Erling Eide
Biographic Data
| ID | 5729360 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Erling Eide |
| GIVEN NAMES | Erling |
| FAMILY NAME | Eide |
| SIGNATURE | EIDE E |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Oslo |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 2 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 6 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 2 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1981 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2011 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Rank-Dependent Utility, Tax Evasion, and Labor Supply
In a portfolio model of tax evasion an expected utility maximizer will cheat more than what is estimated in empirical studies. At least two types of explanation have been suggested as solutions to this puzzle: (1) taxpayers act according to some unexpected utility theory, and (2) individual ethical norms and social stigma induce people not to cheat. Based on Norwegian survey data, we find that a rank-dependent expected-utility model performs bett…
Economic Models of Criminal Behavior
Journal Article Economic Models of Criminal Behavior Get access Economic Models of Criminal Behavior. Edited by J. M. Heineke. (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1978. Pp. xi + 391. $40.00, Dfl 90.00.) Erling Eide Erling Eide University of Oslo Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Economic Journal, Volume 91, Issue 362, 1 June 1981, Pages 584–585, https://doi.org/10.2307/2232628 Published: 01 June 1981
Economic Models of Criminal Behavior
Journal Article Economic Models of Criminal Behavior Get access Economic Models of Criminal Behavior. Edited by J. M. Heineke. (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1978. Pp. xi + 391. $40.00, Dfl 90.00.) Erling Eide Erling Eide University of Oslo Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Economic Journal, Volume 91, Issue 362, 1 June 1981, Pages 584–585, https://doi.org/10.2307/2232628 Published: 01 June 1981
Economic Models of Criminal Behavior
Journal Article Economic Models of Criminal Behavior Get access Economic Models of Criminal Behavior. Edited by J. M. Heineke. (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1978. Pp. xi + 391. $40.00, Dfl 90.00.) Erling Eide Erling Eide University of Oslo Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Economic Journal, Volume 91, Issue 362, 1 June 1981, Pages 584–585, https://doi.org/10.2307/2232628 Published: 01 June 1981
Rank-Dependent Utility, Tax Evasion, and Labor Supply
In a portfolio model of tax evasion an expected utility maximizer will cheat more than what is estimated in empirical studies. At least two types of explanation have been suggested as solutions to this puzzle: (1) taxpayers act according to some unexpected utility theory, and (2) individual ethical norms and social stigma induce people not to cheat. Based on Norwegian survey data, we find that a rank-dependent expected-utility model performs bett…
Psychology (2 works) · Cheating (1 works) · Crime Patterns and Interventions (1 works) · Criminal behavior (1 works) · Criminology (1 works) · Econometrics (1 works) · Economics (1 works) · Expected utility hypothesis (1 works) · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies (1 works) · Financial economics (1 works)