Skip to main content

ETHNOS_APP

Home • Search • Journals • List 0

John R Lott

Biographic Data

ID5684194
NAMEJohn R Lott
GIVEN NAMESJohn R
FAMILY NAMELott
SIGNATURELOTT J R
AFFILIATIONSUniversity of Chicago
VERIFIEDNo
TOTAL WORKS30
TOTAL CITATIONS376
AUTHOR COUNT30
EDITOR COUNT0
FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR1986
LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR2024
H-INDEX9
  • Estimating the effect of concealed carry laws on murder

    Open Access•Carlisle E Moody, John R Lott•ARTICLE•International Review of Law and…•2024

  • Is newspaper coverage of economic events politically biased

    Open Access•John R Lott, Kevin A Hassett•ARTICLE•Public Choice•2014•Cited by: 5•References: 25

  • ABA ratings

    Open Access•John R Lott•ARTICLE•Public Choice•2013•References: 5

  • Non-voted ballots, the cost of voting, and race

    Open Access•John R Lott•ARTICLE•Public Choice•2009•Cited by: 5•References: 12

  • Campaign finance reform and electoral competition

    Open Access•John R Lott•ARTICLE•Public Choice•2006•Cited by: 4•References: 32

  • The Reputational Penalties for Environmental Violations

    Jonathan M Karpoff, John R Lott et al.•ARTICLE•The Journal of Law and Economics•2005

    This paper examines the sizes of the fines, damage awards, remediation costs, and market value losses imposed on companies that violate environmental regulations. Firms that violate environmental laws suffer statistically significant losses in the market value of firm equity. The losses, however, are of similar magnitudes to the legal penalties imposed, and in the cross section, the market value loss is related to the size of the legal penalty. T…

  • The impact of early media election calls on Republican voting rates in Florida’s western Panhandle counties in 2000

    Open Access•John R Lott•ARTICLE•Public Choice•2005•Cited by: 6•References: 5

  • More Guns, Less Crime

    Jens Ludwig, John R Lott•ARTICLE•Contemporary Sociology A Journal…•1999

  • Did Women's Suffrage Change the Size and Scope of Government

    John R Lott, Jr John R Lott et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•1999•Cited by: 92•References: 4

    This paper examines the growth of government during this century as a result of giving women the right to vote. Using cross‐sectional time‐series data for 1870–1940, we examine state government expenditures and revenue as well as voting by U.S. House and Senate state delegations and the passage of a wide range of different state laws. Suffrage coincided with immediate increases in state government expenditures and revenue and more liberal voting …

  • Public Schooling, Indoctrination, and Totalitarianism

    John R Lott, Jr John R Lott•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•1999•Cited by: 41•References: 2

    Governments use public education and public ownership of the media to control the information that their citizens receive. More totalitarian governments as well as those with larger wealth transfers make greater investments in publicly controlled information. This finding is borne out from cross‐sectional time‐series evidence acros countries and is confirmed when the recent fall of communism is specifically examined. My results reject the standar…

  • Crime, Deterrence, and Right‐to‐Carry Concealed Handguns

    Open Access•John R Lott, Jr John R Lott et al.•ARTICLE•The Journal of Legal Studies•1997

    Using cross‐sectional time‐series data for U.S. counties from 1977 to 1992, we find that allowing citizens to carry concealed weapons deters violent crimes, without increasing accidental deaths. If those states without right‐to‐carry concealed gun provisions had adopted them in 1992, county‐ and state‐level data indicate that approximately 1,500 murders would have been avoided yearly. Similarly, we predict that rapes would have declined by over 4…

  • Does political reform increase wealth

    Open Access•John R Lott•ARTICLE•Public Choice•1997•Cited by: 2•References: 19

  • Term limits and electoral competitiveness

    Open Access•Kermit Daniel, John R Lott et al.•ARTICLE•Public Choice•1997•Cited by: 20•References: 18

  • The reputational penalty firms bear from committing criminal fraud

    Open Access•Jonathan M Karpoff, John R Lott•CHAPTER•Economics of Organised Crime•1996

    Optimal penalties for corporate fraud require that firms face expected penalties equal to the total social costs of the crime. Yet formal courtimposed sanctions for committing fraud often represent a small fraction of the damage produced by the fraud. Sheer and Ho (1989), for example, estimate that the median and mean ratios of criminal fines to the private loss from private fraud were 0.14 and 0.73 in 1988. The corresponding median and mean rati…

