60, No. 3 (Jul., 1996), pp. 471-494
Borrowing from the Master: Uses of Clausewitz in German Military Literature before the Great War
Heroic History and Vicarious War: Nineteenth‐Century German Military History Writing
Tomorrow's Army: The Challenge of Nonlinear Change
The German Idea of Militarism: Radical and Socialist Critics 1866-1914
Introduction Part I. The Anti-Militarist Tradition: 1. The Reich, democracy and cheap government 2. National interest and national defence 3. Karl Kautsky's theory of militarism Part II. The New Militarism: 4. Karl Liebknecht and the end of democratic anti-militarism 5. The economics of armament 6. The turn to pacifism, 1907-14 Conclusion
After Clausewitz: German Military Thinkers before the Great War
Helmuth von Moltke and the Origins of the First World War
Rapid decisive operations: US operational assumptions regarding future warfare
(2002). Rapid decisive operations: US operational assumptions regarding future warfare. Defence Studies: Vol. 2, No. 1, pp. 127-138
Rapid decisive operations: US operational assumptions regarding future warfare
The 'Cult of the Offensive' Revisited: Confronting Technological Change Before the Great War
Conventional wisdom maintains that military thinkers before the Great War resorted to an irrational, and ultimately self-defeating, 'cult of the offensive' to overcome the rapidly increasing effectiveness of modern firepower. On the contrary, an underlying and, indeed, compelling military rationale did exist for placing renewed emphasis on the offensive spirit, particularly after the Russo-Japanese War. Moreover, the cult's central argument was n…
Preparing the U.S. Army for Homeland Security: Concepts, Issues, and Options
Globalization and the Clausewitzian Nature of War
(2003). Globalization and the Clausewitzian Nature of War. The European Legacy: Vol. 8, No. 3, pp. 317-332
The Trouble with History
once admitted that the past, which he aptly referred to as an "inexhaustible storehouse of events," could be used to "prove anything or its contrary." 1 Howard's admission exposes an underlying problem with history that most historians prefer not to acknowledge. The past has indeed served many masters and conflicting purposes over time; its storehouse of events has been used to validate or discredit practically every major theory, precept, or pri…
Deconstructing the theory of fourth-generation war
Although Colonel Hammes rightly takes the Pentagon's vision of future warfare to task for being too technologically oriented and for not taking into account the countermeasures an intelligent, adap
On the Clausewitz of the Cold War: Reconsidering the Primacy of Policy in On War
Throughout the Cold War, scholars gave considerable privilege to Clausewitz's observation that war is the “mere continuation of political activity ( Politik) by other means.” It is often referred to in intellectual shorthand as the primacy of policy. This article questions the extent to which emphasis on the primacy of policy has been overstressed, influenced perhaps by the strategic context of the Cold War. Clausewitz's trinitarian concept of wa…
Strategy’ as Prologue
Beatrice Heuser's The Evolution of Strategy is an interesting book. 1 It is a first-rate historical review of several principal ideas concerning ‘Strategy with a capital S’, which is defined, appro
Rediscovering US Military Strategy: A Role for Doctrine
This article argues that US military doctrine, and by extension that of most Western militaries, missed an opportunity in the period following the Cold War to rediscover the many types of military strategies employed to good effect before the industrial-age wars of the twentieth century. This missed opportunity resulted in Coalition forces having to relearn many of those strategies through costly trial and error in Iraq and Afghanistan
Hostility and War, Small or Otherwise
Translations are difficult because they require translators to choose between several words, and thereby to interpret rather than merely to translate. Any interpretation is, almost by definition, i
War's Logic: Strategic Thought and the American Way of War
Antulio J. Echevarria II reveals how successive generations of American strategic theorists have thought about war. Analyzing the work of Alfred Thayer Mahan, Billy Mitchell, Bernard Brodie, Robert Osgood, Thomas Schelling, Herman Kahn, Henry Eccles, Joseph Wiley, Harry Summers, John Boyd, William Lind, and John Warden, he uncovers the logic that underpinned each theorist's critical concepts, core principles, and basic assumptions about the natur…
Colin Gray and the paradox of strategic culture: Critical but unknowable
As Colin Gray’s colleagues and friends well know, he invested considerable intellectual energy into championing the concept of strategic culture. His affinity for it traces to his 1981 article in I
Putin’s Invasion of Ukraine in 2022: Implications for Strategic Studies
This special commentary examines critical issues for the field of strategic studies raised by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, including the waning of major war, strategic coercion, and “War Amongst the People.” Drawing on previous scholarship and current events, this commentary considers the questions raised by the first major war of the twenty-first century. It provides recommendations for scholars and senior leaders on how to work together to add…
Putin’s Invasion of Ukraine in 2022: Implications for Strategic Studies
This commentary discusses how some of the key dilemmas in strategic studies—such as the decline of major wars, the limitations of strategic coercion, the utility of the paradigm “War amongst the People,” and our current understanding of the relationship between war’s character and its nature—are either challenged or refined by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine
Reframing the Nature of Strategic Competition
In this Corner, Dr. Antulio J. Echevarria II, professor of strategic competition at the US Army War College, critiques the essential concepts underpinning US doctrine concerning intrastate strategic competition. In this, his inaugural contribution, Dr. Echevarria discusses the shortfalls in the Joint concept of interstate strategic competition, namely, its failure to capture the true nature of that competition. A more extensive reading of the sch…
Political science (19 works) · Law (12 works) · History (10 works) · Philosophy (10 works) · Sociology (10 works) · Military History and Strategy (9 works) · European history and politics (7 works) · German (7 works) · Political economy (7 works) · Ancient history (6 works)