HAGIT BENBAJI
Biographic Data
| ID | 5723355 |
|---|---|
| NAME | HAGIT BENBAJI |
| GIVEN NAMES | HAGIT |
| FAMILY NAME | BENBAJI |
| SIGNATURE | BENBAJI H |
| AFFILIATIONS | Ben-Gurion University of the Negev |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 4 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 3 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 4 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2003 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2022 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Why (getting) the phenomenology of recognition (right) matters for epistemology
Are kind properties (e.g. being a eucalyptus tree) presented to us in visual experience? I propose an account of kind recognition that incorporates two conflicting intuitions: (1) Kind properties are not presented in the content of visual experience, (2) the application of kind concepts affects the phenomenology of experience. The conjunction of these claims seems puzzling only given the uniformity assumption that dominates theories of experience…
Persons and Mysterianism
The aim of this paper is to argue against the widely held view that our concept of person is purely mental. Utilizing an Anscombian scenario, in which reports on one’s own actions are made on the basis of observation, I argue that such “pilots in their ships,” as it were, cannot self-ascribe bodily properties. The mere fact that we feel in our bodies unlike pilots in their ships cannot generate the intuition that we are bodily: as long as we conc…
Constitution and the explanatory gap
Reid on Causation and Action
The Jounal of Scottish Philosophy, 1 (1) 2003, 1–19 ISSN 1479-6651 Causality is considered to be Reid’s Achilles’ heel. Apparently, he denies that events in nature are causes: the fire did not cause the collapse of the building; the collapse of the building did not cause the women’s death. Of course, this is not the first time that philosophers deny the obvious. But when such a denial comes from a philosopher who is famous for being loyal to the …
Reid on Causation and Action
The Jounal of Scottish Philosophy, 1 (1) 2003, 1–19 ISSN 1479-6651 Causality is considered to be Reid’s Achilles’ heel. Apparently, he denies that events in nature are causes: the fire did not cause the collapse of the building; the collapse of the building did not cause the women’s death. Of course, this is not the first time that philosophers deny the obvious. But when such a denial comes from a philosopher who is famous for being loyal to the …
Reid on Causation and Action
The Jounal of Scottish Philosophy, 1 (1) 2003, 1–19 ISSN 1479-6651 Causality is considered to be Reid’s Achilles’ heel. Apparently, he denies that events in nature are causes: the fire did not cause the collapse of the building; the collapse of the building did not cause the women’s death. Of course, this is not the first time that philosophers deny the obvious. But when such a denial comes from a philosopher who is famous for being loyal to the …
Constitution and the explanatory gap
Persons and Mysterianism
The aim of this paper is to argue against the widely held view that our concept of person is purely mental. Utilizing an Anscombian scenario, in which reports on one’s own actions are made on the basis of observation, I argue that such “pilots in their ships,” as it were, cannot self-ascribe bodily properties. The mere fact that we feel in our bodies unlike pilots in their ships cannot generate the intuition that we are bodily: as long as we conc…
Why (getting) the phenomenology of recognition (right) matters for epistemology
Are kind properties (e.g. being a eucalyptus tree) presented to us in visual experience? I propose an account of kind recognition that incorporates two conflicting intuitions: (1) Kind properties are not presented in the content of visual experience, (2) the application of kind concepts affects the phenomenology of experience. The conjunction of these claims seems puzzling only given the uniformity assumption that dominates theories of experience…
Epistemology (4 works) · Philosophy (4 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (3 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (3 works) · Cognitive psychology (2 works) · Cognitive science (2 works) · Computer Science (2 works) · Psychology (2 works) · Action (physics (1 work) · Aesthetics (1 work)