George Economides
Biographic Data
| ID | 5689334 |
|---|---|
| NAME | George Economides |
| GIVEN NAMES | George |
| FAMILY NAME | Economides |
| SIGNATURE | ECONOMIDES G |
| AFFILIATIONS | Athens University of Economics and Business Athens Greece |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-1024-9005 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 4 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 8 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 4 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2008 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2024 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
On the provision of excludable public goods
This paper compares some of the most common ways of financing the provision of publicly provided impure public goods/services in a unified dynamic general equilibrium framework with heterogeneous income groups. The focus is on the effects of user prices on individual incentives and how the latter shape aggregate outcomes and distribution. We show that a market‐like mechanism of user prices not only improves individual incentives and enhances aggr…
User Prices and Multiplicity in a Simple General Equilibrium Model
We use a simple general equilibrium model with multiple equilibria in the form of a coordination failure in which the government has the option to finance the provision of a merit good by using user prices. Ourmain results, derived analytically, are as follows: First, the introduction of a price mechanism for the merit good forces agents to internalize the social cost of publicly provided goods and this allows for higher public expenditures other…
Does foreign aid distort incentives and hurt growth? Theory and evidence from 75 aid-recipient countries
Fiscal policy, rent seeking, and growth under electoral uncertainty
We construct a general equilibrium model of economic growth and optimally chosen fiscal policy, in which individuals compete with each other for a share of government spending and two political parties alternate in power according to exogenous electoral uncertainty. The main prediction is that uncertainty about remaining in power results in increased fiscal spending, which in turn distorts incentives by pushing individuals away from productive wo…
Does foreign aid distort incentives and hurt growth? Theory and evidence from 75 aid-recipient countries
Fiscal policy, rent seeking, and growth under electoral uncertainty
We construct a general equilibrium model of economic growth and optimally chosen fiscal policy, in which individuals compete with each other for a share of government spending and two political parties alternate in power according to exogenous electoral uncertainty. The main prediction is that uncertainty about remaining in power results in increased fiscal spending, which in turn distorts incentives by pushing individuals away from productive wo…
Does foreign aid distort incentives and hurt growth? Theory and evidence from 75 aid-recipient countries
Fiscal policy, rent seeking, and growth under electoral uncertainty
We construct a general equilibrium model of economic growth and optimally chosen fiscal policy, in which individuals compete with each other for a share of government spending and two political parties alternate in power according to exogenous electoral uncertainty. The main prediction is that uncertainty about remaining in power results in increased fiscal spending, which in turn distorts incentives by pushing individuals away from productive wo…
User Prices and Multiplicity in a Simple General Equilibrium Model
We use a simple general equilibrium model with multiple equilibria in the form of a coordination failure in which the government has the option to finance the provision of a merit good by using user prices. Ourmain results, derived analytically, are as follows: First, the introduction of a price mechanism for the merit good forces agents to internalize the social cost of publicly provided goods and this allows for higher public expenditures other…
On the provision of excludable public goods
This paper compares some of the most common ways of financing the provision of publicly provided impure public goods/services in a unified dynamic general equilibrium framework with heterogeneous income groups. The focus is on the effects of user prices on individual incentives and how the latter shape aggregate outcomes and distribution. We show that a market‐like mechanism of user prices not only improves individual incentives and enhances aggr…
Economics (3 works) · Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth (3 works) · Local Government Finance and Decentralization (2 works) · Macroeconomics (2 works) · Microeconomics (2 works) · Public economics (2 works) · Rent-seeking (2 works) · Business (1 works) · Commerce (1 works) · Competition (biology (1 works)