Volker Nocke
Biographic Data
| ID | 5729107 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Volker Nocke |
| GIVEN NAMES | Volker |
| FAMILY NAME | Nocke |
| SIGNATURE | NOCKE V |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Mannheim |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-5000-6828 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 5 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 3 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 5 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2007 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2023 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Consumer Search, Steering, and Choice Overload
We develop a model of within-firm sequential, directed search and study a \nfirm’s ability and incentive to steer consumers. We find that the firm often ben- efits from adopting a noisy positioning strategy, which limits the information available to consumers. This induces consumers to keep searching but discour- ages some of them from visiting the firm. This occurs even though the firm and the consumers have in common the interest of maximizing …
Internal versus External Growth in Industries with Scale Economies
We study merger policy in a dynamic computational model in which firms can reduce costs through investment or through mergers. Firms invest or propose mergers according to the profitability of these strategies. An antitrust authority can block mergers at some cost. We examine the optimal policy for an antitrust authority that cannot commit to its future policy and approves mergers as they are proposed. We find that the optimal policy can differ s…
Merger Policy in a Quantitative Model of International Trade
In a two-country international trade model with oligopolistic competition, we study the conditions on market structure and trade costs under which a merger policy designed to benefit domestic consumers is too tough or too lenient from the viewpoint of the foreign country. We calibrate the model to match industry-level data in the U.S. and Canada. Our results suggest that at present levels of trade costs, merger policy is too tough in the vast maj…
Dynamic Merger Review
We analyze the optimal dynamic policy of an antitrust authority toward horizontal mergers when merger proposals are endogenous and occur over time. Approving a currently proposed merger may affect the profitability and welfare effects of potential future mergers, whose characteristics may not yet be known. We identify conditions under which discounted expected consumer surplus is maximized by using a completely myopic merger review policy that ap…
A Theory of Clearance Sales
Clearance sales are widely used by firms as an intertemporal selling policy, in particular in markets where firms face demand uncertainty and need to choose capacity in advance. Clearance sales consist in charging a high price initially but then lowering the price in the sales period. High-valuation consumers purchase the good at the high initial price so as to avoid rationing at the low price, while low-valuation consumers wait for the price to …
A Theory of Clearance Sales
Clearance sales are widely used by firms as an intertemporal selling policy, in particular in markets where firms face demand uncertainty and need to choose capacity in advance. Clearance sales consist in charging a high price initially but then lowering the price in the sales period. High-valuation consumers purchase the good at the high initial price so as to avoid rationing at the low price, while low-valuation consumers wait for the price to …
Internal versus External Growth in Industries with Scale Economies
We study merger policy in a dynamic computational model in which firms can reduce costs through investment or through mergers. Firms invest or propose mergers according to the profitability of these strategies. An antitrust authority can block mergers at some cost. We examine the optimal policy for an antitrust authority that cannot commit to its future policy and approves mergers as they are proposed. We find that the optimal policy can differ s…
A Theory of Clearance Sales
Clearance sales are widely used by firms as an intertemporal selling policy, in particular in markets where firms face demand uncertainty and need to choose capacity in advance. Clearance sales consist in charging a high price initially but then lowering the price in the sales period. High-valuation consumers purchase the good at the high initial price so as to avoid rationing at the low price, while low-valuation consumers wait for the price to …
Dynamic Merger Review
We analyze the optimal dynamic policy of an antitrust authority toward horizontal mergers when merger proposals are endogenous and occur over time. Approving a currently proposed merger may affect the profitability and welfare effects of potential future mergers, whose characteristics may not yet be known. We identify conditions under which discounted expected consumer surplus is maximized by using a completely myopic merger review policy that ap…
Internal versus External Growth in Industries with Scale Economies
We study merger policy in a dynamic computational model in which firms can reduce costs through investment or through mergers. Firms invest or propose mergers according to the profitability of these strategies. An antitrust authority can block mergers at some cost. We examine the optimal policy for an antitrust authority that cannot commit to its future policy and approves mergers as they are proposed. We find that the optimal policy can differ s…
Merger Policy in a Quantitative Model of International Trade
In a two-country international trade model with oligopolistic competition, we study the conditions on market structure and trade costs under which a merger policy designed to benefit domestic consumers is too tough or too lenient from the viewpoint of the foreign country. We calibrate the model to match industry-level data in the U.S. and Canada. Our results suggest that at present levels of trade costs, merger policy is too tough in the vast maj…
Consumer Search, Steering, and Choice Overload
We develop a model of within-firm sequential, directed search and study a \nfirm’s ability and incentive to steer consumers. We find that the firm often ben- efits from adopting a noisy positioning strategy, which limits the information available to consumers. This induces consumers to keep searching but discour- ages some of them from visiting the firm. This occurs even though the firm and the consumers have in common the interest of maximizing …
Economics (5 works) · Business (4 works) · Merger and Competition Analysis (4 works) · Consumer Market Behavior and Pricing (3 works) · Finance (3 works) · Finance (3 works) · Microeconomics (3 works) · Digital Platforms and Economics (2 works) · Industrial organization (2 works) · Market economy (2 works)