Tim Worrall
Biographic Data
| ID | 5729340 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Tim Worrall |
| GIVEN NAMES | Tim |
| FAMILY NAME | Worrall |
| SIGNATURE | WORRALL T |
| AFFILIATIONS | Keele University |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-1017-6769 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 8 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 20 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 8 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1988 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2024 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
Intergenerational Insurance
How should successive generations insure each other when the young can default on previously promised transfers to the old? This paper studies intergenerational insurance that maximizes the expected discounted utility of all generations subject to participation constraints for each generation. If complete insurance is unattainable, the optimal intergenerational insurance is history-dependent even when the environment is stationary. The risk from …
Self-Enforcing Wage Contracts Redux
This paper provides our reflections on self-enforcing wage contracts.We present a simple version of the model of Thomas and Worrall (1988) and explain its motivation, contribution, and methodology. We discuss some of its limitations, the development of literature, and its connection to the literature on relational contracting with an observable effort cost. We suggest some open questions for the future development of the literature.
Using Linked Data Sources to Enhance Catalog Discovery
Our research explores how linked data sources and non-library metadata can support open-ended discovery of library resources. We also consider which experimental methods are best suited to the improvement of library catalog systems. We provide an overview of the questions driving our discovery experiments with linked data, a summary of some of our usability findings, as well as our design and implementation approach. In addition, we situate the d…
Limited Commitment Models of the Labour Market
We present an overview of models of long‐term self‐enforcing labour contracts in which risk‐sharing is the dominant motive for contractual solutions. A base model is developed that is sufficiently general to encompass the two‐agent problem central to most of the literature, including variable hours. We consider two‐sided limited commitment and look at its implications for aggregate labour market variables. We consider the implications for empiric…
Informal Insurance Arrangements with Limited Commitment
Recent work on consumption allocations in village economies finds that idiosyncratic variation in consumption is systematically related to idiosyncratic variation in income, thus rejecting the hypothesis of full risk-pooling. We attempt to explain these observations by adding limited commitment as an impediment to risk-pooling. We provide a general dynamic model and completely characterise efficient informal insurance arrangements constrained by …
Gift-giving, Quasi-credit and Reciprocity
The fluctuations in incomes inherent in rural communities can be attenuated by reciprocal assistance. A model of reciprocal assistance based upon rational action and voluntary participation is presented. Individuals provide assistance only if the costs of so doing are outweighed by the benefits from expected future reciprocation. A distinction is made between general reciprocity, where the counter obligation is expected but not certain, and balan…
The Welfare Implications of Costly Monitoring in the Credit Market
Rationing is a pervasive feature of credit markets. It has been suggested that credit rationing represents a sub-optimal allocation of resources. In a general equilibrium model of credit rationing with hidden information and costly monitoring we show that if credit is rationed it is sub-optimal but that credit should be rationed more tightly. In equilibrium loan applicants bear average monitoring costs, whereas for efficiency they should bear mar…
Self-Enforcing Wage Contracts
Journal Article Self-Enforcing Wage Contracts Get access Jonathan Thomas, Jonathan Thomas University of Warwick Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Tim Worrall Tim Worrall University of Konstanz Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Review of Economic Studies, Volume 55, Issue 4, October 1988, Pages 541–554, https://doi.org/10.2307/2297404 Published: 01 October 1988 Artic…
Self-Enforcing Wage Contracts
Journal Article Self-Enforcing Wage Contracts Get access Jonathan Thomas, Jonathan Thomas University of Warwick Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Tim Worrall Tim Worrall University of Konstanz Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Review of Economic Studies, Volume 55, Issue 4, October 1988, Pages 541–554, https://doi.org/10.2307/2297404 Published: 01 October 1988 Artic…
Gift-giving, Quasi-credit and Reciprocity
