Clive Southey
Biographic Data
| ID | 5729568 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Clive Southey |
| GIVEN NAMES | Clive |
| FAMILY NAME | Southey |
| SIGNATURE | SOUTHEY C |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Guelph |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 7 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 24 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 7 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1972 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1999 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Too Much Monitoring, Not Enough Performance Pay
Journal Article Too Much Monitoring, Not Enough Performance Pay Get access David De Meza, David De Meza London School of Economics and University of Exeter Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Clive Southey Clive Southey University of Guelph Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Economic Journal, Volume 109, Issue 454, 1 March 1999, Pages 126–139, https://doi.org/10.1111/1…
The Borrower's Curse
This paper argues that most of the facts characterising small-scale businesses, including high failure rates, reliance on bank credit rather than equity finance, relatively low interest rate margins, and credit rationing, can be explained by a tendency for those who are excessively optimistic to dominate new entrants. Drawing on findings in psychology, we model entrants as relatively naive optimisers. Banks on the other hand are viewed as well in…
The opportunity costs of biodiversity conservation in Kenya
Lost Initiatives
The Public Regulation of Commercial Fisheries in Canada
Crown Charges for Early Timber Rights
Policy Prescriptions in Bionomic Models
The Borrower's Curse
This paper argues that most of the facts characterising small-scale businesses, including high failure rates, reliance on bank credit rather than equity finance, relatively low interest rate margins, and credit rationing, can be explained by a tendency for those who are excessively optimistic to dominate new entrants. Drawing on findings in psychology, we model entrants as relatively naive optimisers. Banks on the other hand are viewed as well in…
Too Much Monitoring, Not Enough Performance Pay
Journal Article Too Much Monitoring, Not Enough Performance Pay Get access David De Meza, David De Meza London School of Economics and University of Exeter Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Clive Southey Clive Southey University of Guelph Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Economic Journal, Volume 109, Issue 454, 1 March 1999, Pages 126–139, https://doi.org/10.1111/1…
Policy Prescriptions in Bionomic Models
Crown Charges for Early Timber Rights
The Public Regulation of Commercial Fisheries in Canada
Lost Initiatives
The opportunity costs of biodiversity conservation in Kenya
The Borrower's Curse
This paper argues that most of the facts characterising small-scale businesses, including high failure rates, reliance on bank credit rather than equity finance, relatively low interest rate margins, and credit rationing, can be explained by a tendency for those who are excessively optimistic to dominate new entrants. Drawing on findings in psychology, we model entrants as relatively naive optimisers. Banks on the other hand are viewed as well in…
Too Much Monitoring, Not Enough Performance Pay
Journal Article Too Much Monitoring, Not Enough Performance Pay Get access David De Meza, David De Meza London School of Economics and University of Exeter Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Clive Southey Clive Southey University of Guelph Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Economic Journal, Volume 109, Issue 454, 1 March 1999, Pages 126–139, https://doi.org/10.1111/1…
Business (4 works) · Economics (4 works) · Political science (4 works) · Geography (3 works) · Agricultural economics (2 works) · Computer Science (2 works) · Economic and Environmental Valuation (2 works) · Environmental Science (2 works) · Finance (2 works) · Forest Management and Policy (2 works)