David Sackris
Biographic Data
| ID | 5722958 |
|---|---|
| NAME | David Sackris |
| GIVEN NAMES | David |
| FAMILY NAME | Sackris |
| SIGNATURE | SACKRIS D |
| AFFILIATIONS | Arapahoe Community College |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-3914-3311 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 9 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 0 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 9 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2013 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 0 |
Dissolving the moral-conventional distinction
One way in which philosophers have often sought to distinguish moral judgments from non-moral judgments is by using the “moral-conventional” distinction. I seek to raise serious questions about the significance of the moral-conventional distinction, at least for philosophers interested in moral judgment. I survey recent developments in the fields of philosophy, psychology, and cognitive science that have led many to the conclusion that moral judg…
The disunity of moral judgment
Since the 18th century, one of the key features of diagnosed psychopaths has been “moral colorblindness” or an inability to form moral judgments. However, attempts at experimentally verifying this moral incapacity have been largely unsuccessful. After reviewing the centrality of “moral colorblindness” to the study and diagnosis of psychopathy, I argue that the reason that researchers have been unable to verify that diagnosed psychopaths have an i…
The disunity of moral judgment
We argue that there is significant evidence for reconsidering the possibility that moral judgment constitutes a distinctive category of judgment. We begin by reviewing evidence and arguments from neuroscience and philosophy that seem to indicate that a diversity of brain processes result in verdicts that we ordinarily consider “moral judgments”. We argue that if these findings are correct, this is plausible reason for doubting that all moral judg…
Are There “Aesthetic” Judgments
Some Socratic Modesty
The Perniciousness of Higher-Order Evidence on Aesthetic Appreciation
We demonstrate that many philosophers accept the following claim: When an aesthetic object is apprehended correctly, taking pleasure in said object is a reliable sign that the object is aesthetically successful. We undermine this position by showing that what grounds our pleasurable experience is opaque: In many cases, the experienced pleasure is attributable to factors that have little to do with the aesthetic object. The evidence appealed to is…
The Arbitrariness of Aesthetic Judgment
A Consideration of Carroll’s Content Theory
Category Independent Aesthetic Experience
No prominent works on this page.
Category Independent Aesthetic Experience
A Consideration of Carroll’s Content Theory
The Arbitrariness of Aesthetic Judgment
The Perniciousness of Higher-Order Evidence on Aesthetic Appreciation
We demonstrate that many philosophers accept the following claim: When an aesthetic object is apprehended correctly, taking pleasure in said object is a reliable sign that the object is aesthetically successful. We undermine this position by showing that what grounds our pleasurable experience is opaque: In many cases, the experienced pleasure is attributable to factors that have little to do with the aesthetic object. The evidence appealed to is…
The disunity of moral judgment
Since the 18th century, one of the key features of diagnosed psychopaths has been “moral colorblindness” or an inability to form moral judgments. However, attempts at experimentally verifying this moral incapacity have been largely unsuccessful. After reviewing the centrality of “moral colorblindness” to the study and diagnosis of psychopathy, I argue that the reason that researchers have been unable to verify that diagnosed psychopaths have an i…
The disunity of moral judgment
We argue that there is significant evidence for reconsidering the possibility that moral judgment constitutes a distinctive category of judgment. We begin by reviewing evidence and arguments from neuroscience and philosophy that seem to indicate that a diversity of brain processes result in verdicts that we ordinarily consider “moral judgments”. We argue that if these findings are correct, this is plausible reason for doubting that all moral judg…
Are There “Aesthetic” Judgments
Some Socratic Modesty
Dissolving the moral-conventional distinction
One way in which philosophers have often sought to distinguish moral judgments from non-moral judgments is by using the “moral-conventional” distinction. I seek to raise serious questions about the significance of the moral-conventional distinction, at least for philosophers interested in moral judgment. I survey recent developments in the fields of philosophy, psychology, and cognitive science that have led many to the conclusion that moral judg…
Psychology (8 works) · Epistemology (7 works) · Philosophy (7 works) · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment (6 works) · Aesthetic Perception and Analysis (4 works) · Aesthetics (4 works) · Emotions and Moral Behavior (2 works) · Ethics in Business and Education (2 works) · Mathematics (2 works) · Moral disengagement (2 works)