DWAYNE MOORE
Biographic Data
| ID | 5722743 |
|---|---|
| NAME | DWAYNE MOORE |
| GIVEN NAMES | DWAYNE |
| FAMILY NAME | MOORE |
| SIGNATURE | MOORE D |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Saskatchewan |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 9 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 1 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 9 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2009 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Compatibilism, Manipulation, and the Hard-Line Reply
Mereological emergentism and agent-causal libertarianism
Agent-causal, event-causal, libertarian free will
Libertarian free will is the view that agents can choose between various courses of action. Advocates of libertarian free will largely divide themselves between event-causal libertarianism and agent-causal libertarianism. Robert Kane, a leading contemporary libertarian, recently proposes a hybrid agent-causal, event-causal model, according to which agent involving events such as reasons and efforts play a necessary but insufficient role in causin…
A nonreductive physicalist libertarian free will
Libertarian free will is, roughly, the view that the same agential states can cause different possible actions. Nonreductive physicalism is, roughly, the view that mental states cause actions to occur, while these actions also have sufficient physical causes. Though libertarian free will and nonreductive physicalism have overlapping subject matter, and while libertarian free will is currently trending at the same time as nonreductive physicalism …
A Naturalistic Theodicy for Sterba’s Problem of Natural Evil
Reconciling Appraisal Love and Bestowal Love
The appraisal model of love is object-centred and reasons-based: love is based on reasons derived from the valuable properties of the beloved. The bestowal model of love is subject-centred and non-reasons-based: love is not based on reasons derived from the valuable properties of the beloved, but rather originates in the lover. In this paper, I blend these disparate models, with the aim of preserving their virtues and overcoming their difficultie…
On the Constitutive Property Reply
For the nonreductive physicalist, behavioural effects have a complete physiological explanation and a distinct psychological explanation. In a series of papers J aegwon K im argues that there can be no more than a single complete and independent explanation of any one event, thereby excluding the psychological explanation. For his own part, K im includes psychological explanations through the use of an extensional model of explanatory individuati…
Physical-Effect Epiphenomenalism and Common Underlying Causes
Qualia epiphenomenalism is the view that qualitative properties of events, such as the raw feel of tastes or painfulness, lack causal efficacy. One common objection to qualia epiphenomenalism is the epistemic argument, which states that this loss of causal efficacy undermines our capacity to know about these epiphenomenal qualitative properties (Sterjnberg, 1999; Watkins, 1989). A number of rejoinders have been offered up to insulate qualia epiph…
On Kim’s exclusion principle
On Kim’s exclusion principle
Physical-Effect Epiphenomenalism and Common Underlying Causes
Qualia epiphenomenalism is the view that qualitative properties of events, such as the raw feel of tastes or painfulness, lack causal efficacy. One common objection to qualia epiphenomenalism is the epistemic argument, which states that this loss of causal efficacy undermines our capacity to know about these epiphenomenal qualitative properties (Sterjnberg, 1999; Watkins, 1989). A number of rejoinders have been offered up to insulate qualia epiph…
On the Constitutive Property Reply
For the nonreductive physicalist, behavioural effects have a complete physiological explanation and a distinct psychological explanation. In a series of papers J aegwon K im argues that there can be no more than a single complete and independent explanation of any one event, thereby excluding the psychological explanation. For his own part, K im includes psychological explanations through the use of an extensional model of explanatory individuati…
Reconciling Appraisal Love and Bestowal Love
The appraisal model of love is object-centred and reasons-based: love is based on reasons derived from the valuable properties of the beloved. The bestowal model of love is subject-centred and non-reasons-based: love is not based on reasons derived from the valuable properties of the beloved, but rather originates in the lover. In this paper, I blend these disparate models, with the aim of preserving their virtues and overcoming their difficultie…
A Naturalistic Theodicy for Sterba’s Problem of Natural Evil
Agent-causal, event-causal, libertarian free will
Libertarian free will is the view that agents can choose between various courses of action. Advocates of libertarian free will largely divide themselves between event-causal libertarianism and agent-causal libertarianism. Robert Kane, a leading contemporary libertarian, recently proposes a hybrid agent-causal, event-causal model, according to which agent involving events such as reasons and efforts play a necessary but insufficient role in causin…
A nonreductive physicalist libertarian free will
Libertarian free will is, roughly, the view that the same agential states can cause different possible actions. Nonreductive physicalism is, roughly, the view that mental states cause actions to occur, while these actions also have sufficient physical causes. Though libertarian free will and nonreductive physicalism have overlapping subject matter, and while libertarian free will is currently trending at the same time as nonreductive physicalism …
Compatibilism, Manipulation, and the Hard-Line Reply
Mereological emergentism and agent-causal libertarianism
Epistemology (7 works) · Philosophy (7 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (6 works) · Metaphysics (5 works) · Free Will and Agency (4 works) · Physicalism (4 works) · Libertarianism (3 works) · Philosophical Ethics and Theory (3 works) · Philosophy of mind (3 works) · Psychology (3 works)