Charles J Thomas
Biographic Data
| ID | 5731969 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Charles J Thomas |
| GIVEN NAMES | Charles J |
| FAMILY NAME | Thomas |
| SIGNATURE | THOMAS C J |
| AFFILIATIONS | Chapman University |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 3 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 4 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 3 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2005 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2023 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Experimental analysis of impatience in bilateral and multilateral negotiations
Horizontal Product Differentiation in Auctions and Multilateral Negotiations
We experimentally compare first‐price auctions and multilateral negotiations after introducing horizontal product differentiation into a standard procurement setting. Both institutions yield identical surplus for the buyer, a difference from prior findings with homogeneous products that results from differentiation's influence on sellers' pricing behaviour. The data are consistent with this finding being driven by concessions from low‐cost seller…
Verifiable Offers and the Relationship Between Auctions and Multilateral Negotiations
We use the experimental method to compare second-price auctions with 'verifiable' multilateral negotiations in which the sole buyer can credibly reveal to sellers the best price offer he currently holds. Despite the two institutions' seeming equivalence, we find that prices are lower in verifiable multilateral negotiations than in second-price auctions. The difference occurs because low-cost sellers in negotiations often submit initial offers bel…
Verifiable Offers and the Relationship Between Auctions and Multilateral Negotiations
We use the experimental method to compare second-price auctions with 'verifiable' multilateral negotiations in which the sole buyer can credibly reveal to sellers the best price offer he currently holds. Despite the two institutions' seeming equivalence, we find that prices are lower in verifiable multilateral negotiations than in second-price auctions. The difference occurs because low-cost sellers in negotiations often submit initial offers bel…
Experimental analysis of impatience in bilateral and multilateral negotiations
Horizontal Product Differentiation in Auctions and Multilateral Negotiations
We experimentally compare first‐price auctions and multilateral negotiations after introducing horizontal product differentiation into a standard procurement setting. Both institutions yield identical surplus for the buyer, a difference from prior findings with homogeneous products that results from differentiation's influence on sellers' pricing behaviour. The data are consistent with this finding being driven by concessions from low‐cost seller…
Verifiable Offers and the Relationship Between Auctions and Multilateral Negotiations
We use the experimental method to compare second-price auctions with 'verifiable' multilateral negotiations in which the sole buyer can credibly reveal to sellers the best price offer he currently holds. Despite the two institutions' seeming equivalence, we find that prices are lower in verifiable multilateral negotiations than in second-price auctions. The difference occurs because low-cost sellers in negotiations often submit initial offers bel…
Horizontal Product Differentiation in Auctions and Multilateral Negotiations
We experimentally compare first‐price auctions and multilateral negotiations after introducing horizontal product differentiation into a standard procurement setting. Both institutions yield identical surplus for the buyer, a difference from prior findings with homogeneous products that results from differentiation's influence on sellers' pricing behaviour. The data are consistent with this finding being driven by concessions from low‐cost seller…
Experimental analysis of impatience in bilateral and multilateral negotiations
Auction Theory and Applications (3 works) · Economics (3 works) · Microeconomics (3 works) · Negotiation (3 works) · Common value auction (2 works) · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies (2 works) · Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems (2 works) · Mathematics (2 works) · Political science (2 works) · Bilateral trade (1 work)