Robert W Rosenthal
Biographic Data
| ID | 5730069 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Robert W Rosenthal |
| GIVEN NAMES | Robert W |
| FAMILY NAME | Rosenthal |
| SIGNATURE | ROSENTHAL R W |
| AFFILIATIONS | Boston University |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 8 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 6 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 8 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1980 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2001 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Bargaining Piecemeal Or All At Once
Journal Article Bargaining Piecemeal Or All At Once? Get access Kevin Lang, Kevin Lang Boston University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Robert W. Rosenthal Robert W. Rosenthal Boston University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Economic Journal, Volume 111, Issue 473, July 2001, Pages 526–540, https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0297.00649 Published: 09 October 2008
Suicide attempts and signalling games
A Strategic Altruism Model in Which Ricardian Equivalence Does Not Hold
Journal Article A Strategic Altruism Model in Which Ricardian Equivalence Does Not Hold Get access Laurence J. Kotlikoff, Laurence J. Kotlikoff Boston University and NBER Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Assaf Razin, Assaf Razin Tel Aviv University and NBER Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Robert W. Rosenthal Robert W. Rosenthal Boston University Search for other work…
Noncooperative games and nontransitive preferences
A model of far-sighted electoral competition
Games of perfect information, predatory pricing and the chain-store paradox
Repeated bargaining with opportunities for learning
We describe a model in which individuals repeatedly play a non‐cooperative bargaining game against different opponents. The payoffs of the game for all but one of the possible outcomes are fixed and known from the outset. The remaining, disagreement, payoff varies with the player and is revealed to him only when he has once experienced it. This possibility of information acquisition creates an extra incentive for uninformed players not to yield i…
New equilibria for noncooperative two‐person games
New equilibrium concepts for noncooperative two‐person games are introduced and examined. Although these equilibria coincide with the Nash equilibria in all constant‐sum games, they differ significantly in other cases. In particular, for finite repetitions of the prisoner's dilemma, some cooperating strategy combinations become equilibria
New equilibria for noncooperative two‐person games
New equilibrium concepts for noncooperative two‐person games are introduced and examined. Although these equilibria coincide with the Nash equilibria in all constant‐sum games, they differ significantly in other cases. In particular, for finite repetitions of the prisoner's dilemma, some cooperating strategy combinations become equilibria
Bargaining Piecemeal Or All At Once
Journal Article Bargaining Piecemeal Or All At Once? Get access Kevin Lang, Kevin Lang Boston University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Robert W. Rosenthal Robert W. Rosenthal Boston University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Economic Journal, Volume 111, Issue 473, July 2001, Pages 526–540, https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0297.00649 Published: 09 October 2008
Suicide attempts and signalling games
A Strategic Altruism Model in Which Ricardian Equivalence Does Not Hold
Journal Article A Strategic Altruism Model in Which Ricardian Equivalence Does Not Hold Get access Laurence J. Kotlikoff, Laurence J. Kotlikoff Boston University and NBER Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Assaf Razin, Assaf Razin Tel Aviv University and NBER Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Robert W. Rosenthal Robert W. Rosenthal Boston University Search for other work…
Noncooperative games and nontransitive preferences
New equilibria for noncooperative two‐person games
New equilibrium concepts for noncooperative two‐person games are introduced and examined. Although these equilibria coincide with the Nash equilibria in all constant‐sum games, they differ significantly in other cases. In particular, for finite repetitions of the prisoner's dilemma, some cooperating strategy combinations become equilibria
Games of perfect information, predatory pricing and the chain-store paradox
Repeated bargaining with opportunities for learning
We describe a model in which individuals repeatedly play a non‐cooperative bargaining game against different opponents. The payoffs of the game for all but one of the possible outcomes are fixed and known from the outset. The remaining, disagreement, payoff varies with the player and is revealed to him only when he has once experienced it. This possibility of information acquisition creates an extra incentive for uninformed players not to yield i…
A model of far-sighted electoral competition
Noncooperative games and nontransitive preferences
A Strategic Altruism Model in Which Ricardian Equivalence Does Not Hold
Journal Article A Strategic Altruism Model in Which Ricardian Equivalence Does Not Hold Get access Laurence J. Kotlikoff, Laurence J. Kotlikoff Boston University and NBER Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Assaf Razin, Assaf Razin Tel Aviv University and NBER Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Robert W. Rosenthal Robert W. Rosenthal Boston University Search for other work…
Suicide attempts and signalling games
Bargaining Piecemeal Or All At Once
Journal Article Bargaining Piecemeal Or All At Once? Get access Kevin Lang, Kevin Lang Boston University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Robert W. Rosenthal Robert W. Rosenthal Boston University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Economic Journal, Volume 111, Issue 473, July 2001, Pages 526–540, https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0297.00649 Published: 09 October 2008
Economics (8 works) · Game Theory and Applications (6 works) · Mathematical economics (6 works) · Computer Science (5 works) · Microeconomics (5 works) · Game theory (4 works) · Economic theories and models (3 works) · Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation (3 works) · Game Theory and Voting Systems (3 works) · Psychology (3 works)