Pascalis Raimondos‐Møller
Biographic Data
| ID | 5730365 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Pascalis Raimondos‐Møller |
| GIVEN NAMES | Pascalis |
| FAMILY NAME | Raimondos‐Møller |
| SIGNATURE | MØLLER P R |
| AFFILIATIONS | Copenhagen Business School |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 2 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 19 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 2 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1999 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2000 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Lobbying by Ethnic Groups and Aid Allocation
We develop a political-economic model of foreign aid allocation. Each ethnic group in the donor country lobbies the government for allocating more aid to its country of origin, and the government accepts contributions from lobby groups. Initial per-capita income of the recipients and those of the ethnic groups are shown to be important determinants of the solution of the political equilibrium. We also examine the e®ects of changes in the degree o…
Foreign Aid, Domestic Investment and Welfare
This paper examines the welfare implications of temporary foreign aid in a simple two‐period, two‐country model of trade. Domestic investment is endogenous, providing an important link between aid in period one and the terms of trade in periods one and two. Transfer‐induced changes in the terms of trade redistribute present and future income between the donor and the recipient. In the presence of barriers to international borrowing and lending, s…
Lobbying by Ethnic Groups and Aid Allocation
We develop a political-economic model of foreign aid allocation. Each ethnic group in the donor country lobbies the government for allocating more aid to its country of origin, and the government accepts contributions from lobby groups. Initial per-capita income of the recipients and those of the ethnic groups are shown to be important determinants of the solution of the political equilibrium. We also examine the e®ects of changes in the degree o…
Foreign Aid, Domestic Investment and Welfare
This paper examines the welfare implications of temporary foreign aid in a simple two‐period, two‐country model of trade. Domestic investment is endogenous, providing an important link between aid in period one and the terms of trade in periods one and two. Transfer‐induced changes in the terms of trade redistribute present and future income between the donor and the recipient. In the presence of barriers to international borrowing and lending, s…
Foreign Aid, Domestic Investment and Welfare
This paper examines the welfare implications of temporary foreign aid in a simple two‐period, two‐country model of trade. Domestic investment is endogenous, providing an important link between aid in period one and the terms of trade in periods one and two. Transfer‐induced changes in the terms of trade redistribute present and future income between the donor and the recipient. In the presence of barriers to international borrowing and lending, s…
Lobbying by Ethnic Groups and Aid Allocation
We develop a political-economic model of foreign aid allocation. Each ethnic group in the donor country lobbies the government for allocating more aid to its country of origin, and the government accepts contributions from lobby groups. Initial per-capita income of the recipients and those of the ethnic groups are shown to be important determinants of the solution of the political equilibrium. We also examine the e®ects of changes in the degree o…
Economics (2 works) · International Development and Aid (2 works) · Politics (2 works) · Demographic economics (1 work) · Demography (1 work) · Demography (1 work) · Development economics (1 work) · Economic growth (1 work) · Economic Growth and Development (1 work) · Ethnic group (1 work)