The fluctuations in incomes inherent in rural communities can be attenuated by reciprocal assistance. A model of reciprocal assistance based upon rational action and voluntary participation is presented. Individuals provide assistance only if the costs of so doing are outweighed by the benefits from expected future reciprocation. A distinction is made between general reciprocity, where the counter obligation is expected but not certain, and balan…
The Welfare Implications of Costly Monitoring in the Credit Market
Rationing is a pervasive feature of credit markets. It has been suggested that credit rationing represents a sub-optimal allocation of resources. In a general equilibrium model of credit rationing with hidden information and costly monitoring we show that if credit is rationed it is sub-optimal but that credit should be rationed more tightly. In equilibrium loan applicants bear average monitoring costs, whereas for efficiency they should bear mar…
Self-Enforcing Wage Contracts
Journal Article Self-Enforcing Wage Contracts Get access Jonathan Thomas, Jonathan Thomas University of Warwick Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Tim Worrall Tim Worrall University of Konstanz Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Review of Economic Studies, Volume 55, Issue 4, October 1988, Pages 541–554, https://doi.org/10.2307/2297404 Published: 01 October 1988 Artic…
The Welfare Implications of Costly Monitoring in the Credit Market
Rationing is a pervasive feature of credit markets. It has been suggested that credit rationing represents a sub-optimal allocation of resources. In a general equilibrium model of credit rationing with hidden information and costly monitoring we show that if credit is rationed it is sub-optimal but that credit should be rationed more tightly. In equilibrium loan applicants bear average monitoring costs, whereas for efficiency they should bear mar…
Informal Insurance Arrangements with Limited Commitment
Recent work on consumption allocations in village economies finds that idiosyncratic variation in consumption is systematically related to idiosyncratic variation in income, thus rejecting the hypothesis of full risk-pooling. We attempt to explain these observations by adding limited commitment as an impediment to risk-pooling. We provide a general dynamic model and completely characterise efficient informal insurance arrangements constrained by …
Gift-giving, Quasi-credit and Reciprocity
The fluctuations in incomes inherent in rural communities can be attenuated by reciprocal assistance. A model of reciprocal assistance based upon rational action and voluntary participation is presented. Individuals provide assistance only if the costs of so doing are outweighed by the benefits from expected future reciprocation. A distinction is made between general reciprocity, where the counter obligation is expected but not certain, and balan…
Limited Commitment Models of the Labour Market
We present an overview of models of long‐term self‐enforcing labour contracts in which risk‐sharing is the dominant motive for contractual solutions. A base model is developed that is sufficiently general to encompass the two‐agent problem central to most of the literature, including variable hours. We consider two‐sided limited commitment and look at its implications for aggregate labour market variables. We consider the implications for empiric…
Using Linked Data Sources to Enhance Catalog Discovery
Our research explores how linked data sources and non-library metadata can support open-ended discovery of library resources. We also consider which experimental methods are best suited to the improvement of library catalog systems. We provide an overview of the questions driving our discovery experiments with linked data, a summary of some of our usability findings, as well as our design and implementation approach. In addition, we situate the d…
Self-Enforcing Wage Contracts Redux
This paper provides our reflections on self-enforcing wage contracts.We present a simple version of the model of Thomas and Worrall (1988) and explain its motivation, contribution, and methodology. We discuss some of its limitations, the development of literature, and its connection to the literature on relational contracting with an observable effort cost. We suggest some open questions for the future development of the literature.
Intergenerational Insurance
How should successive generations insure each other when the young can default on previously promised transfers to the old? This paper studies intergenerational insurance that maximizes the expected discounted utility of all generations subject to participation constraints for each generation. If complete insurance is unattainable, the optimal intergenerational insurance is history-dependent even when the environment is stationary. The risk from …
Economics (6 works) · Business (3 works) · Labor market dynamics and wage inequality (3 works) · Law (3 works) · Microeconomics (3 works) · Political science (3 works) · Computer Science (2 works) · Economic history (2 works) · Economic theories and models (2 works) · Finance (2 works)