Joel M Guttman
Biographic Data
| ID | 5731491 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Joel M Guttman |
| GIVEN NAMES | Joel M |
| FAMILY NAME | Guttman |
| SIGNATURE | GUTTMAN J M |
| AFFILIATIONS | Bar-Ilan University |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 8 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 25 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 8 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1975 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2014 |
| H-INDEX | 3 |
On revolt and endogenous economic policy in autocratic regimes
Assortative matching, adverse selection, and group lending
Repeated Interaction and the Evolution of Preferences for Reciprocity
This paper models self‐enforcing agreements and the evolution of preferences for reciprocity when all agents are rational, Bayesian optimisers. In this 'indirect' evolutionary model, player types are defined not by their strategies, but by their preferences. The paper studies the evolution of a community consisting of 'opportunists', who maximise material payoffs, and 'reciprocators', who prefer joint co‐operation to exploiting their opponents. P…
Dynamic optimization of political popularity in an empirical macroeconomic model
Strategic Work Interactions and the Kibbutz-Kolkhoz Paradox
Journal Article Strategic Work Interactions and the Kibbutz-Kolkhoz Paradox Get access Joel M. Guttman, Joel M. Guttman Bar-Ran University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Adi Schnytzer Adi Schnytzer Bar-Ran University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Economic Journal, Volume 99, Issue 397, 1 September 1989, Pages 686–699, https://doi.org/10.2307/2233765 Published…
A Non-Cournot Model of Voluntary Collective Action
The interaction of selfish, rational actors in the provision of a public good is analyzed, in an attempt to explain recent experimental findings as well as real-world cases of voluntary collective action. The model, which allows for more sophisticated behavior than that assumed by the conventional Cournot theory, predicts a higher level of collective action that that theory. The impacts of income effects and of the price elasticity of demand for …
Interest Groups and the Demand for Agricultural Research
This paper applies a model of the demand for public goods to explain cross-sectional differences in public allocations to agricultural research in the United States. The model postulates that demanders of agricultural research on the state level--primarily farmers and firms producing agricultural inputs--contribute voluntarily to lobbying activity either by voting or by making campaign contributions in order to induce research allocations. A "con…
Avoiding specification errors in estimating the value of time
Repeated Interaction and the Evolution of Preferences for Reciprocity
This paper models self‐enforcing agreements and the evolution of preferences for reciprocity when all agents are rational, Bayesian optimisers. In this 'indirect' evolutionary model, player types are defined not by their strategies, but by their preferences. The paper studies the evolution of a community consisting of 'opportunists', who maximise material payoffs, and 'reciprocators', who prefer joint co‐operation to exploiting their opponents. P…
Interest Groups and the Demand for Agricultural Research
This paper applies a model of the demand for public goods to explain cross-sectional differences in public allocations to agricultural research in the United States. The model postulates that demanders of agricultural research on the state level--primarily farmers and firms producing agricultural inputs--contribute voluntarily to lobbying activity either by voting or by making campaign contributions in order to induce research allocations. A "con…
A Non-Cournot Model of Voluntary Collective Action
The interaction of selfish, rational actors in the provision of a public good is analyzed, in an attempt to explain recent experimental findings as well as real-world cases of voluntary collective action. The model, which allows for more sophisticated behavior than that assumed by the conventional Cournot theory, predicts a higher level of collective action that that theory. The impacts of income effects and of the price elasticity of demand for …
On revolt and endogenous economic policy in autocratic regimes
Dynamic optimization of political popularity in an empirical macroeconomic model
Strategic Work Interactions and the Kibbutz-Kolkhoz Paradox
Journal Article Strategic Work Interactions and the Kibbutz-Kolkhoz Paradox Get access Joel M. Guttman, Joel M. Guttman Bar-Ran University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Adi Schnytzer Adi Schnytzer Bar-Ran University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Economic Journal, Volume 99, Issue 397, 1 September 1989, Pages 686–699, https://doi.org/10.2307/2233765 Published…
Avoiding specification errors in estimating the value of time
Interest Groups and the Demand for Agricultural Research
This paper applies a model of the demand for public goods to explain cross-sectional differences in public allocations to agricultural research in the United States. The model postulates that demanders of agricultural research on the state level--primarily farmers and firms producing agricultural inputs--contribute voluntarily to lobbying activity either by voting or by making campaign contributions in order to induce research allocations. A "con…
A Non-Cournot Model of Voluntary Collective Action
The interaction of selfish, rational actors in the provision of a public good is analyzed, in an attempt to explain recent experimental findings as well as real-world cases of voluntary collective action. The model, which allows for more sophisticated behavior than that assumed by the conventional Cournot theory, predicts a higher level of collective action that that theory. The impacts of income effects and of the price elasticity of demand for …
Strategic Work Interactions and the Kibbutz-Kolkhoz Paradox
Journal Article Strategic Work Interactions and the Kibbutz-Kolkhoz Paradox Get access Joel M. Guttman, Joel M. Guttman Bar-Ran University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Adi Schnytzer Adi Schnytzer Bar-Ran University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Economic Journal, Volume 99, Issue 397, 1 September 1989, Pages 686–699, https://doi.org/10.2307/2233765 Published…
Dynamic optimization of political popularity in an empirical macroeconomic model
Repeated Interaction and the Evolution of Preferences for Reciprocity
This paper models self‐enforcing agreements and the evolution of preferences for reciprocity when all agents are rational, Bayesian optimisers. In this 'indirect' evolutionary model, player types are defined not by their strategies, but by their preferences. The paper studies the evolution of a community consisting of 'opportunists', who maximise material payoffs, and 'reciprocators', who prefer joint co‐operation to exploiting their opponents. P…
Assortative matching, adverse selection, and group lending
On revolt and endogenous economic policy in autocratic regimes
Economics (7 works) · Microeconomics (5 works) · Political science (4 works) · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies (3 works) · Mathematics (3 works) · Politics (3 works) · Computer Science (2 works) · Economic Policies and Impacts (2 works) · Economic system (2 works) · Economic theories and models (2 works)