Takuya Niikawa
Biographic Data
| ID | 5688608 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Takuya Niikawa |
| GIVEN NAMES | Takuya |
| FAMILY NAME | Niikawa |
| SIGNATURE | NIIKAWA T |
| AFFILIATIONS | Kobe University |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-4078-4917 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 8 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 0 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 7 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 1 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2018 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 0 |
Naïve realism, imagination and hallucination
Naïve realists hold that the phenomenology of veridical perceptual experience is in part constituted by environmental objects that the subject is perceiving. Although naïve realism is well-motivated by considering the cognitive and epistemic roles of the phenomenology of veridical perceptual experience, it is considered difficult to explain hallucinatory and imaginative experiences. This paper provides three arguments to address these explanatory…
Atmospheres and the Intentionality of Moods
One of the central questions in philosophy of mind concerns the intentionality of moods. While it is standard to take the intentional object of moods as either ‘everything’ or ‘nothing’, neither view seems to be explanatorily inadequate. Given this, this paper develops and motivates a positive account of the intentionality of moods, according to which moods are directed at atmospheres. We first analyze the elusiveness of mood experiences in terms…
The We‐Relationship as a Key to Addressing Dementia‐Related Ambiguous Loss
Pauline Boss describes the challenges faced by people caring for family members with dementia in terms of ambiguous loss – a condition in which the physical presence of the person with dementia coexists with their psychological absence. This article proposes the concept of we‐relationship as a key to addressing dementia‐related ambiguous loss. Roughly defined, two or more people stand in a we‐relationship if (1) they engage in a joint action and …
Consciousness is Sublime
Does consciousness have non-instrumental aesthetic value? This paper answers this question affirmatively by arguing that consciousness is sublime. The argument consists of three premises. (1) An awe experience of an object provides prima facie justification to believe that the object is sublime. (2) I have an awe experience about consciousness through introspecting three features of consciousness, namely the mystery of consciousness, the connecti…
What are atmospheres
This paper advances an analytic philosophical approach to atmospheres. We start by outlining three core characteristics of atmospheres: holism (an atmosphere is a holistic entity that emerges through the combinations of various aspects of the environment), affectivity (atmospheres are grasped corporeally and affectively), and quasi-objectivity (atmospheres cannot be captured in solely objective or solely subjective terms). We look at the most pro…
The Sublime of Consciousness
The aesthetic tradition has identified as paradigmatically sublime such objects as imposing mountains and intense storms, as well as monumental art. But the tradition also acknowledges less paradigmatic cases, including sometimes mathematical structures or abstract concepts. In this paper, we argue that there is also a case for considering phenomenal consciousness—the experiential quality of subjective awareness—as a sublime phenomenon. One appre…
Illusionism and definitions of phenomenal consciousness
The Realizations of the Self
No prominent works on this page.
The Realizations of the Self
Illusionism and definitions of phenomenal consciousness
The Sublime of Consciousness
The aesthetic tradition has identified as paradigmatically sublime such objects as imposing mountains and intense storms, as well as monumental art. But the tradition also acknowledges less paradigmatic cases, including sometimes mathematical structures or abstract concepts. In this paper, we argue that there is also a case for considering phenomenal consciousness—the experiential quality of subjective awareness—as a sublime phenomenon. One appre…
Consciousness is Sublime
Does consciousness have non-instrumental aesthetic value? This paper answers this question affirmatively by arguing that consciousness is sublime. The argument consists of three premises. (1) An awe experience of an object provides prima facie justification to believe that the object is sublime. (2) I have an awe experience about consciousness through introspecting three features of consciousness, namely the mystery of consciousness, the connecti…
What are atmospheres
This paper advances an analytic philosophical approach to atmospheres. We start by outlining three core characteristics of atmospheres: holism (an atmosphere is a holistic entity that emerges through the combinations of various aspects of the environment), affectivity (atmospheres are grasped corporeally and affectively), and quasi-objectivity (atmospheres cannot be captured in solely objective or solely subjective terms). We look at the most pro…
Naïve realism, imagination and hallucination
Naïve realists hold that the phenomenology of veridical perceptual experience is in part constituted by environmental objects that the subject is perceiving. Although naïve realism is well-motivated by considering the cognitive and epistemic roles of the phenomenology of veridical perceptual experience, it is considered difficult to explain hallucinatory and imaginative experiences. This paper provides three arguments to address these explanatory…
Atmospheres and the Intentionality of Moods
One of the central questions in philosophy of mind concerns the intentionality of moods. While it is standard to take the intentional object of moods as either ‘everything’ or ‘nothing’, neither view seems to be explanatorily inadequate. Given this, this paper develops and motivates a positive account of the intentionality of moods, according to which moods are directed at atmospheres. We first analyze the elusiveness of mood experiences in terms…
The We‐Relationship as a Key to Addressing Dementia‐Related Ambiguous Loss
Pauline Boss describes the challenges faced by people caring for family members with dementia in terms of ambiguous loss – a condition in which the physical presence of the person with dementia coexists with their psychological absence. This article proposes the concept of we‐relationship as a key to addressing dementia‐related ambiguous loss. Roughly defined, two or more people stand in a we‐relationship if (1) they engage in a joint action and …
Philosophy (4 works) · Embodied and Extended Cognition (3 works) · Epistemology (3 works) · Psychology (3 works) · Aesthetic Perception and Analysis (2 works) · Consciousness (2 works) · Metaphysics (2 works) · Paranormal Experiences and Beliefs (2 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (2 works) · Philosophy of mind (2 works)