Amber D Carpenter
Biographic Data
| ID | 5718168 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Amber D Carpenter |
| GIVEN NAMES | Amber D |
| FAMILY NAME | Carpenter |
| SIGNATURE | CARPENTER A D |
| AFFILIATIONS | 1Department of Philosophy, University of York United Kingdom, Email: [email protected] |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-2220-6723 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 10 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 2 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 10 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2006 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Platonic Autonomy
Accounts and Accountability
It is natural to see in the Republic’s concern with self-mastery a Platonic account of autonomy. But Plato’s understanding of self-rule in the Republic has more to do with cognition, and rather less to do with independent agency. Indeed, in the ethically motivated epistemology of the Republic , it is aiming at ideal knowledge that transforms one ethically and engenders many of the features centrally associated with the notion of ‘autonomy’. Being…
Ethics of atomism – Democritus, Vasubandhu, and the skepticism that wasn’t
Democritus’ atomism aims to respond to threats of Parmenidean monism. In so doing, it deploys a familiar epistemological distinction between what is known by the senses and what is known by the mind. This turns out to be a risky strategy, however, leading to inadvertent skepticism with only diffuse and contrary ethical implications. Vasubandhu’s more explicitly metaphysical atomism, by contrast, relies on a different principle to get to its resul…
The Unhappiness of the Great King ( Gorgias 461–81)
A summary is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content.
Ranking Knowledge in the Philebus
Socrates’ concise examination of intelligence in the Philebus is framed with the odd ambition to discover which knowledges are more closely related to knowledge. If we take Plato’s epistemology here to be ‘paradeigmatist’, this and other oddities of the passage disappear; we can then read it as articulating that paradigm, setting procedural as well as objectual constraints on perfect knowledge. While all cognitive disciplines, however lowly, aim …
Pleasure as Genesis in Plato’s Philebus
What Is Peculiar to Plato's and Aristotle's Psychologies? What Is Common to Them Both
Journal Article WHAT IS PECULIAR TO PLATO'S AND ARISTOTLE'S PSYCHOLOGIES? WHAT IS COMMON TO THEM BOTH? Get access AMBER CARPENTER AMBER CARPENTER University of York Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies, Volume 54, Issue Supplement_107, January 2011, Pages 21–44, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.2041-5370.2011.tb00011.x Published: 24 March 2015
Embodied Intelligent (?) Souls
In the Timaeus, plants are granted soul, and specifically the sort of soul capable of perception and desire. Also in the Timaeus, perception requires the involvement of to phronimon. It seems it must follow that plants are intelligent. I argue that we can neither avoid granting plants sensation in just this sense, nor can we suppose that ‘to phronimon’ is something devoid of intelligence. Indeed, plants must be related to intelligence, if they ar…
Plato on Knowledge and Forms
Book Review| January 01 2008 Plato on Knowledge and Forms: Selected Essays Gail Fine, Plato on Knowledge and Forms: Selected Essays. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003. 464 pp. A. D. Carpenter A. D. Carpenter Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google The Philosophical Review (2008) 117 (1): 138–141. https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-2007-032 Cite Icon Cite Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn MailTo Permissions Search Sit…
Hedonistic Persons. The Good Man Argument in Plato's Philebus
It seems an odd claim that knowing could be itself of intrinsic worth. Knowledge appears heavily, perhaps entirely reliant for its worth on the value of the objects known and the value of the ends ...
Embodied Intelligent (?) Souls
In the Timaeus, plants are granted soul, and specifically the sort of soul capable of perception and desire. Also in the Timaeus, perception requires the involvement of to phronimon. It seems it must follow that plants are intelligent. I argue that we can neither avoid granting plants sensation in just this sense, nor can we suppose that ‘to phronimon’ is something devoid of intelligence. Indeed, plants must be related to intelligence, if they ar…
Hedonistic Persons. The Good Man Argument in Plato's Philebus
It seems an odd claim that knowing could be itself of intrinsic worth. Knowledge appears heavily, perhaps entirely reliant for its worth on the value of the objects known and the value of the ends ...
Plato on Knowledge and Forms
Book Review| January 01 2008 Plato on Knowledge and Forms: Selected Essays Gail Fine, Plato on Knowledge and Forms: Selected Essays. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003. 464 pp. A. D. Carpenter A. D. Carpenter Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google The Philosophical Review (2008) 117 (1): 138–141. https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-2007-032 Cite Icon Cite Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn MailTo Permissions Search Sit…
Embodied Intelligent (?) Souls
In the Timaeus, plants are granted soul, and specifically the sort of soul capable of perception and desire. Also in the Timaeus, perception requires the involvement of to phronimon. It seems it must follow that plants are intelligent. I argue that we can neither avoid granting plants sensation in just this sense, nor can we suppose that ‘to phronimon’ is something devoid of intelligence. Indeed, plants must be related to intelligence, if they ar…
Pleasure as Genesis in Plato’s Philebus
What Is Peculiar to Plato's and Aristotle's Psychologies? What Is Common to Them Both
Journal Article WHAT IS PECULIAR TO PLATO'S AND ARISTOTLE'S PSYCHOLOGIES? WHAT IS COMMON TO THEM BOTH? Get access AMBER CARPENTER AMBER CARPENTER University of York Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies, Volume 54, Issue Supplement_107, January 2011, Pages 21–44, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.2041-5370.2011.tb00011.x Published: 24 March 2015
Ranking Knowledge in the Philebus
Socrates’ concise examination of intelligence in the Philebus is framed with the odd ambition to discover which knowledges are more closely related to knowledge. If we take Plato’s epistemology here to be ‘paradeigmatist’, this and other oddities of the passage disappear; we can then read it as articulating that paradigm, setting procedural as well as objectual constraints on perfect knowledge. While all cognitive disciplines, however lowly, aim …
The Unhappiness of the Great King ( Gorgias 461–81)
A summary is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content.
Ethics of atomism – Democritus, Vasubandhu, and the skepticism that wasn’t
Democritus’ atomism aims to respond to threats of Parmenidean monism. In so doing, it deploys a familiar epistemological distinction between what is known by the senses and what is known by the mind. This turns out to be a risky strategy, however, leading to inadvertent skepticism with only diffuse and contrary ethical implications. Vasubandhu’s more explicitly metaphysical atomism, by contrast, relies on a different principle to get to its resul…
Platonic Autonomy
Accounts and Accountability
It is natural to see in the Republic’s concern with self-mastery a Platonic account of autonomy. But Plato’s understanding of self-rule in the Republic has more to do with cognition, and rather less to do with independent agency. Indeed, in the ethically motivated epistemology of the Republic , it is aiming at ideal knowledge that transforms one ethically and engenders many of the features centrally associated with the notion of ‘autonomy’. Being…
Classical Philosophy and Thought (9 works) · Philosophy (8 works) · Psychology (5 works) · Epistemology (4 works) · Philosophy (3 works) · Classical Antiquity Studies (2 works) · Computer Science (2 works) · Historical, Religious, and Philosophical Studies (2 works) · Law (2 works) · Medieval and Classical Philosophy (2 works)