Peter H Hess
Biographic Data
| ID | 5722741 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Peter H Hess |
| GIVEN NAMES | Peter H |
| FAMILY NAME | Hess |
| SIGNATURE | HESS P H |
| AFFILIATIONS | Victoria College |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 3 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 0 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 3 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1981 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1991 |
| H-INDEX | 0 |
Thought and Experience
Doxastic Obligations and the Traditional Definition of Knowledge
In the sixth chapter of his Theory of Knowledge Roderick Chisholm refers to an example suggested by Alexius Meinong in order to show that the traditional definition of knowledge is in need of some modification. In this paper I should like to show that Chisholm's argument rests on a mistaken assumption as to what an individual's doxastic responsibilities are
Justified True Belief is Knowledge
If we accept the traditional definition of knowledge according to which S knows that P provided that (i) P is true, (ii) S accepts P and (iii) S is justified in believing that P, the Gettier's counter-examples will prompt us to look for a fourth condition to complete the analyses of knowledge. Before we determine whether such a fourth condition is, indeed, needed and, if so, how it is to be formulated, we may do well to examine with some care the…
No prominent works on this page.
Justified True Belief is Knowledge
If we accept the traditional definition of knowledge according to which S knows that P provided that (i) P is true, (ii) S accepts P and (iii) S is justified in believing that P, the Gettier's counter-examples will prompt us to look for a fourth condition to complete the analyses of knowledge. Before we determine whether such a fourth condition is, indeed, needed and, if so, how it is to be formulated, we may do well to examine with some care the…
Doxastic Obligations and the Traditional Definition of Knowledge
In the sixth chapter of his Theory of Knowledge Roderick Chisholm refers to an example suggested by Alexius Meinong in order to show that the traditional definition of knowledge is in need of some modification. In this paper I should like to show that Chisholm's argument rests on a mistaken assumption as to what an individual's doxastic responsibilities are
Thought and Experience
Epistemology (3 works) · Philosophy (3 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (2 works) · Order (exchange) (2 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (2 works) · Action (physics) (1 work) · Argument (complex analysis) (1 work) · Artificial Intelligence (1 work) · Artificial Intelligence (1 work) · Business (1 work)