Shouyong Shi
Biographic Data
| ID | 5732085 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Shouyong Shi |
| GIVEN NAMES | Shouyong |
| FAMILY NAME | Shi |
| SIGNATURE | SHI S |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Toronto |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 3 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 17 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 3 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2001 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2011 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
Efficient Search on the Job and the Business Cycle
The paper develops a model of directed search on the job in which transitions of workers between unemployment and employment and across employers are driven by heterogeneity in the quality of firm-worker matches. The equilibrium is such that the agents’ value and policy functions are independent of the endogenous distribution of workers across employment states. Hence, the model can be solved outside of the steady state and used to measure the ef…
Friedman Meets Hosios: Efficiency in Search Models of Money
This article studies optimal monetary policy in an economy with endogenous search decisions. We show that the same frictions that give fiat money a positive value generate an inefficient quantity of goods in each trade and an inefficient number of trades. The Friedman rule eliminates the first inefficiency and the Hosios rule the second. A monetary equilibrium attains the social optimum if and only if both rules are satisfied. When they cannot be…
Pricing and Matching with Frictions
Suppose that n buyers each want one unit and m sellers each have one or more units of a good. Sellers post prices, and then buyers choose sellers. In symmetric equilibrium, similar sellers all post one price, and buyers randomize. Hence, more or fewer buyers may arrive than a seller can accommodate. We call this frictions. We solve for prices and the endogenous matching function for finite n and m and consider the limit as n and m grow. The match…
Pricing and Matching with Frictions
Suppose that n buyers each want one unit and m sellers each have one or more units of a good. Sellers post prices, and then buyers choose sellers. In symmetric equilibrium, similar sellers all post one price, and buyers randomize. Hence, more or fewer buyers may arrive than a seller can accommodate. We call this frictions. We solve for prices and the endogenous matching function for finite n and m and consider the limit as n and m grow. The match…
Efficient Search on the Job and the Business Cycle
The paper develops a model of directed search on the job in which transitions of workers between unemployment and employment and across employers are driven by heterogeneity in the quality of firm-worker matches. The equilibrium is such that the agents’ value and policy functions are independent of the endogenous distribution of workers across employment states. Hence, the model can be solved outside of the steady state and used to measure the ef…
Pricing and Matching with Frictions
Suppose that n buyers each want one unit and m sellers each have one or more units of a good. Sellers post prices, and then buyers choose sellers. In symmetric equilibrium, similar sellers all post one price, and buyers randomize. Hence, more or fewer buyers may arrive than a seller can accommodate. We call this frictions. We solve for prices and the endogenous matching function for finite n and m and consider the limit as n and m grow. The match…
Friedman Meets Hosios: Efficiency in Search Models of Money
This article studies optimal monetary policy in an economy with endogenous search decisions. We show that the same frictions that give fiat money a positive value generate an inefficient quantity of goods in each trade and an inefficient number of trades. The Friedman rule eliminates the first inefficiency and the Hosios rule the second. A monetary equilibrium attains the social optimum if and only if both rules are satisfied. When they cannot be…
Efficient Search on the Job and the Business Cycle
The paper develops a model of directed search on the job in which transitions of workers between unemployment and employment and across employers are driven by heterogeneity in the quality of firm-worker matches. The equilibrium is such that the agents’ value and policy functions are independent of the endogenous distribution of workers across employment states. Hence, the model can be solved outside of the steady state and used to measure the ef…
Computer Science (3 works) · Economic theories and models (3 works) · Economics (3 works) · Macroeconomics (2 works) · Mathematical economics (2 works) · Microeconomics (2 works) · Value (mathematics (2 works) · Barter (1 works) · Beveridge curve (1 works) · Business cycle (1 works)