Enrico Perotti
Biographic Data
| ID | 5658085 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Enrico Perotti |
| GIVEN NAMES | Enrico |
| FAMILY NAME | Perotti |
| SIGNATURE | PEROTTI E |
| AFFILIATIONS | Centre for Economic Policy Research |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-9519-8667 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 4 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 27 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 4 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2006 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
The euro as an institutionally diverse monetary union
Depersonalization of Business in Ancient Rome
A crucial step in economic development is the depersonalization of business, which enables an enterprise to operate as a separate entity from its owners and managers. Until the emergence of a de iure depersonalization of business in the 19th century, business activities were eminently personal, with managing partners bearing unlimited liability. Roman law even restricted agency. Yet, the Roman legal system developed a form of de facto depersonali…
Corporate Governance and the Distribution of Wealth
We present a theory in which the corporate governance structure in a country is determined by a political majority and show how this decision is related to the distribution of financial wealth. The main argument is that labor claims are exposed to undiversifiable risk, so voters with small financial stakes may prefer a corporate governance structure that reduces corporate risktaking. We discuss the inflationary experiences of different countries …
The Political Economy of Corporate Control and Labor Rents
In a democracy, a political majority can influence both the corporate governance structure and the return to human and financial capital. We argue that when financial wealth is sufficiently concentrated, there is political support for high labor rents and a strong governance role for banks or large investors. The model is consistent with the "great reversal" phenomenon in the first half of the twentieth century. We offer evidence that in several …
The Political Economy of Corporate Control and Labor Rents
In a democracy, a political majority can influence both the corporate governance structure and the return to human and financial capital. We argue that when financial wealth is sufficiently concentrated, there is political support for high labor rents and a strong governance role for banks or large investors. The model is consistent with the "great reversal" phenomenon in the first half of the twentieth century. We offer evidence that in several …
Depersonalization of Business in Ancient Rome
A crucial step in economic development is the depersonalization of business, which enables an enterprise to operate as a separate entity from its owners and managers. Until the emergence of a de iure depersonalization of business in the 19th century, business activities were eminently personal, with managing partners bearing unlimited liability. Roman law even restricted agency. Yet, the Roman legal system developed a form of de facto depersonali…
Corporate Governance and the Distribution of Wealth
We present a theory in which the corporate governance structure in a country is determined by a political majority and show how this decision is related to the distribution of financial wealth. The main argument is that labor claims are exposed to undiversifiable risk, so voters with small financial stakes may prefer a corporate governance structure that reduces corporate risktaking. We discuss the inflationary experiences of different countries …
The Political Economy of Corporate Control and Labor Rents
In a democracy, a political majority can influence both the corporate governance structure and the return to human and financial capital. We argue that when financial wealth is sufficiently concentrated, there is political support for high labor rents and a strong governance role for banks or large investors. The model is consistent with the "great reversal" phenomenon in the first half of the twentieth century. We offer evidence that in several …
Depersonalization of Business in Ancient Rome
A crucial step in economic development is the depersonalization of business, which enables an enterprise to operate as a separate entity from its owners and managers. Until the emergence of a de iure depersonalization of business in the 19th century, business activities were eminently personal, with managing partners bearing unlimited liability. Roman law even restricted agency. Yet, the Roman legal system developed a form of de facto depersonali…
The euro as an institutionally diverse monetary union
Banking stability, regulation, efficiency (3 works) · Economics (3 works) · Global Financial Crisis and Policies (3 works) · Political science (3 works) · Corporate Finance and Governance (2 works) · Corporate governance (2 works) · Economic system (2 works) · Finance (2 works) · Law (2 works) · Market economy (2 works)