Edwin B Allaire
Biographic Data
| ID | 5723504 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Edwin B Allaire |
| GIVEN NAMES | Edwin B |
| FAMILY NAME | Allaire |
| SIGNATURE | ALLAIRE E B |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Iowa |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 8 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 0 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 8 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1960 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1997 |
| H-INDEX | 0 |
Tractarian Semantics
Ontologically speaking, things are
In the first place ... it will be necessary to explain what an individual substance is. It is indeed true that when several predicates are attributes of a single subject and this subject is not an attribute of another, we speak of it as an individual substance, but this is not enough, and such an explanation is merely nominal. We must therefore inquire what it is to be an attribute in reality of a certain subject. ‘What is a Thing (substance)?’ e…
Things, Relations and Identity
Philosophers have long believed that if the Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles were logically true, there would be no problem of individuation. I show (a) that if spatial relations are, as seems plausible, of such a nature that it makes no sense to say of one thing that it is related to itself, then the Principle is a logical truth, asserting that a certain kind of state of affairs is impossible because the kind of sentence purporting to…
The Circle of Ideas and the Circularity of the Meditations
Arnauld's suspicion was right: the Meditations is circular. That is not surprising, for there is no escape from the circle of ideas into which Descartes drove himself. Nor is it surprising that Descartes failed to see what Arnauld suspected. What is surprising is that some still fail to see what Arnauld suspected. They fail, I think, because they are bewildered. They cannot understand how Descartes could have committed such a blunder, nor how, if…
Ontology and Acquaintance: A Reply to Clatterbaugh
Consider a red circle, and suppose it is a paradigmatic thing. Some philosophers maintain that a thing is ontologically analyzable into a particular exemplifying properties, those properties truly ascribed to the thing by the customary words. Our red circle, then, consists of a particular, say a; two properties, red and circle; and exemplification, a tie tying a , red, and circle into “the red circle.” Upon this analysis, a is bare, i.e., not re-…
The Attack on Substance: Descartes to Hume
An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content
Berkeley's idealism
Existence, Independence and Universals
No prominent works on this page.
Existence, Independence and Universals
Berkeley's idealism
The Attack on Substance: Descartes to Hume
An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content
Ontology and Acquaintance: A Reply to Clatterbaugh
Consider a red circle, and suppose it is a paradigmatic thing. Some philosophers maintain that a thing is ontologically analyzable into a particular exemplifying properties, those properties truly ascribed to the thing by the customary words. Our red circle, then, consists of a particular, say a; two properties, red and circle; and exemplification, a tie tying a , red, and circle into “the red circle.” Upon this analysis, a is bare, i.e., not re-…
The Circle of Ideas and the Circularity of the Meditations
Arnauld's suspicion was right: the Meditations is circular. That is not surprising, for there is no escape from the circle of ideas into which Descartes drove himself. Nor is it surprising that Descartes failed to see what Arnauld suspected. What is surprising is that some still fail to see what Arnauld suspected. They fail, I think, because they are bewildered. They cannot understand how Descartes could have committed such a blunder, nor how, if…
Things, Relations and Identity
Philosophers have long believed that if the Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles were logically true, there would be no problem of individuation. I show (a) that if spatial relations are, as seems plausible, of such a nature that it makes no sense to say of one thing that it is related to itself, then the Principle is a logical truth, asserting that a certain kind of state of affairs is impossible because the kind of sentence purporting to…
Ontologically speaking, things are
In the first place ... it will be necessary to explain what an individual substance is. It is indeed true that when several predicates are attributes of a single subject and this subject is not an attribute of another, we speak of it as an individual substance, but this is not enough, and such an explanation is merely nominal. We must therefore inquire what it is to be an attribute in reality of a certain subject. ‘What is a Thing (substance)?’ e…
Tractarian Semantics
Epistemology (7 works) · Philosophy (7 works) · Computer Science (5 works) · Historical Philosophy and Science (3 works) · Linguistics (3 works) · Mathematics (3 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (3 works) · Psychology (3 works) · Analytic philosophy (2 works) · Classical Philosophy and Thought (2 works)