  • Legislator voting and shirking

    Open Access•Bruce Bender, John R Lott•ARTICLE•Public Choice•1996

  • Time series evidence on shirking in the U.S. House of Representatives

    Open Access•John R Lott, Stephen G Bronars•ARTICLE•Public Choice•1993•Cited by: 41•References: 21

  • A critical review and an extension of the political shirking literature

    Open Access•John R Lott, Michael L Davis•ARTICLE•Public Choice•1992

  • Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance

    Open Access•John R Lott, Douglass C North•ARTICLE•Journal of Policy Analysis and…•1992•Cited by: 23

  • Reforming Products Liability

    Open Access•John R Lott, W Kip Viscusi•ARTICLE•Journal of Policy Analysis and…•1992•Cited by: 2

    Preface 1. Diagnosing the Liability Crisis Perspectives on Liability Reform Recent Trends in Products Liability Proposals for Reform 2. The Dimensions of the Liability Crisis Accident Rates Decline, But Litigation Soars The Surge in Asbestos Litigation Insurance Industry Trends Roots of the Insurance Crisis, 1980-1984 Other Economic Effects of Products Liability The Design Defect Doctrine and Hazard Warnings 3. The Litigation Process The Overall …

  • Does additional campaign spending really hurt incumbents

    Open Access•John R Lott•ARTICLE•Public Choice•1991•Cited by: 10•References: 7

  • Shirking and sorting in a political market with finite-lived politicians

    Open Access•John R Lott, W Robert Reed•ARTICLE•Public Choice•1989•Cited by: 29•References: 27

  • Production costs and deregulation

    Open Access•John R Lott, Morgan O Reynolds•ARTICLE•Public Choice•1989•References: 6

  • Racial Employment and Earnings Differentials

    Open Access•John R Lott•ARTICLE•The Review of Black Political…•1989

  • Televising legislatures

    Open Access•Gertrud M Fremling, John R Lott•ARTICLE•Public Choice•1988•Cited by: 2•References: 15

  • Externalities, agency structure, and the level of transfers

    Open Access•John R Lott•ARTICLE•Public Choice•1987•References: 6

Next
  • Did Women's Suffrage Change the Size and Scope of Government

    John R Lott, Jr John R Lott et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•1999•Cited by: 92•References: 4

    This paper examines the growth of government during this century as a result of giving women the right to vote. Using cross‐sectional time‐series data for 1870–1940, we examine state government expenditures and revenue as well as voting by U.S. House and Senate state delegations and the passage of a wide range of different state laws. Suffrage coincided with immediate increases in state government expenditures and revenue and more liberal voting …

  • Political cheating

    Open Access•John R Lott•ARTICLE•Public Choice•1987•Cited by: 65•References: 13

  • Public Schooling, Indoctrination, and Totalitarianism

    John R Lott, Jr John R Lott•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•1999•Cited by: 41•References: 2

    Governments use public education and public ownership of the media to control the information that their citizens receive. More totalitarian governments as well as those with larger wealth transfers make greater investments in publicly controlled information. This finding is borne out from cross‐sectional time‐series evidence acros countries and is confirmed when the recent fall of communism is specifically examined. My results reject the standar…

  • Time series evidence on shirking in the U.S. House of Representatives

    Open Access•John R Lott, Stephen G Bronars•ARTICLE•Public Choice•1993•Cited by: 41•References: 21

  • Shirking and sorting in a political market with finite-lived politicians

    Open Access•John R Lott, W Robert Reed•ARTICLE•Public Choice•1989•Cited by: 29•References: 27

  • Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance

    Open Access•John R Lott, Douglass C North•ARTICLE•Journal of Policy Analysis and…•1992•Cited by: 23

  • Term limits and electoral competitiveness

    Open Access•Kermit Daniel, John R Lott et al.•ARTICLE•Public Choice•1997•Cited by: 20•References: 18

  • Brand names and barriers to entry in political markets

    Open Access•John R Lott•ARTICLE•Public Choice•1986•Cited by: 16•References: 1

  • Does additional campaign spending really hurt incumbents

    Open Access•John R Lott•ARTICLE•Public Choice•1991•Cited by: 10•References: 7

  • "Should the Wealthy Be Able to "Buy Justice

    John R Lott, John R Lott John R Lott•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•1987•Cited by: 7•References: 5

    This paper shows that allowing wealthy individuals to influence the outcome of their trials through the purchase of legal services can be consistent with the optimal penalty literature. Using this analysis, the author reviews some of the advantages and disadvantages of varying the length of jail terms versus varying the probability of conviction. Finally, implications for the bail, prosecutorial, and plea bargaining systems are examined. Copyrigh…

