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Parimal Kanti Bag

Biographic Data

ID5731584
NAMEParimal Kanti Bag
GIVEN NAMESParimal Kanti
FAMILY NAMEBag
SIGNATUREBAG P K
AFFILIATIONSNational University of Singapore
VERIFIEDNo
TOTAL WORKS3
TOTAL CITATIONS10
WORKS AS AUTHOR3
WORKS AS EDITOR0
FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR2006
LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR2017
H-INDEX2
  • Corrupt Bookmaking in a Fixed Odds Illegal Betting Market

    Open Access•Parimal Kanti Bag, P Bag et al.•ARTICLE•The Economic Journal•2017•References: 16

    Illegal betting in a two‐team sports contest is studied with player sabotage instigated by a monopolist bookmaker. Whereas punters hold beliefs about the teams’ winning chances correlated with Nature’s draw, the bookmaker’s information is noise‐free. Enforcement investigates with a higher probability, the greater the upset. In such an environment, if punters do not suspect match‐fixing, the favourite is bribed, thus creating upsets and intensifyi…

  • Repeated Charitable Contributions Under Incomplete Information

    Open Access•Parimal Kanti Bag, P Bag et al.•ARTICLE•The Economic Journal•2008•Cited by: 8•References: 20

    Incomplete information about (independent) private valuations of charities by potential donors provides an important strategic rationale for announcement of donations during fundraising drives and explains why donors may add to their initial contributions after learning about contributions made by others. In a two-stage fundraising drive where potential donors may contribute at either or both stages, it is shown that under certain conditions, ann…

  • Beneficial collusion in corruption control

    Open Access•Mehmet Bac, Parimal Kanti Bag et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Development Economics•2006•Cited by: 2•References: 3

  • Repeated Charitable Contributions Under Incomplete Information

    Open Access•Parimal Kanti Bag, P Bag et al.•ARTICLE•The Economic Journal•2008•Cited by: 8•References: 20

    Incomplete information about (independent) private valuations of charities by potential donors provides an important strategic rationale for announcement of donations during fundraising drives and explains why donors may add to their initial contributions after learning about contributions made by others. In a two-stage fundraising drive where potential donors may contribute at either or both stages, it is shown that under certain conditions, ann…

  • Beneficial collusion in corruption control

    Open Access•Mehmet Bac, Parimal Kanti Bag et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Development Economics•2006•Cited by: 2•References: 3

  • Beneficial collusion in corruption control

    Open Access•Mehmet Bac, Parimal Kanti Bag et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Development Economics•2006•Cited by: 2•References: 3

  • Repeated Charitable Contributions Under Incomplete Information

    Open Access•Parimal Kanti Bag, P Bag et al.•ARTICLE•The Economic Journal•2008•Cited by: 8•References: 20

    Incomplete information about (independent) private valuations of charities by potential donors provides an important strategic rationale for announcement of donations during fundraising drives and explains why donors may add to their initial contributions after learning about contributions made by others. In a two-stage fundraising drive where potential donors may contribute at either or both stages, it is shown that under certain conditions, ann…

  • Corrupt Bookmaking in a Fixed Odds Illegal Betting Market

    Open Access•Parimal Kanti Bag, P Bag et al.•ARTICLE•The Economic Journal•2017•References: 16

    Illegal betting in a two‐team sports contest is studied with player sabotage instigated by a monopolist bookmaker. Whereas punters hold beliefs about the teams’ winning chances correlated with Nature’s draw, the bookmaker’s information is noise‐free. Enforcement investigates with a higher probability, the greater the upset. In such an environment, if punters do not suspect match‐fixing, the favourite is bribed, thus creating upsets and intensifyi…

Business (3 works) · Computer Science (3 works) · Economics (3 works) · Enforcement (2 works) · Law (2 works) · Law (2 works) · Microeconomics (2 works) · Political science (2 works) · Public economics (2 works) · Actuarial science (1 work)

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