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W Henry Chiu

Biographic Data

ID5732229
NAMEW Henry Chiu
GIVEN NAMESW Henry
FAMILY NAMEChiu
SIGNATURECHIU W H
AFFILIATIONSUniversity of Manchester
ORCID0000-0003-3000-9519
VERIFIEDYes
TOTAL WORKS5
TOTAL CITATIONS17
AUTHOR COUNT5
EDITOR COUNT0
FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR1998
LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR2021
H-INDEX2
  • Intersecting Lorenz curves and aversion to inverse downside inequality

    Open Access•W Henry Chiu•ARTICLE•Social Choice and Welfare•2021

    This paper defines and characterizes the concept of an increase in inverse downside inequality and show that, when the Lorenz curves of two income distributions intersect, how the change from one distribution to the other is judged by an inequality index exhibiting inverse downside inequality aversion often depends on the relative strengths of its aversion to inverse downside inequality and inequality aversion. For the class of linear inequality …

  • Comparative statics in an ordinal theory of choice under risk

    Open Access•W Henry Chiu•ARTICLE•Mathematical Social Sciences•2019•References: 29

  • The Political Economy of Rule Evasion and Policy Reform

    Open Access•W Henry Chiu•ARTICLE•The Economic Journal•2004•Cited by: 1

    The book starts with an interesting anecdote. ‘In Bogota, Colombia, cars stopping at red lights late at night became favoured targets for robbery and carjacking. As a result, nocturnal drivers refused to brake for lights... The Bogota city traffic department responded to these development by legalising the behaviour of drivers: between 11 PM and 2 AM, red lights were eliminated, and replaced with flashing yellow signals’. It goes on to argue that…

  • Endogenous Adverse Selection and Unemployment Insurance

    W Henry Chiu, Edi Karni•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•1998•Cited by: 5•References: 3

    In this paper we consider how the presence of private information may explain the failure of the private sector to provide unemployment insurance. In particular, we show how the interaction of private information regarding employees' preferences for work with the unobservable level of effort exerted on the job may explain the absence of private unemployment insurance. We also reflect on the implications of our findings for the role of the public …

  • Income Inequality, Human Capital Accumulation and Economic Performance

    Open Access•W Henry Chiu•ARTICLE•The Economic Journal•1998•Cited by: 11•References: 1

    Journal Article Income Inequality, Human Capital Accumulation and Economic Performance Get access W. H. Chiu W. H. Chiu University of Manchester Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Economic Journal, Volume 108, Issue 446, 1 January 1998, Pages 44–59, https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0297.00272 Published: 27 December 2001

  • Income Inequality, Human Capital Accumulation and Economic Performance

    Open Access•W Henry Chiu•ARTICLE•The Economic Journal•1998•Cited by: 11•References: 1

    Journal Article Income Inequality, Human Capital Accumulation and Economic Performance Get access W. H. Chiu W. H. Chiu University of Manchester Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Economic Journal, Volume 108, Issue 446, 1 January 1998, Pages 44–59, https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0297.00272 Published: 27 December 2001

  • Endogenous Adverse Selection and Unemployment Insurance

    W Henry Chiu, Edi Karni•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•1998•Cited by: 5•References: 3

    In this paper we consider how the presence of private information may explain the failure of the private sector to provide unemployment insurance. In particular, we show how the interaction of private information regarding employees' preferences for work with the unobservable level of effort exerted on the job may explain the absence of private unemployment insurance. We also reflect on the implications of our findings for the role of the public …

  • The Political Economy of Rule Evasion and Policy Reform

    Open Access•W Henry Chiu•ARTICLE•The Economic Journal•2004•Cited by: 1

    The book starts with an interesting anecdote. ‘In Bogota, Colombia, cars stopping at red lights late at night became favoured targets for robbery and carjacking. As a result, nocturnal drivers refused to brake for lights... The Bogota city traffic department responded to these development by legalising the behaviour of drivers: between 11 PM and 2 AM, red lights were eliminated, and replaced with flashing yellow signals’. It goes on to argue that…

  • Endogenous Adverse Selection and Unemployment Insurance

    W Henry Chiu, Edi Karni•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•1998•Cited by: 5•References: 3

    In this paper we consider how the presence of private information may explain the failure of the private sector to provide unemployment insurance. In particular, we show how the interaction of private information regarding employees' preferences for work with the unobservable level of effort exerted on the job may explain the absence of private unemployment insurance. We also reflect on the implications of our findings for the role of the public …

  • Income Inequality, Human Capital Accumulation and Economic Performance

    Open Access•W Henry Chiu•ARTICLE•The Economic Journal•1998•Cited by: 11•References: 1

    Journal Article Income Inequality, Human Capital Accumulation and Economic Performance Get access W. H. Chiu W. H. Chiu University of Manchester Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Economic Journal, Volume 108, Issue 446, 1 January 1998, Pages 44–59, https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0297.00272 Published: 27 December 2001

  • The Political Economy of Rule Evasion and Policy Reform

    Open Access•W Henry Chiu•ARTICLE•The Economic Journal•2004•Cited by: 1

    The book starts with an interesting anecdote. ‘In Bogota, Colombia, cars stopping at red lights late at night became favoured targets for robbery and carjacking. As a result, nocturnal drivers refused to brake for lights... The Bogota city traffic department responded to these development by legalising the behaviour of drivers: between 11 PM and 2 AM, red lights were eliminated, and replaced with flashing yellow signals’. It goes on to argue that…

  • Comparative statics in an ordinal theory of choice under risk

    Open Access•W Henry Chiu•ARTICLE•Mathematical Social Sciences•2019•References: 29

  • Intersecting Lorenz curves and aversion to inverse downside inequality

    Open Access•W Henry Chiu•ARTICLE•Social Choice and Welfare•2021

    This paper defines and characterizes the concept of an increase in inverse downside inequality and show that, when the Lorenz curves of two income distributions intersect, how the change from one distribution to the other is judged by an inequality index exhibiting inverse downside inequality aversion often depends on the relative strengths of its aversion to inverse downside inequality and inequality aversion. For the class of linear inequality …

Economics (5 works) · Econometrics (3 works) · Business (2 works) · Economic growth (2 works) · Economic inequality (2 works) · Economic theories and models (2 works) · Income, Poverty, and Inequality (2 works) · Inequality (2 works) · Mathematics (2 works) · Actuarial science (1 works)

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