  • The impact of early media election calls on Republican voting rates in Florida’s western Panhandle counties in 2000

    Open Access•John R Lott•ARTICLE•Public Choice•2005•Cited by: 6•References: 5

  • Is newspaper coverage of economic events politically biased

    Open Access•John R Lott, Kevin A Hassett•ARTICLE•Public Choice•2014•Cited by: 5•References: 25

  • Non-voted ballots, the cost of voting, and race

    Open Access•John R Lott•ARTICLE•Public Choice•2009•Cited by: 5•References: 12

  • Campaign finance reform and electoral competition

    Open Access•John R Lott•ARTICLE•Public Choice•2006•Cited by: 4•References: 32

  • The institutional arrangement of public education

    Open Access•John R Lott•ARTICLE•Public Choice•1987•Cited by: 4•References: 10

  • Does political reform increase wealth

    Open Access•John R Lott•ARTICLE•Public Choice•1997•Cited by: 2•References: 19

  • Reforming Products Liability

    Open Access•John R Lott, W Kip Viscusi•ARTICLE•Journal of Policy Analysis and…•1992•Cited by: 2

    Preface 1. Diagnosing the Liability Crisis Perspectives on Liability Reform Recent Trends in Products Liability Proposals for Reform 2. The Dimensions of the Liability Crisis Accident Rates Decline, But Litigation Soars The Surge in Asbestos Litigation Insurance Industry Trends Roots of the Insurance Crisis, 1980-1984 Other Economic Effects of Products Liability The Design Defect Doctrine and Hazard Warnings 3. The Litigation Process The Overall …

  • Televising legislatures

    Open Access•Gertrud M Fremling, John R Lott•ARTICLE•Public Choice•1988•Cited by: 2•References: 15

  • On nationalizing private property and the present value of dictators

    Open Access•John R Lott, David Reiffen•ARTICLE•Public Choice•1986•Cited by: 2•References: 1

  • On nationalizing private property and the present value of dictators

    Open Access•John R Lott, David Reiffen•ARTICLE•Public Choice•1986•Cited by: 2•References: 1

  • Brand names and barriers to entry in political markets

    Open Access•John R Lott•ARTICLE•Public Choice•1986•Cited by: 16•References: 1

  • Externalities, agency structure, and the level of transfers

    Open Access•John R Lott•ARTICLE•Public Choice•1987•References: 6

  • The institutional arrangement of public education

    Open Access•John R Lott•ARTICLE•Public Choice•1987•Cited by: 4•References: 10

  • Political cheating

    Open Access•John R Lott•ARTICLE•Public Choice•1987•Cited by: 65•References: 13

  • "Should the Wealthy Be Able to "Buy Justice

    John R Lott, John R Lott John R Lott•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•1987•Cited by: 7•References: 5

    This paper shows that allowing wealthy individuals to influence the outcome of their trials through the purchase of legal services can be consistent with the optimal penalty literature. Using this analysis, the author reviews some of the advantages and disadvantages of varying the length of jail terms versus varying the probability of conviction. Finally, implications for the bail, prosecutorial, and plea bargaining systems are examined. Copyrigh…

  • Televising legislatures

    Open Access•Gertrud M Fremling, John R Lott•ARTICLE•Public Choice•1988•Cited by: 2•References: 15

  • Shirking and sorting in a political market with finite-lived politicians

    Open Access•John R Lott, W Robert Reed•ARTICLE•Public Choice•1989•Cited by: 29•References: 27

  • Production costs and deregulation

    Open Access•John R Lott, Morgan O Reynolds•ARTICLE•Public Choice•1989•References: 6

  • Racial Employment and Earnings Differentials

    Open Access•John R Lott•ARTICLE•The Review of Black Political…•1989

  • Does additional campaign spending really hurt incumbents

    Open Access•John R Lott•ARTICLE•Public Choice•1991•Cited by: 10•References: 7

  • A critical review and an extension of the political shirking literature

    Open Access•John R Lott, Michael L Davis•ARTICLE•Public Choice•1992

  • Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance

    Open Access•John R Lott, Douglass C North•ARTICLE•Journal of Policy Analysis and…•1992•Cited by: 23

  • Reforming Products Liability

    Open Access•John R Lott, W Kip Viscusi•ARTICLE•Journal of Policy Analysis and…•1992•Cited by: 2

