Christopher M Bell
Biographic Data
| ID | 5693242 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Christopher M Bell |
| GIVEN NAMES | Christopher M |
| FAMILY NAME | Bell |
| SIGNATURE | BELL C M |
| AFFILIATIONS | Dalhousie University |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 13 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 14 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 13 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1996 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
The Battle of the Atlantic, the “Air Gap,” and the Delay in Allocating Liberators to the Royal Canadian Air Force
The gravest crisis of the Battle of the Atlantic came in the latter part of 1942 and early 1943 when German submarine forces concentrated in the central ocean, the “air gap” beyond the reach of shore based Allied maritime air forces. More capable aircraft were available, but not assigned to the maritime role until the spring of 1943. This article proposes a new methodology for understanding the reasons for the delay by examining the complex inter…
The Fear of Invasion
The British army’s enormous losses in the First World War can be traced back to the decision to despatch the British Expeditionary Force to fight on the continent alongside the French army, a choice that ultimately led to the creation of the mass army that would be thrown into the bloody, attritional battles of the Western Front in 1916 and beyond. Scholars have carefully examined the British armed services’ preparations for a major European war …
Contested Waters
When Britain Saved the West
The Myth of a Naval Revolution by Proxy
Revisionist historians have argued that in July 1914 Britain’s First Lord of the Admiralty, Winston Churchill, was preparing to implement a ‘Naval Revolution’ based on radical ideas they attribute to Admiral Sir John Fisher. This article examines Fisher’s influence on Churchill in 1911–14. By subjecting the revisionist argument to rigorous scrutiny, it demonstrates that Churchill did not embrace either ‘flotilla defence’ or the ‘battlecruiser con…
Sentiment vs Strategy
This article examines British naval policy towards imperial defence and the development of autonomous Dominion navies in 1911–14. It shows that the Admiralty's main goal under the leadership of Winston Churchill was to concentrate British and Dominion warships in European waters, and ideally in the North Sea, to meet the German threat. Churchill's approach to naval developments in the Dominions was also shaped by his desire to fulfil the Cabinet'…
On Standards and Scholarship
This article examines Nicholas Lambert’s criticisms of the article ‘Sir John Fisher’s Naval Revolution Reconsidered: Winston Churchill at the Admiralty, 1911–1914’ ( War in History 18, 2011), which challenged revisionist claims that in July 1914 the Royal Navy was on the verge of implementing a ‘naval revolution’ based on radical ideas attributed to Admiral Sir John Fisher. It demonstrates that Lambert’s criticisms are unfounded, and provides add…
Sir John Fisher’s Naval Revolution Reconsidered
This article challenges claims by revisionist historians that in July 1914 the Royal Navy was on the verge of instituting a ‘naval revolution’ based on the ideas of Admiral Sir John Fisher. Winston Churchill, the first lord of the Admiralty, was not prepared to rely on Fisher’s concept of ‘flotilla defence’ in the North Sea, as revisionists contend. Nor did he wish to send capital ships to distant waters. He increasingly looked to submarines to p…
The King's English and the Security of the Empire
An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content
The Royal Navy and the Lessons of the Invergordon Mutiny
This article examines the Royal Navy’s efforts to understand the underlying causes of the Invergordon mutiny. Previous studies of this event have tended to focus on the Admiralty’s attempt to conceal its own failures by finding scapegoats in the Atlantic Fleet. However, the navy’s treatment of the senior personnel involved in the mutiny is less important than its efforts to identify and correct systemic problems within the service that were belie…
The Royal Navy, Seapower, and Strategy between the Wars
List of Maps List of Tables Acknowledgements List of Abbreviations Introduction The Politics of Seapower: the 'One Power Standard' and British Maritime Security 'Main Fleet to Bermuda': British Naval Strategy for an Anglo-American War Far Eastern War Plans and the Myth of the Singapore Strategy 'The Ultimate Potential Enemy': Nazi Germany and British Defence Dilemmas The Search for the 'Knock-Out Blow': War Plans against Italy Neither Corbett nor…
Thinking the Unthinkable
a friendly meeting between the British ambassador to the United States, Sir Esme Howard, and the US secretary of commerce, Herbert Hoover, in July 1927, an unusual conversation took place. The two men had previously agreed that public opinion in both Britain and the United States needed to be convinced of the 'absurdity of contemplating the possibility of war between the United States and the British Empire'. When they met over lunch to make plan…
"Our Most Exposed Outpost"
Sir John Fisher’s Naval Revolution Reconsidered
This article challenges claims by revisionist historians that in July 1914 the Royal Navy was on the verge of instituting a ‘naval revolution’ based on the ideas of Admiral Sir John Fisher. Winston Churchill, the first lord of the Admiralty, was not prepared to rely on Fisher’s concept of ‘flotilla defence’ in the North Sea, as revisionists contend. Nor did he wish to send capital ships to distant waters. He increasingly looked to submarines to p…
Contested Waters
On Standards and Scholarship
This article examines Nicholas Lambert’s criticisms of the article ‘Sir John Fisher’s Naval Revolution Reconsidered: Winston Churchill at the Admiralty, 1911–1914’ ( War in History 18, 2011), which challenged revisionist claims that in July 1914 the Royal Navy was on the verge of implementing a ‘naval revolution’ based on radical ideas attributed to Admiral Sir John Fisher. It demonstrates that Lambert’s criticisms are unfounded, and provides add…
The King's English and the Security of the Empire
An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content
Thinking the Unthinkable
