Prabhpal Singh
Biographic Data
| ID | 5723531 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Prabhpal Singh |
| GIVEN NAMES | Prabhpal |
| FAMILY NAME | Singh |
| SIGNATURE | SINGH P |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Ottawa |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-3660-8563 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 7 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 0 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 7 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2020 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 0 |
Asymmetry endures
Holt argues against my account of the moral disanalogy between the situation of a pregnant person having an abortion and a parent committing the infanticide of their newborn. I explain that this critique fails because Holt constructs a straw man of my account by misrepresenting its scope, misrepresents one of my arguments and presents false equivalences between both, withdrawing consent for sex and withdrawing from parenthood, and the relationshi…
Birth’s transformative shift
Waleszczyński critiques my argument for why the relationship between a pregnant person and any fetus they carry is not a relationship between a parent and a child. I argue Waleszczyński does not show that my ‘argument from potentiality’ is inadequate, and I provide further justification for why birth marks a transformative shift into a moral relationship
Abortion, Infanticide, and Choosing Parenthood
Some responses to analogies between abortion and infanticide appeal to Judith Jarvis Thomson's argument for the permissibility of abortion. I argue that these responses fail because a parallel argument can be constructed for the permissibility of infanticide. However, an argument on the grounds of a right to choose to become a parent can maintain that abortion is permissible but infanticide is not by recognizing the normative significance and nat…
Why there is no dilemma for the birth strategy
Bobier and Omelianchuk argue that the Birth Strategy for addressing analogies between abortion and infanticide is saddled with a dilemma. It must be accepted that non-therapeutic late-term abortions are either, impermissible, or they are not. If accepted, then the Birth Strategy is undermined. If not, then the highly unintuitive claim that non-therapeutic late-term abortions are permissible must be accepted. I argue that the moral principle emplo…
Orphans cannot be after-birth aborted
I offer a response to an objection to my account of the moral difference between fetuses and newborns, an account that seeks to address an analogy between abortion and infanticide, which is based on the apparent equality of moral value of fetuses and newborns
Defending the distinction between pregnancy and parenthood
In this paper, I respond to the criticisms towards my account of the difference in moral status between fetuses and newborns. I show my critics have not adequately argued for their view that pregnant women participate in a parent–child relationship. While an important counterexample is raised against my account, this counterexample had already been dealt with in my original paper. Because the criticisms against my account lack argumentative suppo…
Moral Realism and Expert Disagreement
The fact of moral disagreement is often raised as a problem for moral realism. The idea is that disagreement amongst people or communities on moral issues is to be taken as evidence that there are no objective moral facts. While the fact of â folkâ moral disagreement has been of interest, the fact of expert moral disagreement, that is, widespread and longstanding disagreement amongst expert moral philosophers, is even more compelling. In this pap…
No prominent works on this page.
Moral Realism and Expert Disagreement
The fact of moral disagreement is often raised as a problem for moral realism. The idea is that disagreement amongst people or communities on moral issues is to be taken as evidence that there are no objective moral facts. While the fact of â folkâ moral disagreement has been of interest, the fact of expert moral disagreement, that is, widespread and longstanding disagreement amongst expert moral philosophers, is even more compelling. In this pap…
Defending the distinction between pregnancy and parenthood
In this paper, I respond to the criticisms towards my account of the difference in moral status between fetuses and newborns. I show my critics have not adequately argued for their view that pregnant women participate in a parent–child relationship. While an important counterexample is raised against my account, this counterexample had already been dealt with in my original paper. Because the criticisms against my account lack argumentative suppo…
Why there is no dilemma for the birth strategy
Bobier and Omelianchuk argue that the Birth Strategy for addressing analogies between abortion and infanticide is saddled with a dilemma. It must be accepted that non-therapeutic late-term abortions are either, impermissible, or they are not. If accepted, then the Birth Strategy is undermined. If not, then the highly unintuitive claim that non-therapeutic late-term abortions are permissible must be accepted. I argue that the moral principle emplo…
Orphans cannot be after-birth aborted
I offer a response to an objection to my account of the moral difference between fetuses and newborns, an account that seeks to address an analogy between abortion and infanticide, which is based on the apparent equality of moral value of fetuses and newborns
Birth’s transformative shift
Waleszczyński critiques my argument for why the relationship between a pregnant person and any fetus they carry is not a relationship between a parent and a child. I argue Waleszczyński does not show that my ‘argument from potentiality’ is inadequate, and I provide further justification for why birth marks a transformative shift into a moral relationship
Abortion, Infanticide, and Choosing Parenthood
Some responses to analogies between abortion and infanticide appeal to Judith Jarvis Thomson's argument for the permissibility of abortion. I argue that these responses fail because a parallel argument can be constructed for the permissibility of infanticide. However, an argument on the grounds of a right to choose to become a parent can maintain that abortion is permissible but infanticide is not by recognizing the normative significance and nat…
Asymmetry endures
Holt argues against my account of the moral disanalogy between the situation of a pregnant person having an abortion and a parent committing the infanticide of their newborn. I explain that this critique fails because Holt constructs a straw man of my account by misrepresenting its scope, misrepresents one of my arguments and presents false equivalences between both, withdrawing consent for sex and withdrawing from parenthood, and the relationshi…
Psychology (7 works) · Epistemology (6 works) · Philosophy (6 works) · Reproductive Health and Technologies (6 works) · Ethics and Legal Issues in Pediatric Healthcare (5 works) · Pregnancy (5 works) · Social Psychology (5 works) · Abortion (4 works) · Medicine (3 works) · Biology (2 works)