    Preface 1. Diagnosing the Liability Crisis Perspectives on Liability Reform Recent Trends in Products Liability Proposals for Reform 2. The Dimensions of the Liability Crisis Accident Rates Decline, But Litigation Soars The Surge in Asbestos Litigation Insurance Industry Trends Roots of the Insurance Crisis, 1980-1984 Other Economic Effects of Products Liability The Design Defect Doctrine and Hazard Warnings 3. The Litigation Process The Overall …

  • Time series evidence on shirking in the U.S. House of Representatives

    Open Access•John R Lott, Stephen G Bronars•ARTICLE•Public Choice•1993•Cited by: 41•References: 21

  • The reputational penalty firms bear from committing criminal fraud

    Open Access•Jonathan M Karpoff, John R Lott•CHAPTER•Economics of Organised Crime•1996

    Optimal penalties for corporate fraud require that firms face expected penalties equal to the total social costs of the crime. Yet formal courtimposed sanctions for committing fraud often represent a small fraction of the damage produced by the fraud. Sheer and Ho (1989), for example, estimate that the median and mean ratios of criminal fines to the private loss from private fraud were 0.14 and 0.73 in 1988. The corresponding median and mean rati…

  • Legislator voting and shirking

    Open Access•Bruce Bender, John R Lott•ARTICLE•Public Choice•1996

  • Crime, Deterrence, and Right‐to‐Carry Concealed Handguns

    Open Access•John R Lott, Jr John R Lott et al.•ARTICLE•The Journal of Legal Studies•1997

    Using cross‐sectional time‐series data for U.S. counties from 1977 to 1992, we find that allowing citizens to carry concealed weapons deters violent crimes, without increasing accidental deaths. If those states without right‐to‐carry concealed gun provisions had adopted them in 1992, county‐ and state‐level data indicate that approximately 1,500 murders would have been avoided yearly. Similarly, we predict that rapes would have declined by over 4…

  • Does political reform increase wealth

    Open Access•John R Lott•ARTICLE•Public Choice•1997•Cited by: 2•References: 19

  • Term limits and electoral competitiveness

    Open Access•Kermit Daniel, John R Lott et al.•ARTICLE•Public Choice•1997•Cited by: 20•References: 18

  • More Guns, Less Crime

    Jens Ludwig, John R Lott•ARTICLE•Contemporary Sociology A Journal…•1999

  • Did Women's Suffrage Change the Size and Scope of Government

    John R Lott, Jr John R Lott et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•1999•Cited by: 92•References: 4

    This paper examines the growth of government during this century as a result of giving women the right to vote. Using cross‐sectional time‐series data for 1870–1940, we examine state government expenditures and revenue as well as voting by U.S. House and Senate state delegations and the passage of a wide range of different state laws. Suffrage coincided with immediate increases in state government expenditures and revenue and more liberal voting …

  • Public Schooling, Indoctrination, and Totalitarianism

    John R Lott, Jr John R Lott•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•1999•Cited by: 41•References: 2

    Governments use public education and public ownership of the media to control the information that their citizens receive. More totalitarian governments as well as those with larger wealth transfers make greater investments in publicly controlled information. This finding is borne out from cross‐sectional time‐series evidence acros countries and is confirmed when the recent fall of communism is specifically examined. My results reject the standar…

  • The Reputational Penalties for Environmental Violations

    Jonathan M Karpoff, John R Lott et al.•ARTICLE•The Journal of Law and Economics•2005

    This paper examines the sizes of the fines, damage awards, remediation costs, and market value losses imposed on companies that violate environmental regulations. Firms that violate environmental laws suffer statistically significant losses in the market value of firm equity. The losses, however, are of similar magnitudes to the legal penalties imposed, and in the cross section, the market value loss is related to the size of the legal penalty. T…

  • The impact of early media election calls on Republican voting rates in Florida’s western Panhandle counties in 2000

    Open Access•John R Lott•ARTICLE•Public Choice•2005•Cited by: 6•References: 5

Economics (26 works) · Law (26 works) · Political science (26 works) · Politics (19 works) · Law (18 works) · Public finance (17 works) · Business (11 works) · Electoral Systems and Political Participation (10 works) · Public economics (10 works) · Macroeconomics (9 works)

Ethnos_APP • Open Source Project • MIT License • Frontend v2.0.0 • Privacy and Cookies • API Documentation: api.ethnos.app/docs • API Source Code: GitHub • DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.17049435 • Frontend Source Code: GitHub • DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.17050053 • cruz.rio.br • Expectantes Misericordiae