Asher Wolinsky
Biographic Data
| ID | 5731249 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Asher Wolinsky |
| GIVEN NAMES | Asher |
| FAMILY NAME | Wolinsky |
| SIGNATURE | WOLINSKY A |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Pennsylvania |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 6 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 68 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 6 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1986 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2009 |
| H-INDEX | 3 |
Vote Buying
We examine the consequences of lobbying and vote buying, assuming this practice were allowed and free of stigma. Two lobbyists compete for the votes of legislators by offering up-front payments to the legislators in exchange for their votes. We analyze how the lobbyists’ budget constraints and legislators’ preferences determine the winner and the payments. When lobbyists are budget constrained then the preferences ofall legislators can matter, an…
Vote Buying
We examine the consequences of vote buying, assuming this practice were allowed and free of stigma. Two parties compete in a binary election and may purchase votes in a sequential bidding game via up-front binding payments and/or campaign promises (platforms) that are contingent on the outcome of the election. We analyze the role of the parties' and voters' preferences in determining the winner and the payments to voters. (c) 2008 by The Universi…
A Strategic Model of Social and Economic Networks
Worker Substitutability and Patterns of Unionisation
Journal Article Worker Substitutability and Patterns of Unionisation Get access Henrik Horn, Henrik Horn Institute for International Economic Studies, University of Stockholm Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Asher Wolinsky Asher Wolinsky Hebrew University and University of Pennsylvania Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Economic Journal, Volume 98, Issue 391, 1 June…
Middlemen
We study a model of a market with three types of agents: sellers, buyers, and middlemen. Buyers and sellers can trade directly or indirectly through the middlemen. The analysis focuses on steady state situations in which the numbers of agents of the different types and hence the trading opportunities are constant over time. The paper provides a framework for analyzing the activity of middlemen and the endogenous determination of the extent of tha…
The Nash Bargaining Solution in Economic Modelling
This article establishes the relationship between the static axiomatic theory of bargaining and the sequential strategic approach to bargaining. We consider two strategic models of alternating offers. The models differ in the source of the incentive of the bargaining parties to reach agreement: the bargainers' time preference and the risk of breakdown of negotiations. Each of the models has a unique perfect equilibrium. When the motivation to rea…
Vote Buying
We examine the consequences of vote buying, assuming this practice were allowed and free of stigma. Two parties compete in a binary election and may purchase votes in a sequential bidding game via up-front binding payments and/or campaign promises (platforms) that are contingent on the outcome of the election. We analyze the role of the parties' and voters' preferences in determining the winner and the payments to voters. (c) 2008 by The Universi…
Vote Buying
We examine the consequences of lobbying and vote buying, assuming this practice were allowed and free of stigma. Two lobbyists compete for the votes of legislators by offering up-front payments to the legislators in exchange for their votes. We analyze how the lobbyists’ budget constraints and legislators’ preferences determine the winner and the payments. When lobbyists are budget constrained then the preferences ofall legislators can matter, an…
Worker Substitutability and Patterns of Unionisation
Journal Article Worker Substitutability and Patterns of Unionisation Get access Henrik Horn, Henrik Horn Institute for International Economic Studies, University of Stockholm Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Asher Wolinsky Asher Wolinsky Hebrew University and University of Pennsylvania Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Economic Journal, Volume 98, Issue 391, 1 June…
The Nash Bargaining Solution in Economic Modelling
This article establishes the relationship between the static axiomatic theory of bargaining and the sequential strategic approach to bargaining. We consider two strategic models of alternating offers. The models differ in the source of the incentive of the bargaining parties to reach agreement: the bargainers' time preference and the risk of breakdown of negotiations. Each of the models has a unique perfect equilibrium. When the motivation to rea…
Middlemen
We study a model of a market with three types of agents: sellers, buyers, and middlemen. Buyers and sellers can trade directly or indirectly through the middlemen. The analysis focuses on steady state situations in which the numbers of agents of the different types and hence the trading opportunities are constant over time. The paper provides a framework for analyzing the activity of middlemen and the endogenous determination of the extent of tha…
Worker Substitutability and Patterns of Unionisation
Journal Article Worker Substitutability and Patterns of Unionisation Get access Henrik Horn, Henrik Horn Institute for International Economic Studies, University of Stockholm Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Asher Wolinsky Asher Wolinsky Hebrew University and University of Pennsylvania Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Economic Journal, Volume 98, Issue 391, 1 June…
A Strategic Model of Social and Economic Networks
Vote Buying
We examine the consequences of vote buying, assuming this practice were allowed and free of stigma. Two parties compete in a binary election and may purchase votes in a sequential bidding game via up-front binding payments and/or campaign promises (platforms) that are contingent on the outcome of the election. We analyze the role of the parties' and voters' preferences in determining the winner and the payments to voters. (c) 2008 by The Universi…
Vote Buying
We examine the consequences of lobbying and vote buying, assuming this practice were allowed and free of stigma. Two lobbyists compete for the votes of legislators by offering up-front payments to the legislators in exchange for their votes. We analyze how the lobbyists’ budget constraints and legislators’ preferences determine the winner and the payments. When lobbyists are budget constrained then the preferences ofall legislators can matter, an…
Economics (5 works) · Auction Theory and Applications (3 works) · Computer Science (3 works) · Microeconomics (3 works) · Political science (3 works) · Advertising (2 works) · Business (2 works) · Classics (2 works) · Economic theories and models (2 works) · Game Theory and Applications (2 works)