a friendly meeting between the British ambassador to the United States, Sir Esme Howard, and the US secretary of commerce, Herbert Hoover, in July 1927, an unusual conversation took place. The two men had previously agreed that public opinion in both Britain and the United States needed to be convinced of the 'absurdity of contemplating the possibility of war between the United States and the British Empire'. When they met over lunch to make plan…
Sentiment vs Strategy
This article examines British naval policy towards imperial defence and the development of autonomous Dominion navies in 1911–14. It shows that the Admiralty's main goal under the leadership of Winston Churchill was to concentrate British and Dominion warships in European waters, and ideally in the North Sea, to meet the German threat. Churchill's approach to naval developments in the Dominions was also shaped by his desire to fulfil the Cabinet'…
The Royal Navy and the Lessons of the Invergordon Mutiny
This article examines the Royal Navy’s efforts to understand the underlying causes of the Invergordon mutiny. Previous studies of this event have tended to focus on the Admiralty’s attempt to conceal its own failures by finding scapegoats in the Atlantic Fleet. However, the navy’s treatment of the senior personnel involved in the mutiny is less important than its efforts to identify and correct systemic problems within the service that were belie…
"Our Most Exposed Outpost"
Thinking the Unthinkable
a friendly meeting between the British ambassador to the United States, Sir Esme Howard, and the US secretary of commerce, Herbert Hoover, in July 1927, an unusual conversation took place. The two men had previously agreed that public opinion in both Britain and the United States needed to be convinced of the 'absurdity of contemplating the possibility of war between the United States and the British Empire'. When they met over lunch to make plan…
The Royal Navy, Seapower, and Strategy between the Wars
List of Maps List of Tables Acknowledgements List of Abbreviations Introduction The Politics of Seapower: the 'One Power Standard' and British Maritime Security 'Main Fleet to Bermuda': British Naval Strategy for an Anglo-American War Far Eastern War Plans and the Myth of the Singapore Strategy 'The Ultimate Potential Enemy': Nazi Germany and British Defence Dilemmas The Search for the 'Knock-Out Blow': War Plans against Italy Neither Corbett nor…
The Royal Navy and the Lessons of the Invergordon Mutiny
This article examines the Royal Navy’s efforts to understand the underlying causes of the Invergordon mutiny. Previous studies of this event have tended to focus on the Admiralty’s attempt to conceal its own failures by finding scapegoats in the Atlantic Fleet. However, the navy’s treatment of the senior personnel involved in the mutiny is less important than its efforts to identify and correct systemic problems within the service that were belie…
The King's English and the Security of the Empire
An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content
Sir John Fisher’s Naval Revolution Reconsidered
This article challenges claims by revisionist historians that in July 1914 the Royal Navy was on the verge of instituting a ‘naval revolution’ based on the ideas of Admiral Sir John Fisher. Winston Churchill, the first lord of the Admiralty, was not prepared to rely on Fisher’s concept of ‘flotilla defence’ in the North Sea, as revisionists contend. Nor did he wish to send capital ships to distant waters. He increasingly looked to submarines to p…
On Standards and Scholarship
This article examines Nicholas Lambert’s criticisms of the article ‘Sir John Fisher’s Naval Revolution Reconsidered: Winston Churchill at the Admiralty, 1911–1914’ ( War in History 18, 2011), which challenged revisionist claims that in July 1914 the Royal Navy was on the verge of implementing a ‘naval revolution’ based on radical ideas attributed to Admiral Sir John Fisher. It demonstrates that Lambert’s criticisms are unfounded, and provides add…
Sentiment vs Strategy
This article examines British naval policy towards imperial defence and the development of autonomous Dominion navies in 1911–14. It shows that the Admiralty's main goal under the leadership of Winston Churchill was to concentrate British and Dominion warships in European waters, and ideally in the North Sea, to meet the German threat. Churchill's approach to naval developments in the Dominions was also shaped by his desire to fulfil the Cabinet'…
The Myth of a Naval Revolution by Proxy
Revisionist historians have argued that in July 1914 Britain’s First Lord of the Admiralty, Winston Churchill, was preparing to implement a ‘Naval Revolution’ based on radical ideas they attribute to Admiral Sir John Fisher. This article examines Fisher’s influence on Churchill in 1911–14. By subjecting the revisionist argument to rigorous scrutiny, it demonstrates that Churchill did not embrace either ‘flotilla defence’ or the ‘battlecruiser con…
Contested Waters
When Britain Saved the West
The Fear of Invasion
The British army’s enormous losses in the First World War can be traced back to the decision to despatch the British Expeditionary Force to fight on the continent alongside the French army, a choice that ultimately led to the creation of the mass army that would be thrown into the bloody, attritional battles of the Western Front in 1916 and beyond. Scholars have carefully examined the British armed services’ preparations for a major European war …
The Battle of the Atlantic, the “Air Gap,” and the Delay in Allocating Liberators to the Royal Canadian Air Force
The gravest crisis of the Battle of the Atlantic came in the latter part of 1942 and early 1943 when German submarine forces concentrated in the central ocean, the “air gap” beyond the reach of shore based Allied maritime air forces. More capable aircraft were available, but not assigned to the maritime role until the spring of 1943. This article proposes a new methodology for understanding the reasons for the delay by examining the complex inter…
History (12 works) · History (9 works) · Political science (9 works) · Ancient history (7 works) · World Wars: History, Literature, and Impact (7 works) · Archaeology (6 works) · Engineering (6 works) · Law (6 works) · Navy (6 works) · Economic history (5 works)