Leora Weitzman
Biographic Data
| ID | 5723340 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Leora Weitzman |
| GIVEN NAMES | Leora |
| FAMILY NAME | Weitzman |
| SIGNATURE | WEITZMAN L |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Wisconsin–Madison |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 2 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 1 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 2 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1996 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1997 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Frege on the Individuation of Thoughts
Les caractérisations apparemment conflictuelles quepropose Frege des pensées comme étant à lafois vériconditionnelles et ordonnées à la cognition, peuvent être vues comme deux manifestations d'une unique conception unificatrice. Mais ni la conception unificatrice ni chacune des caractérisations divergentes ne conduisent a un véritable critère d'identité pour les pensées. Car aucune des voies qu'elles suggerent pour distinguer les pensées les unes…
What Makes a Causal Theory of Content Anti-skeptical
Recently some arguments against Cartesian-style skepticism have been based on theories of content. I hope to show that the relevance of theories of to what we can know is conditional in a more complex way than has been recognized so far. Three different skeptical questions will be considered below. The first and most central will be whether one can know one's most basic concepts to have nonempty extensions. (Whether one can know which of one's co…
What Makes a Causal Theory of Content Anti-skeptical
Recently some arguments against Cartesian-style skepticism have been based on theories of content. I hope to show that the relevance of theories of to what we can know is conditional in a more complex way than has been recognized so far. Three different skeptical questions will be considered below. The first and most central will be whether one can know one's most basic concepts to have nonempty extensions. (Whether one can know which of one's co…
What Makes a Causal Theory of Content Anti-skeptical
Recently some arguments against Cartesian-style skepticism have been based on theories of content. I hope to show that the relevance of theories of to what we can know is conditional in a more complex way than has been recognized so far. Three different skeptical questions will be considered below. The first and most central will be whether one can know one's most basic concepts to have nonempty extensions. (Whether one can know which of one's co…
Frege on the Individuation of Thoughts
Les caractérisations apparemment conflictuelles quepropose Frege des pensées comme étant à lafois vériconditionnelles et ordonnées à la cognition, peuvent être vues comme deux manifestations d'une unique conception unificatrice. Mais ni la conception unificatrice ni chacune des caractérisations divergentes ne conduisent a un véritable critère d'identité pour les pensées. Car aucune des voies qu'elles suggerent pour distinguer les pensées les unes…
Philosophy (2 works) · Causal theory of reference (1 works) · Content (measure theory (1 works) · Epistemology (1 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (1 works) · Humanities (1 works) · Individuation (1 works) · Linguistics and Discourse Analysis (1 works) · Mathematics (1 works) · Metaphysics (1 works)